McGraw v. Director of Postal Data Center

• Decision Date: 18 September 1975
• Docket Number: No. 10404,10404
• Citation: 319 So.2d 797
• Parties: Sidney J. McGRAW v. DIRECTOR OF POSTAL DATA CENTER et al.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Page 797

319 So.2d 797

Sidney J. McGRAW v. DIRECTOR OF POSTAL DATA CENTER et al.

No. 10404.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

Sept. 18, 1975.

Jonathan C. Harris, Baton Rouge, for appellant.

Marion Weimer and James A. McGraw, Baton Rouge, for appellees.

Before LANDRY, BLANCHE and BAILES, JJ.

LANDRY, Judge.

Plaintiff (Appellant) appeals from judgment affirming his disqualification for unemployment insurance benefits upon a finding that Appellant's election to accept optional retirement from a position with the United States Postal Department (Employer) does not constitute good cause for leaving one's employment as required by LSA-R.S. 23:1601(1). We affirm.

On December 28, 1973, Appellant voluntarily opted to resign his employment as Dispatcher and Distribution Expediter by his said employer. Appellant, then 61 years of age, did not face mandatory retirement until age 70. The reason Appellant assigned for taking 'early retirement' was to take advantage of increased retirement benefits.

Upon being notified of Appellant's application for benefits, Employer filed its form ES--931 with the State Employment Security Department (Department), which form recites:

'Optional Retirement. Employee retiring in order to receive cost of living increase to retirement annuity.'

After a hearing, the Department concluded Appellant had not left his employment for good cause connected therewith. Said determination was predicated upon the following specific factual findings:

'You voluntarily retired from your employment to take advantage of a cost of living retirement benefit.

Your leaving was for a personal reason and not good cause connected with the employment.'

The Department's determination of disqualification was affirmed by the Board of Review.

It is conceded that prior to November, 1973, an employee like Appellant, who worked past the effective date of a cost of living increase to pensioners, was not eligible for such increases. While this regulation was in effect, an employee who retired to take advantage of an increase in retirement benefits was considered to have been induced to retire and was therefore deemed to have retired for good cause connected with his employment. An employee who resigned under such circumstances was not disqualified from unemployment insurance benefits.

Public Law 93--136, approved October 24, 1973, changed the above policy by providing that henceforth an employee retiring after the effective date of a cost of living increase would nevertheless receive the benefits of such increase in computing his annuity. Because of this change favorable to a retiring employee, an employee who retires after the effective date of Public Law 93--136 is deemed not to have been induced to retire, and therefore considered to have left his employment without good cause connected therewith. Consequently, such an employee is disqualified for unemployment insurance benefits.

Appellant correctly argues that applicable Federal regulations provide that the findings of a Federal agency employer as to an employee's reasons for termination are final and conclusive upon state agencies charged with the duty of determining eligibility for state unemployment insurance benefits. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1367 expressly so provides. Our own courts have followed this guiding principle, Thompson v. Brown, La.App., 157 So.2d 239 (1963).

First, Appellant maintains he was induced to retire to be eligible for larger retirement benefits. He urges that this finding was made by his employer and is conclusive. Therefore, according to Appellant, he is entitled to unemployment insurance...