McGuire v. Marshall

• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
• Writing for the Court: W. KEITH WATKINS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Docket Number: 2:19-CV-174-WKW [WO]
• Decision Date: 23 May 2024
• Parties: MICHAEL A. McGUIRE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STEVEN T. MARSHALL, et al., Defendants.
• topic: Civil Rights,Constitutional Law,Ongoing or Prospective Litigation

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MICHAEL A. McGUIRE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. STEVEN T. MARSHALL, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:19-CV-174-WKW [WO]

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division

May 23, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

W KEITH WATKINS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

There is no doubt that a legislature may pass valid laws to protect the public from predators and sexual abuse. Packingham v North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98, 106 (2017). “But the assertion of a valid governmental interest cannot, in every context, be insulated from all constitutional protections.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). This is no less true in the troubling context of a law that “imposes severe restrictions on persons who already have served their sentence and are no longer subject to the supervision of the criminal justice system.” Id. at 107.

Plaintiffs are three adult men who have challenged the facial constitutionality of several provisions of Alabama's sex-offender registry law, the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act (ASORCNA), by which they are required to register as sex offenders. See generally Ala. Code § 15-20A-1 et seq. ASORCNA is one of the most comprehensive and debilitating sex-offender schemes in the nation, affecting every area of Plaintiffs' post-conviction existence. They have sued Steven T. Marshall, the Attorney General of the State of Alabama, as well as Hal Taylor, the Secretary of the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency. They seek declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting enforcement of several of ASORCNA's provisions. Over a dozen claims were dismissed at the motion-to-dismiss stage.^[1] See McGuire v. Marshall, 512 F.Supp.3d 1189 (M.D. Ala. 2021) (Watkins, J.) [hereinafter McGuire II].^[2] The surviving claims are before the court on the parties' dueling motions for summary judgment. (Doc. # 122); (Doc. # 124).

For the reasons to follow, summary judgment will be granted in Defendants' favor for all claims except Plaintiffs' facial First Amendment challenges to ASORCNA's residency provision, Ala. Code § 15-20A-11. Two aspects of that provision are facially unconstitutional. Id. §§ 15-20A-11(a), 15-20A-11(d). Importantly, this opinion does not consider the constitutionality of sex-offender residency restrictions generally, but only aspects of Alabama's residency provision in its current form that plainly fail to survive constitutional review under the First Amendment.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE ........................................................................................... 4

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW .................................................................................................. 5

III. BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................... 6

A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY ............................................................................................. 6

B. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK ....................................................................................... 7

1. The Residency Provision (Ala. Code § 15-20A-11) .................................................... 12

2. The Employment Provision (Ala. Code § 15-20A-13) ................................................ 15

3. The Loitering Provision (Ala. Code § 15-20A-17) ..................................................... 16

4. The ID Provision (Ala. Code § 15-20A-18) ................................................................ 17

5. The Internet Dissemination Provision (Ala. Code § 15-20A-8) ................................. 19

C. FACTS ........................................................................................................................... 20

1. The Plaintiffs and Their Injuries ................................................................................ 20

2. The Plaintiffs' Prior ASORCNA Challenges .............................................................. 24

D. OVERVIEW OF PENDING CLAIMS .......................................................................... 25

IV. DISCUSSION ...................................................................................................................... 27

A. THE RESIDENCY PROVISION (Count 1) .................................................................. 27

1. Standing ...................................................................................................................... 30

2. Claim Preclusion ........................................................................................................ 38

3. Abstention ................................................................................................................... 42

4. Whether the Residency Provision is Overbroad ......................................................... 44

a) Construction of “Reside” and “Overnight Visit” .................................................... 46

b) Substantial Overbreadth .......................................................................................... 71

5. Whether the Residency Provision is Narrowly Tailored ............................................ 88

6. Conclusion and Remedy ........................................................................................... 107

B. THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISION (Count 2) .......................................................... 111

1. Claim Preclusion ...................................................................................................... 114

2. Statute of Limitations ................................................................................................ 116

3. Abstention ................................................................................................................. 117

4. Whether the Employment Provision is Vague .......................................................... 117

a) “No way to know if a location is within the employment zone of exclusion.” .... 120

b) “Whether intermittent working within the zone of exclusion is permitted.” ........ 132

C. THE LOITERING PROVISION (Count 2) ................................................................. 142

1. Abstention ................................................................................................................. 142

2. Statute of Limitations ................................................................................................ 144

3. Whether the Loitering Provision is Vague ............................................................... 145

D. THE ID PROVISION or THE CV606 INDICATOR (Count 3) ................................. 153

E. THE INTERNET DISSEMINATION PROVISION (Count 3) .................................. 159

F. CONCEDED CLAIMS (Counts 4 and 5) .................................................................... 160

V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 161

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Neither personal jurisdiction nor venue is contested, and both are proper. Subject-matter jurisdiction is generally not contested under federal-question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. However, jurisdiction is contested to the extent that Defendants assert that Article III standing has not been met for several claims. The court will address those arguments in its discussion of each claim.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), (c). No genuine dispute of material fact exists if the opposing party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his case as to which he would have the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

Just as important, the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position” is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). In making this assessment, the court must “view all the evidence and all factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 1997), and “resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant,” United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Sun Life Ins. Co. of Am., 894 F.2d 1555, 1558 (11th Cir. 1990).

The applicable Rule 56 standard is not affected by the filing of crossmotions for summary judgment. See, e.g., Am. Bankers Ins. Grp. v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2005). “Cross-motions . . . will not, in themselves, warrant the court in granting summary judgment unless one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not genuinely disputed.” United States v. Oakley, 744 F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (citation omitted). When both parties move for summary judgment, the court must evaluate each motion on its own merits, resolving all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration. See Am. Bankers Ins. Grp., 408 F.3d at 1331.

III. BACKGROUND

The relevant background will be relayed in four parts: (A) procedural history, (B) ASORCNA's statutory framework, (C) facts, and (D) an overview of the pending claims.

A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs initially filed this case in March of 2019. (Doc. # 1.) That same month, the complaint was amended for the first time. (Doc. # 9.) The second amended complaint came in November 2019. (Doc. # 31.)...