McGuire v. Oliver

• Decision Date: 22 September 1969
• Docket Number: No. 11250,11250
• Parties: Rodney W. McGUIRE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James M. OLIVER et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Page 149

227 So.2d 149

Rodney W. McGUIRE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James M. OLIVER et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 11250.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

Sept. 22, 1969.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 20, 1969.

Naff, Kennedy & Goodman, Shreveport, Frank S. Kennedy, Shreveport, of counsel, for appellant.

Hayes, Harkey & Smith, Monroe, Thomas M. Hayes, Jr., Monroe, of counsel, for James M. Oliver and Claude Oliver, defendants-appellees .

Before AYRES, BOLIN, and DIXON, JJ.

AYRES, Judge.

Only concerned in this appeal is a question of the quantum of an award to adequately compensate plaintiff for personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle collision. Plaintiff appealed from an award of $1,150. Defendants contend the award is excessive and, in an answer to the appeal, pray that it be decreased.

The issues are factual matters to be resolved from the record. Difficulties attendant to their resolution are increased by the fact that plaintiff was involved in two additional accidents within a period of 17 days after the occurrence of the first accident which forms the basis of this action. The problem is confused and rendered complex by the fact that plaintiff sustained injuries in all three accidents inasmuch as the principle is well settled that a tort-feasor is liable only for the direct and proximate results of his wrongful acts or of those for whom he is responsible. Waggoner v. Marquette Casualty Company, 181 So.2d 475 (La.App., 2d Cir. 1965); Livaccari v. United Jewish Appeal, Inc., 126 So.2d 67 (La.App ., 4th Cir. 1961--cert. denied); Rainwater v. Timothy, 87 So.2d 11 (La.App., Orls. 1956). Therefore, it is incumbent upon him to establish that the injuries upon which he bases his claim result from acts for which defendants are responsible and not from separate, distinct, and intervening acts with regard to which defendants had neither connection nor responsibility.

The accident out of which this action arose was, as already stated, the first of a series of three. The accident involved occurred on U.S. Highway 80 about five miles west of Tallulah, Louisiana, about 3:00 a.m. September 25, 1966, when the car which plaintiff was driving was sideswiped and seriously damaged by defendant's truck which was proceeding in the opposite direction. The second accident was an intersectional collision at U.S. Highway 80 and Spring Street, in Shreveport, about 11:00 a.m. Saturday, October 1, 1966, when the car in which plaintiff was riding as a guest passenger was struck broadside on its right side by another vehicle. The third accident occurred about 7:00 p.m. Monday, October 11, 1966, when plaintiff fell the length of a metal stair at a dormitory at Louisiana Polytechnic Institute.

Plaintiff's contention that his injuries resulted primarily from the first accident are denied by defendants who assert plaintiff sustained injuries in each of the three accidents and their responsibility extends only to the injuries resulting from the first accident. The record establishes, and there is no contention to the contary, that the three accidents were separate and independent acts . The latter two accidents, so far as the first is concerned, were intervening acts with respect to which defendants are without liability. The question then is: What does the record establish with respect to the nature and extent of the injuries sustained and the pain and suffering undergone by plaintiff in the first accident? A brief review of the facts relating to the occurrence of the accident and the events which subsequently followed would appear to aid in the consideration of this matter.

At the time of the accident plaintiff was a student at Louisiana Polytechnic Institute in Ruston, Louisiana. On Saturday, September 24, 1966, the day before the accident, plaintiff had driven his Mustang automobile from Ruston to Jackson, Mississippi, where he visited a friend. He left Jackson about 12:30 a.m. Sunday, September 25, 1966, on his return trip to Louisiana Tech. When approximately five miles west of Tallulah, on U.S. Highway 80, about 3:00 a.m., as aforementioned, plaintiff's automobile, traveling in a westerly direction at about 60 m.p.h., was struck by a cattle truck of the defendant traveling in an easterly direction. After having been sideswiped, plaintiff's car came to rest on the left, or south side, of the highway in a roadside ditch. The focal point of the impact was on the driver's door and resulted in heavy damage to the entire left side of the automobile.

After the accident plaintiff was taken from the scene to a clinic in Tallulah and from there to a police station for questioning. Upon leaving the station, a passing motorist offered him a ride to Bossier City where his father picked him up and returned him to his home in Shreveport. Appellant stayed in bed from the time he arrived at his father's home until 4:30 or 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. At that time plaintiff had a very stiff neck and was experiencing the pains of a severe headache. To obtain relief, he went to a local hopital where x-rays were made. He nevertheless returned to Ruston on Monday to attend classes at Tech but instead was hospitalized that afternoon in the Lincoln Memorial Hospital where he remainted in traction until Wednesday, September 28, 1966. He was furnished and fitted with a cervical collar and permitted to return to his apartment where he remained in bed until Friday, September 30, 1966. On September 30th, he returned to Shreveport and was involved in the second accident the following day.

The force of the impact of the first collision was, as aforesaid, on the driver's door of plaintiff's automobile. The car was struck with great force and heavy damage was inflicted on its left side. The force of the impact was such that plaintiff was rendered unconscious. He was unaware of the events which transpired immediately following the collision. He was in a state of shock. He did not remember how long he stayed in the clinic nor the treatment he received; nor did he remember leaving the clinic and going to the police station.

The indications are most positive that upon plaintiff's arrival in Shreveport he was still in shock. His father testified he was extremely white in color and had a glassy stare. Upon arriving at his father's home, approximately five hours after the accident, he was placed in bed where he remained until 4:30 or 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, when his pain became so excruciating that he sought relief at a local sanitarium. After x-rays were taken, he returned to his father...