McGrew v. Duncan
| Decision Date | 10 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 16-10978 |
| Citation | 333 F.Supp.3d 730 |
| Parties | Katrina MCGREW, Plaintiff, v. Sergeant DUNCAN, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Keith L. Altman, Solomon M. Radner, Excolo Law PLLC, Southfield, MI, for Plaintiff.
Patrick M. Cunningham, City of Detroit Law Department, Detroit, MI, for Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [# 41]
On March 17, 2016, Plaintiff Katrina McGrew ("McGrew") brought this action against Defendants Sergeant Duncan ("Duncan"), Ramson Williams ("Williams"), D. Brents ("Brents"), Lynn Moore ("Moore"), S. Kue ("Kue"), E. Jackson ("Jackson"), D. Harnphanich ("Harnphanich"), W. Zeolla ("Zeolla"), John Doe Officers, and the Detroit Police Department ("DPD") (collectively "Defendants"). (Doc # 1) McGrew's allegations against Defendants include Use of Excessive Force against McGrew in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I), Battery (Count II), Assault (Count III), Conversion (Count IV), Statutory Conversion ( M.C.L. 600.2919a ) (Count V), and Intentional Infliction of Emotion Distress (Count VI). (Doc # 1, Pg. 6–10) McGrew seeks the restoration of her property seized by Defendants, full and compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorney's fees and costs, and any other relief the Court sees just and proper. Id.
A Scheduling Order was issued by the Court on November 8, 2016, which ordered that discovery was to be complete on March 8, 2017. (Doc # 9) Pursuant to a Stipulation and Order Amending the Scheduling Order, a new deadline for completion of discovery was set for May 8, 2017. (Doc # 18) McGrew filed a Motion for Sanctions and to Compel Discovery on May 1, 2017. (Doc # 19) McGrew's Motion to Compel Discovery was granted in part, and deferred in part, by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford ("Magistrate Judge Stafford"). (Doc # 25) Pursuant to a Stipulation and Order, the Scheduling Order was modified to extend all deadlines. August 4, 2017 was the deadline for completion of Discovery. (Doc # 26) September 5, 2017 was the dispositive motion deadline. Id. McGrew also filed a Motion for Leave to file an Amended Complaint on July 20, 2017. (Doc # 28) On August 22, 2017, Magistrate Judge Stafford issued an Order denying McGrew's Motion for Leave to file an Amended Complaint, and granting in part McGrew's previously deferred portions of her Motion to Compel Discovery. (Doc # 36)
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed on September 5, 2017. (Doc # 40) McGrew filed a Response on September 26, 2017. (Doc # 45) Defendants did not file a Reply.
For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART .
On November 26 2014, a warrant was issued for the search of 18744 Glastonbury in the Detroit, Michigan. (Doc # 41-2) A group of Detroit Police Officers including Sergeant Duncan and Officers Williams, Brents, Moore, Kue, Jackson, Harnphanich, and Zeolla, executed the search warrant the same day. According to McGrew, the group of officers forcefully entered her home sometime between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. (Doc # 41-3, Pg. 25, 28:22-29:5)
McGrew stated that all of the officers wore all black, and that she could only see their eyes. (Id. , Pg. 26, 29:20-30:11) It is undisputed that one of the officers threw her down and handcuffed her during the search. (Id. , 29:13-15) McGrew asserts that she told the officer who threw her down the handcuffs were too tight (Id. , Pg. 29, 32:3-32:7), and he replied saying "shut up, bitch, you shouldn't be so fat." (Id. , Pg. 33, 33:4-33:9) She described the officer as a "light-skinned" black man, with a medium build, and approximately six feet, two inches tall. (Id. , Pg. 29, 29:20-30:11)
The officers seized a .380 caliber pistol and brown paper bag of marijuana. (Doc # 41-2) McGrew alleges that some of her other personal property went missing after the raid. Specifically, she alleges that a Samsung Galaxy S4 tablet, a pair of diamond earrings, a Galaxy S5 cell phone, and a Kahr 9 millimeter pistol were missing after the raid. (Doc# 1, Pg. 5, ¶¶ 31-33)
McGrew did not see any of the officers with her Galaxy S4 tablet, the Galaxy S5 cellphone, her diamond earrings, or her Kahr pistol. She did see the officers with her Ruger handgun. (Id. , Pg. 33, 36:18-20) McGrew last saw the tablet and cell phone when she put them in a drawer a week or two after she moved into 18744 Glastonbury on October 1, 2014. (Id. , Pg. 49, 49:25-50:1; 12:10-13) She could not remember when she had last seen her diamond earrings. (Id. , Pg. 45, 46:4-12) She had last seen her Kahr pistol a week before the search warrant was executed. (Id. , 47:3-4)
After the execution of the warrant, McGrew was treated for her wrist injury at Henry Ford Hospital. (Id. , Pg. 21-22, 24:19-25:15) Her medical records reflect the presence of ecchymosis (bruising) on her right wrist. (Doc # 41-4) She was not diagnosed with any medical condition related to her wrist. McGrew testified that she did not suffer any physical injuries other than to her wrists. (Doc # 41-3, Pg. 37, 39:1-7)
The Court will grant summary judgment if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 250-57, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is material if it could affect the outcome of the case based on the governing substantive law. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A dispute about a material fact is genuine if, on review of the evidence, a reasonable jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party. Id.
The moving party bears the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the movant meets this burden, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and ... designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The Court may grant a motion for summary judgment if the nonmoving party who has the burden of proof at trial fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element that is essential to that party's case. See Muncie Power Prods., Inc. v. United Tech. Auto., Inc. , 328 F.3d 870, 873 (6th Cir. 2003). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "Conclusory allegations do not create a genuine issue of material fact which precludes summary judgment." Johari v. Big Easy Restaurants, Inc. , 78 Fed.Appx. 546, 548 (6th Cir. 2003).
When reviewing a summary judgment motion, the Court must view the evidence and all inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Kochins v. Linden-Alimak, Inc. , 799 F.2d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir. 1986). The Court "need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). The Court's function at the summary judgment stage "is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
Each Defendant officer argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim against him. McGrew argues that the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity because a material issue of fact exists as to whether the officers' conduct in handcuffing her was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity where their actions do not "violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Greene v. Reeves , 80 F.3d 1101, 1104 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) ). A government official will not be immune if, on an objective basis, it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that the action at issue was lawful; but if an officer of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should be recognized. Malley v. Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). Qualified immunity is an initial threshold question the court is required to rule on early in the proceeding so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is dispositive. Saucier v. Katz , 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). Qualified immunity is "an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation." Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). The privilege is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Id.
The first inquiry to determine qualified immunity is whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the facts alleged show the official's conduct violated a constitutional right. Siegert v. Gilley , 500 U.S. 226, 232, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991). If no constitutional right would have been violated, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity. Saucier , 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. If a violation could be made out, the next step is to determine whether the right was clearly established in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposit...
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