McGreal v. Vill. of Orland Park, Case No. 12 C 5135
| Decision Date | 15 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 12 C 5135 |
| Parties | JOSEPH S. MCGREAL, Plaintiff, v. THE VILLAGE OF ORLAND PARK, TIMOTHY MCCARTHY, PATRICK DUGAN, and JAMES BIANCHI, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
OPINION AND ORDER
In his second amended complaint,1 Joseph McGreal alleges under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the Village of Orland Park (the Village) and three members of its Police Department (OPPD), Timothy McCarthy, Patrick Dugan, and James Bianchi, terminated his employment without a proper pre-termination hearing, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process right (count I) and in retaliation for his union activities in violation of his First Amendment rights to freedom of association (count II) and speech (count III). (Dkt. 89.) He also alleges a Monell policy claim based on Chief McCarthy's longstanding practice of failing to adequately train,supervise, and discipline its employees (count IV),2 as well as state law tort claims of interference with advantageous business relationship (count V), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (count VIII). (Id.) McGreal alleges that the Village is vicariously liable for the state law claims against its employees (count VI) and required under Illinois law to indemnify them for any judgment entered against them (count VII).3 (Id.) The defendants' motion for summary judgment on all counts is now before the court. (Dkt. 202.) For the reasons stated below, defendants' motion (dkt. 202) is granted.
Summary judgment obviates the need for a trial where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). To determine whether a genuine fact issue exists, the court must pierce the pleadings and assess the proof as presented in depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits that are part of the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In doing so, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007). The court may not weigh conflicting evidence ormake credibility determinations. Omnicare, 629 F.3d at 704.
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of proving there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). In response, the non-moving party cannot rest on bare pleadings alone but must designate specific material facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324; Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 2000). If a claim or defense is factually unsupported, it should be disposed of on summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24.
Unless otherwise noted, the facts set out below are taken from the parties' Local Rule 56.1 statements and are construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. The court will address many but not all of the facts included in the parties' submissions, as the court is "not bound to discuss in detail every single factual allegation put forth at the summary judgment stage." Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 704 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). In accordance with regular practice, it has considered the parties' objections to the statements of fact and includes in this background only those portions of the statements and responses that are appropriately supported and relevant to the resolution of this motion. Any facts that are not controverted as required by Local Rule 56.1 are deemed admitted.
Preparation of this opinion has been made particularly difficult by plaintiff's counsel's failure to comply with Local Rule 56.1 in preparing and responding to statements of material facts. This court's standing order directs counsel to read Malec v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D. 581 (N.D. Ill. 2000), before submitting summary judgment filings. Although counsel are not new to federal court litigation, they have apparently not recently reviewed Malec, since theirsubmissions are largely inconsistent with the helpful guidance in the case: (1) a response to a movant's statement of facts is neither the place for argument nor additional facts that do not actually dispute the factual statement; (2) "supporting documents submitted with a motion that are not referred to in the statement of facts will be ignored"; (3) the paragraphs in a statement of facts should be short and not argumentative or conclusory; (4) paragraphs also must contain specific references that support the factual allegation and the specific references provided should not be so voluminous that they send the court on a wild goose chase; and (5) the memorandum of law should cite back to the statement of facts as opposed to record citations. See id. at 583-86. Frankly, the motion could have been granted by simply rejecting plaintiff's Local Rule 56.1 submissions. The court has done its best, however, to winnow the facts to those supported by the record in order that the case can be resolved on the merits.
Joseph McGreal was a full-time officer with OPPD from January 10, 2005 until June 28, 2010, when his employment was terminated. (Dkt. 215-1 (Defendants' Corrected Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Material Facts (Defs.' LR 56.1)) ¶ 1.) The events that form the basis for the issues before the court run from August 2009 through McGreal's termination approximately nine months later. During that period, Timothy McCarthy was OPPD's Chief of Police; Thomas Kenealy was Patrol Division Commander; Patrick Duggan and James Bianchi were lieutenants; Paul Grimes was Village Manager.
