McGuigen's Estate, In re

• Decision Date: 15 April 1957
• Citation: 131 A.2d 124,388 Pa. 475
• Parties: In re ESTATE of Lou B. McGUIGEN, Deceased. Appeal of Mrs. Lee J. BRADBURN. Appeal of Carrie M. SHALLENBERGER
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 124

131 A.2d 124

388 Pa. 475

In re ESTATE of Lou B. McGUIGEN, Deceased Appeal of Mrs. Lee J. BRADBURN Appeal of Carrie M. SHALLENBERGER

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

April 15, 1957.

James M. McIntyre, N. L. Wymard, Pittsburgh, for Mrs. Lee J. Bradburn, appellant.

John A. Metz, Jr., Metz, McClure & MacAlister, Pittsburgh, for Carrie McDonald Shallenberger, appellant.

Williams H. Eckert, Jack G. Armstrong, Smith, Buchanan, Ingersoll, Rodewald & Eckert, Thomas P. Trimble, Jr., Pittsburgh, for appellee.

Emerson G. Hess, Jr., Pittsburgh, for accountant.

Before JONES, C. J., and BELL, CHIDSEY, MUSMANNO, ARNOLD, JONES and COHEN, JJ.

BELL, Justice.

The question involved is narrow: What, if any, effect did § 7(1) of the Wills Act of 1947 have upon the residuary gift contained in testatrix's last will?

Testatrix died on August 17, 1955. In her last will dated August 12, 1955, after giving a number of pecuniary and specific legacies and providing for the upkeep of her husband's grave, she provided: 'Seventeenth: All the rest and residue of my estate, I direct my Executor hereinafter named to convert into cash and distribute the same to Heart House, Valencia, Pennsylvania, for the general purposes of this organization.' She specifically revoked 'any Will or Wills by me at any time heretofore made.'

Testatrix by a prior will dated May 22, 1953, after making a number of pecuniary gifts and providing a fund for the maintenance of the grave of her husband and her mother, gave her residuary estate to 'Peoples First National Bank & Trust Company * * * as Trustee under the following Trusts.

'1. Trusts.

'A. My Trustee shall hold the balance of the principal of the trust estate in perpetual trust and shall pay the net income therefrom in convenient installments to Heart House, Valencia, Pennsylvania, for the general purposes of this organization.'

Prior to the Act of 1947 the law of Pennsylvania was clearly settled that the residuary gift contained in testatrix's last will of 1955 was void under § 6 of the Wills Act of 1917, P.L. 403, 20 P.S. § 195 (because of testatrix's death within 30 days), and the property devised therein to Heart House would not have gone to Heart House under this will or the prior will of 1953 but would have gone to testatrix's heirs or next of kin: In re Hartman's Estate, 320 Pa. 321, 182 A. 234; In re McClure's Estate, 309 Pa. 370, 165 A.24. Cf. In re Melville's Estate, 245 Pa. 318, 91 A. 679, L.R.A.1916C, 98; In re Braun's Estate, 358 Pa. 271, 56 A.2d 201.

In Re Hartman's Estate, 320 Pa. 321, 182 A. 234, supra, testatrix by a will dated July 28, 1932, bequeathed directly to the White Memorial Congregational Church of Milroy, Pennsylvania, the sum of $500, and then gave her residuary estate to said Church. The will expressly revoked all prior wills. Testatrix died the next day. Testatrix had made a prior will dated July 29, 1931, in which she gave, inter alia, $500. to the White Memorial Congregational Church of Milroy and after certain other specific gifts, gave the balance of her personal estate to said Church. This Court held that under the Act of 1917 and the prior Wills Acts of 1911 and 1855, the church could not take under either will. The Court said, 320 Pa. at pages 330-331, 182 A. at page 238: 'Charitable or religious institutions claiming bequests or devises must bring themselves [strictly and literally] within it [the Act]. * * * The act establishes and unbending rule and fixes an arbitrary period within which such dispositions of property, whether by deed or by will, shall be absolutely barred. Such bequests, under the circumstances, [death within the 30 day period] fail because of the incapacity in the beneficiaries to take. * * * The act provides that the voided legacies shall in the first place go to the residuary legatee or devisee. In the present case the bequest of the residuary estate is void for the same reason as the other charitable bequests, and hence the fund cannot pass to the residuary legatee but must necessarily go 'to the next of kin and heir-at-law."

The reason for the law prior to 1947 was clear. The basic purpose of the 30 day requirement was and is to prevent a testator during his last illness from being importuned or otherwise influenced, by hope of reward or fear of punishment in the hereafter, to leave his estate in whole or in part to charity or to church. Since it would often be difficult to prove whether a man was in his last illness, or whether he had been importuned, or was unduly influenced by charity or church, or was influenced while in extremis by a sudden hope of Heaven or fear of Hades, the Legislature wisely established a clear, realistic and inflexible time period--30 days. However, society came to realize that gifts to charity or church which were made within the last 30 days of a man's life were not always unduly influenced by charity or church and that the law was unfair to testators, charity and church alike for the above mentioned reason, as well as because of the fact that while in good health a testator might die in a motor, railroad or plane accident within 30 days after making his will. The Legislature therefore decided that the prior statutory law in re charitable gifts should be modified and liberalized, and that gifts to charities and churches which were made within 30 days of death should, at least to a limited extent, be protected and validated where the testator had made a substantially identical charitable gift in a prior extant will.

Section 7(1) of the Wills Act of 1947 ¹ reads:

'Wills shall be modified upon the occurrence of any of the following circumstances, among others:

'(1) Death within thirty days.--Religious and charitable gifts. Any bequest or devise for religious or charitable purposes included in a will or codicil executed within thirty days of the death of the testator shall be invalid unless all who would benefit by its invalidity agree that it shall be valid. The thirty-day period shall be so computed as to include the day on which the will or codicil is written and to exclude the day of death. Unless the testator directs otherwise, if such a will or codicil shall revoke or supersede a prior will or codicil executed at least thirty days before the testator's death, and not theretofore revoked or superseded and the original of which can be produced in legible condition, and if each instrument shall contain an identical gift for substantially the same religious or charitable purpose, the gift in the later will or codicil shall be valid; or if each instrument shall give for substantially the same religious or charitable purpose a cash legacy or a share of the residuary estate or a share of the same asset, payable immediately or subject to identical prior estates and conditions, the later gift shall be valid to the extent to which it shall not exceed the prior gift.' ²

Testatrix, under the 1953 will, gave her residuary estate of approximately $141,000 to a trustee to pay the net income in perpetuity to Heart House 'for the general purposes of this organization'; in the last will of 1955, testatrix gave her residuary estate of approximately $94,000., absolutely to Heart House 'for the general purposes of this organization'.

The appellants who are claiming as next of kin, admit that the two wills contain gifts 'for substantially the same charitable purpose' but contend that the two wills do not contain an identical gift, nor the same share of the residuary estate and consequently do not fall within the exception of the Wills Act of 1947. Expressed in another way, appellants contend that the Act of 1947 was intended to preserve and validate charitable gifts made within the prohibited 30 days' period only where the gifts in the last will and in a prior will differed in quantity--not quality--of estate, and then only 'to the extent to which it shall not...