McGuffey v. McClain
Decision Date | 16 February 1892 |
Docket Number | 15,505 |
Citation | 30 N.E. 296,130 Ind. 327 |
Parties | McGuffey v. McClain et al |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Blackford Circuit Court.
Judgment affirmed.
G. W Steele and J. A. Kersey, for appellant.
W. H Carroll, G. D. Dean, J. Cantwell and S.D. Cantwell, for appellees.
Margaret McGuffey brought the suit out of which this appeal grows to foreclose a mortgage executed by James J. Maddux and others. The appellees came in as intervenors, and filed a cross-complaint. Before the submission of the cause for trial upon the issue joined on the cross-complaint, judgment was rendered on the complaint against the mortgagors, and the amount adjudged the mortgagee was paid into court. The issue joined upon the cross complaint was decided in favor of the appellees, and they were decreed entitled to a lien upon the money paid into court by the mortgagors. As appears from our synopsis of the case, the questions here are between the intervenors and the mortgagee. The first of these questions arises on the ruling of the court holding good the cross-complaint of the intervenors.
The cross-complaint states these material facts: Amanda J. McClain is the wife of her co-intervenor, Walker H. McClain, and was his wife prior to the 20th day of March, 1883. On that day she was the owner of a certificate of purchase issued to her by a commissioner authorized to sell real estate, and on the same day she assigned the certificate to William Carroll. She and her husband executed to Carroll a mortgage on the property here the subject of controversy, to secure him against loss, there being some doubt as to the validity of the title to the land held under the commissioner's certificate. Subsequently the intervenors sold the land embraced in the mortgage to the appellant, Margaret McGuffey, by whom it was sold to the mortgagors, Maddux and others. At the time of the sale to Margaret McGuffey the intervenors placed in her hands promissory notes and accounts to the value of four hundred dollars, to secure her from loss by reason of the indemnifying mortgage executed to Carroll. The notes and accounts were delivered pursuant to a written agreement, wherein the appellant undertook to collect the notes and accounts and to properly apply the avails. The notes and accounts were collected, and the appellant appropriated the proceeds. The indemnifying mortgage executed to Carroll was released and satisfaction entered of record. The appellant, Margaret McGuffey, and her husband, are not residents of the State of Indiana. The suit against the mortgagors was brought to collect the purchase-money due from the mortgagors to Margaret McGuffey.
We have no doubt that the matters stated in the cross-complaint are so connected with the main controversy as to entitle the appellees to intervene, provided their cross-complaint shows a right of action. The controversy is as to who is entitled to the purchase-money of the same parcel of land. The theory of Amanda J. McClain is that she is entitled in equity to the purchase-money, because she was the original owner of the land, and is the person to whom the money is owing. If the cross-complaint shows a right of action, that right is necessarily connected with the original controversy, and that controversy, with all its incidents, was before the court for adjudication. We think there is no strength in the contention that there was no jurisdiction in the trial court to determine whether the McClains or the McGuffeys were entitled to the unpaid purchase-money due from the mortgagors of McGuffey. Jurisdiction may exist where there is no right of action, for jurisdiction is nothing more than judicial authority over a general subject.
The real question in the case is whether the cross-complaint shows a right of action in the appellees. If, as the demurrer confesses, the appellant appropriated the proceeds of the notes and accounts deposited with her as collateral security, Amanda J. McClain is entitled to recover the money so collected and appropriated in some form of action. There can be no doubt that there is a valid claim against the appellant, for she has money in her hands that belongs to Mrs. McClain. The only possible doubt is as to the remedy; there can be none as to the primary right.
The right of the appellee Amanda McClain to the money being clear and undoubted, the nature and origin of the right are only important as affecting the question of the remedy, but upon that question the origin and nature of the right are important considerations. We think the origin and nature of her right are such as to give her an equitable claim upon the proceeds realized upon the mortgage executed to the appellant, Margaret McGuffey. Mrs. McClain owned the land, and the money...
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