McGuire v. Davidson Mfg. Corp.

• Decision Date: 08 January 2003
• Docket Number: No. C01-4063-PAX.,C01-4063-PAX.
• Citation: 238 F.Supp.2d 1096
• Parties: Michael McGUIRE and Elaine McGuire, and Michael McGuire as Natural Father and Next Friend of Colleen McGuire, a Minor, Plaintiffs, v. DAVIDSON MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, and Louisville Ladder Group LLC, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

Page 1096

238 F.Supp.2d 1096

Michael McGUIRE and Elaine McGuire, and Michael McGuire as Natural Father and Next Friend of Colleen McGuire, a Minor, Plaintiffs, v. DAVIDSON MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, and Louisville Ladder Group LLC, Defendants.

No. C01-4063-PAX.

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Western Division.

January 8, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Martin E. Spellman, Christine Marie Creighton, Spellman, Spellman, Spellman, Spellman, Kealhofer & Spellman, Perry, IA, Michael Figenshaw, Bradshaw Fowler Proctor Fairgrave, Des Moines, IA, E. Terry Sibbernsen, E. Terry Sibbernsen, PC, Omaha, NE, for Plaintiffs.

Harold D. Dawson, Daniel E. DeKoter, DeKoter, Thole & Dawson, PLC, Sibley, IA, Adam A. Edwards, Blackwell Sanders Peter & Martin, Kansas City, MO, William A. Lynch, Husch & Eppenberger, LLC, Eric E. Packel, Husch & Eppenberger, LLC, Kansas City, MO, for Defendants.

ORDER ON MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY

ZOSS, United States Magistrate Judge.

                TABLE OF CONTENTS
                I. INTRODUCTION ............................................. 1098
                 II. APPLICABLE LAW ........................................... 1099
                III. DISCUSSION ............................................... 1101
                     A. Wood Experts .......................................... 1101
                     B. Engineering Experts ................................... 1104
                 IV. CONCLUSION ............................................... 1104
                

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the court on the motion (Doc. No. 25) of Louisville Ladder Group LLC ("Louisville") to exclude portions of the testimony of the plaintiffs' experts pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), as extended by Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). Louisville filed its motion on December 10, 2002, together with a supporting brief and exhibits (Doc. No. 26). The plaintiffs filed their resistance and a supporting brief on December 26, 2002. (Doc. Nos. 32 & 33) The court held a hearing on the motion on January 6, 2003. The plaintiffs were represented at the hearing by Mark E. Spellman and Michael Figenshaw. Louisville was represented by William A. Lynch, Eric E. Packel, and Daniel DeKoter.

This case arises from an accident in which the plaintiff Michael McGuire fell from a six-foot wooden stepladder. Mr. McGuire proposes to call experts to testify the ladder failed because it was defective. Louisville seeks to prohibit the plaintiffs' experts Glenn Oren and Monlin Kuo, both "wood" experts, "from opining (1) that the wood used in the ladder was brash or brittle due to high temperature drying; and (2) that brash wood caused the accident." (Doc. No. 25, p. 1) Louisville also seeks to prohibit the plaintiffs' experts Jerry Hall and J.B. Sevart, both engineers, "from testifying that any alleged defects caused the accident." (Id.) Louisville claims the experts' opinions are not reliable under the Daubert standards "because the experts failed to apply reliable methodology, failed to test their opinions or submit their opinions to peer review, and based their opinions on conjecture and speculation." (Doc. No. 26, p. 4, citing Daubert and Kumho).

The court first will discuss the standards applicable to Louisville's motion, and then will examine the particular testimony Louisville seeks to exclude from the trial and apply the applicable law to determine whether the testimony should be excluded.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

In a diversity case in federal court, the question of whether expert testimony is admissible is a matter governed by federal, rather than state, law. Clark v. Heidrick, 150 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir.1998) (citing Fox v. Dannenberg, 906 F.2d 1253, 1258 (8th Cir.1990)); see Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Beelman River Terminals, Inc., 254 F.3d 706, 711 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Wheeling").

In Daubert, the Supreme Court explained that under the Federal Rules of Evidence, and particularly Rule 702, a trial judge is charged with a gate-keeping responsibility to ensure all expert testimony or evidence admitted at trial is relevant, reliable, and "`will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.'" Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S.Ct. at 2795 (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 702; emphasis removed). The Court noted an expert witness "is permitted wide latitude to offer opinions, including those that are not based on firsthand knowledge or observation.... Presumably, this relaxation of the usual requirement of firsthand knowledge ... is premised on an assumption that the expert's opinion will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592, 113 S.Ct. at 2796.