During 2008, McGreal was elected secretary of the Metropolitan Alliance of Police Local #159, the union representing the Village's police officers. (See dkt. 220-2, McGreal's Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Additional Facts (McGreal's LR 56.1) ¶ 1; see also Defs.' LR 56.1, Ex. G1 (dkt. 215-28) (McGreal to Kenealy, Step 1 Grievance #2010-06) at 1.) As a Local #159member and leader, McGreal claims to have engaged in representation of several officers in grievance matters and in advocacy for the collective bargaining rights of union members. (McGreal to Kenealy, Step 1 Grievance #2010-06 at 1.)
Although McGreal had in all previous performance evaluations been favorably rated, at some point during 2009 conflict arose, leading to an "Interrogation" of McGreal on January 21, 2010, regarding certain instances of conduct on the job.4 The first incident of consequence to this litigation occurred on August 20, 2009, and related to McGreal's conduct regarding whether he should represent another OPPD officer when that officer was lodging a complaint about a fellow officer. (See McGreal to Kenealy, Step 1 Grievance #2010-06 at 10; see also McGreal's LR 56.1, Ex. 253 (dkt. 220-20) at 25.) The parties have not pointed the court to evidence that any disciplinary investigation of the incident was initiated at that time. The next incident was an October 27, 2009 traffic stop of Charles Robson, which OPPD questioned as to whether the stop and follow-up paperwork were done properly. OPPD undertook an investigation of this incident on November 23, 2009. .)
Around the same time as the Robson stop, the Village made it publicly known that it was having financial difficulties (McGreal's LR 56.1 ¶ 7) and on November 2, 2009, it held a boardmeeting to discuss those difficulties (id. ¶ 9).5 McGreal attended that meeting on behalf of Local #159 and presented written recommendations to eliminate certain newly-created, non-essential positions, eliminate the take-home squad car program for everyone but the Chief, Deputy Chief, and Investigations Lieutenant, and offer a new longevity benefit to police officers.6 (Id. ¶ 11; see also id., Ex. 74 (dkt. 220-16).) All of the individual defendants (McCarthy, Bianchi and Duggan) deny knowing that McGreal made this presentation, and McGreal does not dispute their denial. (Defs.' LR 56.1 ¶ 23; McGreal's Resp. LR 56.1 ¶ 23.)
In the days that followed the board meeting, three more incidents occurred. On November 5, 2009, McGreal was believed to have improperly run the license plate on Commander Kenealy's personal vehicle. (See McGreal's LR 56.1, Ex. 253 at 31-33; McGreal to Kenealy, Step 1 Grievance #2010-06 at 12-13.) On November 7, 2009, McGreal took part in a high-speed pursuit that his superiors considered unauthorized and reckless. (See Defs.' LR 56.1 ¶¶ 100-01.) McGreal participated in another pursuit on November 9, 2009, that was similarly characterized by OPPD as unauthorized. (Defs.' Resp. LR 56.1 ¶ 20.) McGreal contends that his conduct was not improper in either incident. (See McGreal's LR 56.1 ¶¶ 17, 20.)
At an unspecified time, these incidents became part of an OPPD investigation of McGreal's conduct which entailed an interrogation of McGreal on January 21, 2010. (See Defs.' LR 56.1, Ex. C-57 (dkt 215-13).) (There were other incidents subject to the investigation but these are identified because they are most relevant as they are closest in time to McGreal'spresentation to the Village Board.7)
On January 21and March 24, 2010, McGreal was questioned regarding "each and every incident that ultimately led to his termination." (Id. ¶¶ 7, 9.) Prior to each of these interrogations, the Village provided McGreal with a written notice that identified the incidents that would be discussed.8 (Id. ¶ 8,9 Ex. C-57 at ...
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