McGraw v. State
Decision Date | 12 May 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 1176S374,1176S374 |
Citation | 375 N.E.2d 1099,268 Ind. 386 |
Parties | James McGRAW, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Ernie S. Burke, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Kenneth R. Stamm, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Appellant McGraw was convicted by a jury in the Marion Criminal Court on April 20, 1976, of commission of a felony, robbery, while armed. He was sentenced to imprisonment for a determinate period of twelve years.
Appellant raises two issues to be reviewed by this court: (1) whether the trial court erred in giving its instruction on reasonable doubt, and; (2) whether the verdict is supported by sufficient evidence.
Over objection of appellant, the trial court gave as preliminary instruction No. 5 the following instruction on reasonable doubt
Appellant tendered, as his instruction No. 1, an instruction on reasonable doubt which was refused by the court. It read as follows:
The position of the appellant is that the court attempted to improve upon the accepted language of his instruction No. 1 by substituting language that was misleading, and thus failed to define reasonable doubt. It is true that appellant's instruction No. 1 represented the standard "boilerplate" definition of reasonable doubt which has been long and many times approved. This court was faced with a similar situation in Brown v. State (1977), Ind., 360 N.E.2d 830. In that case, the reasonable doubt instruction given by the court was as follows:
The appellant in Brown also urged that the trial court erred by not giving the standard instruction, represented in the present case by defendant's instruction No. 1. This court held, however, that the omission of such language could not be considered reversible error. The reason given, as stated at 360 N.E.2d at 836, was that:
We find the reasoning in Brown to be dispositive of the present issue. All of the elements of the definition of reasonable doubt are contained in the court's instruction No. 5, and the jury was properly and adequately instructed on the subject.
Appellant next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of commission of a felony, robbery, while armed. The record shows that on February 6, 1976, Donna Cook was in the office of the D & B Auto Sales, a used car business owned by herself and her husband. A lone, young black man came in the door and started to approach the counter. There was a large collie puppy in a cage in the office. The dog jumped up when the man came in. There was a conversation then between Mrs. Cook and the man, concerning the safety of entering the office and the ability of the dog to get out of the cage. Mrs. Cook...
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Oglesby v. State
...the witness is the victim. Greenlee, 463 N.E.2d at 1097; Lamb v. State (1984), Ind., 462 N.E.2d 1025, 1028; McGraw v. State (1978), 268 Ind. 386, 391-92, 375 N.E.2d 1099, 1101-02. Oglesby suggests his alibi establishes a record stronger than the victim's identification of him. Oglesby claim......