When proposed expert testimony is scientific in nature, the trial judge must make "a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93, 113 S.Ct. at 2796. Although the Court expressly declined to set out a definitive checklist or test for making this determination, the Court noted several key areas of inquiry that ordinarily will apply "in determining whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact," including: (1) whether the theory or technique "can be (and has been) tested"; (2) "whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication"; (3) the "known or potential rate of error ... and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation"; and (4) whether the theory or technique has obtained general acceptance within the community. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-95, 113 S.Ct. at 2796-97.

The Court observed that this inquiry is flexible. "Its overarching subject is the scientific validity—and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability—of the principles that underlie a proposed submission. The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95, 113 S.Ct. at 2797. The trial court's ultimate task is to ensure "that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. Pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles will satisfy those demands." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597, 113 S.Ct. at 2799. See United States v. Boswell, 270 F.3d 1200, 1204 (8th Cir. 2001)

In Kumho, the Court extended the Daubert inquiry to all types of expert testimony, not just to scientific testimony. The Court noted that in the trial court's inquiry into the relevance and reliability of expert testimony, the trial court may consider the factors which the Daubert Court suggested might be relevant. Noting that in some cases an expert's personal knowledge or experience may be the focus, as opposed to the scientific foundation of an opinion, the Court held the Daubert factors "may or may not be pertinent in assessing reliability, depending on the nature of the issue, the expert's particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony." Kumho, 526 U.S. at 150, 119 S.Ct. at 1175 (citation omitted). The circumstances of each particular case will determine the precise nature of the inquiry to be undertaken by the trial court in performing its gate-keeping function under Daubert. Id.

The Kumho Court explained further, "The trial court must have the same kind of latitude in deciding how to test an expert's reliability, and to decide whether or when special briefing or other proceedings are needed to investigate reliability, as it enjoys when it decides whether or not that expert's relevant testimony is reliable." Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152, 119 S.Ct. at 1176 (emphasis by the Court).

In its capacity as gatekeeper, the trial court is to "separate[] expert opinion evidence based on `good grounds' from subjective speculation that masquerades as scientific knowledge." Glastetter v. Novartis Phar. Corp., 252 F.3d 986, 989 (8th Cir.2001). Although the trial court has substantial latitude to determine whether offered expert testimony is reliable, the court should keep in mind that Rule 702 reflects a liberalized approach to the admissibility of expert testimony. See U.S. v. Reed & Sons Partnership, 280 F.3d 1212, 1215 (8th Cir.2002) ("Trial courts have substantial latitude to determine whether specific expert testimony is reliable, and they may consider some or all of the factors listed in Daubert ... when evaluating reliability."); In re Air Crash at Little Rock, Ark., 291 F.3d 503, 514 (8th Cir.2002) (same); Lauzon v. Senco Prods., Inc., 270 F.3d 681, 685-86 (8th Cir.2001) ("Rule 702 reflects an attempt to liberalize the rules governing the admission of expert testimony," citing Weisgram v. Marley Co., 169 F.3d 514, 523 (8th Cir.1999)); Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235, 1239 (8th Cir.1991) (Rule 702 is a rule of admissibility rather than exclusion). Trial courts should apply the principle that "[e]xpert testimony is admissible if it is reliable and will help the jury understand the evidence or decide a fact in issue." Hartley v. Dillard's, Inc., 310 F.3d 1054, 1060 (8th Cir.2002). "[D]oubts regarding whether an expert's testimony will be useful should generally be resolved in favor of admissibility." Miles v. Gen. Motors Corp., 262 F.3d 720, 724 (8th Cir.2001) (citing Clark, 150 F.3d at 915). See Lauzon, 270 F.3d at 687 n. 2 (citing numerous authorities). A determination by a trial court to admit expert testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997); Giles v. Miners, Inc., 242 F.3d 810, 812 (8th Cir. 2001).

In Bonner v. ISP Technologies, Inc., 259 F.3d 924, 929 (8th Cir.2001), the court emphasized that the focus under Daubert must be on the expert's principles and methodology, not the conclusions they...