McGuire v. Roseville Joint Union High Sch. Dist.
| Docket Number | 2:22-cv-00125-TLN-JDP (PS) |
| Decision Date | 05 June 2023 |
| Parties | DESIREE McGUIRE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ROSEVILLE JOINT UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Plaintiff Cadence DeVault, who was a high school student at the relevant time, and her mother, Desiree McGuire, proceed without counsel in this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court granted defendants' first motion to dismiss ECF No. 6, and dismissed plaintiffs' original complaint without prejudice, see ECF Nos. 19 & 23. Plaintiffs' first amended complaint alleges that defendants violated their rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and under several California state laws, by implementing and enforcing a regulation that required students to wear protective face coverings at school during portions of the COVID-19 pandemic. ECF No. 24. Defendants move to dismiss the first amended complaint for failure to state a claim and on the basis of qualified immunity. ECF No. 25. I recommend that their motion be granted and that plaintiffs' first amended complaint be dismissed without leave to amend.
A complaint may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
For purposes of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the court generally considers only allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial notice, and construes all well-pleaded material factual allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Chubb Custom Ins. Co v. Space Sys. Loral, Inc., 710 F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir. 2013); Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) can be based on either: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory, or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Chubb Custom Ins. Co., 710 F.3d at 956. Dismissal also is appropriate if the complaint alleges a fact that necessarily defeats the claim. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228-29 (9th Cir. 1984).
The factual allegations in the first amended complaint are substantially similar to those in the original complaint. Allegations essential to the adjudication of defendants' motion to dismiss are set out herein; additional details are provided in the court's September 7, 2022 findings and recommendations. ECF No. 19.
During the events in question, plaintiff DeVault was a student at Antelope High School, a school in the Roseville Joint Union High School District (“RJUHSD”); plaintiff McGuire is her mother. ECF No. 24 at 10. Defendants include RJUHSD, several of its board members, and at least two school administrators. Id. at 10-12. On March 13, 2020, the RJUHSD school board suspended on-campus activities due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and on January 5, 2021, it resumed on-campus classes with a requirement that students wear protective face masks as a condition of on-campus attendance. Id. at 14-15. The mask requirement was implemented pursuant to a directive of the California Department of Public Health (“CDPH”) that applied to every school in California. See ECF No. 25-2 at 44.[1] The directive provided that students were exempt from the requirement if they had “a medical or mental health condition or disability that would impede them from properly wearing or handling a face covering.” Id.
On at least two occasions in January 2021, DeVault's teachers or her assistant principal, defendant Gayle, instructed her to wear a mask that complied with the district's mask policy. ECF No. 24 at 15-17. In one instance, DeVault explained to her teacher that the mask “made her feel anxious, dizzy to the point of passing out, and . . . trapped, as if a panic attack were about to start.” Id. at 15. After the second incident, Gayle emailed McGuire to explain that DeVault was required to wear a compliant mask to attend on-campus school. Id. at 16-17, 294. McGuire responded on January 19, informing Gayle that DeVault “will wear the mask [she] feel[s] most comfortable wearing” and providing reports that purported to show “the ineffectiveness of masks and the health concerns related to prolonged wearing of masks.” Id. at 17, 296. The following morning, Gayle responded to McGuire and informed her that DeVault would be required to attend school remotely if she did not comply with the on-campus mask policy. Id. at 17.
Shortly thereafter, Gayle entered DeVault's classroom, “smacked his hand on DeVault's desk, and said, ‘I need you to come with me.'” Id. In the assistant principal's office, defendant DeLorge-Gayle's secretary-confiscated DeVault's phone and instructed her to complete a form entitled “Sworn Statement of Witness in Lieu of Testimony at Hearing”; DeLorge asked DeVault to explain why she refused to wear an appropriate mask. Id. at 18. DeLorge allegedly refused DeVault's request to contact McGuire before completing the statement. Id. Unlike in the original complaint, the first amended complaint alleges that Gayle did not “confirm[] mask compliance” before bringing DeVault to his office, and it alleges that DeVault “was in mask compliance” at the time. Id. On the witness statement form, DeVault wrote, “I feel I should have the right to wear a mask I feel safe in, and I don't feel safe wearing a normal mask.” Id. at 19 & 302. Gayle subsequently called McGuire to inform her that “he would be removing [DeVault] from in-person learning and requiring [her] to work from home until she complied with the mask mandate, and [that McGuire] would need to come pick [DeVault] up from school immediately.” Id. at 19-21. Thereafter, DeLorge returned DeVault's phone and instructed her to wait outside for McGuire. Id. at 21. After McGuire had picked up DeVault, Gayle sent emails to McGuire and to DeVault's teachers informing them that DeVault would “be working from home for the rest of the semester, or until she decides to comply with the CDPH guidelines.” Id. at 22, 305-07.
Plaintiffs supply an affidavit by “an expert in the field of Industrial Hygiene” that purports to dispute the efficacy of face coverings as a means of preventing the transmission of COVID-19. Id. at 123-28. Plaintiffs also claim that “the mask is an experimental requirement violating the Nuremberg Code . . ., requiring full disclosure of risks and benefits of wearing the mask.” Id. at 17. They neither allege that DeVault has a documented medical condition that would exempt her from the school mask requirement nor that they gave defendants documentation of any such condition.
Plaintiffs' federal claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the RJUHSD and against all defendants in both their official and personal capacities. See ECF No. 24 at 10-11, 8492. The RJUHSD and its board of trustees are state agencies immune from suits for damages under the Eleventh Amendment. Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 248, 254 (9th Cir. 1992) (). Because the individual defendants are RJUHSD school board members or school administrators, they are immune from suits for damages in their official capacities. See Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir. 1992) (); see also Everett H. v. Dry Creek Joint Elementary Sch. Dist., 5 F.Supp.3d 1167, 1179 (E.D. Cal. 2014) ().
Such claims cannot be saved by plaintiffs' requests for prospective relief because plaintiffs fail to allege that they remain subject to the complained-of policies. The first amended complaint does not allege that DeVault remains a student within the RJUHSD, and it provides several indications that she is no longer a student: it alleges that the 2021-2022 school year was her senior year of high school, that she is now “an adult individual who resides within the RJUHSD,” and that the mask policy caused her to miss both her graduation and the “2022 Senior Ball.” ECF No. 24 at 10, 24-25, 51, 75. The first amended complaint also fails to allege that the mask policy remains in effect, and plaintiffs acknowledge in their opposition that the mask policy was suspended in February 2022. ECF No. 32 at 9.[2]
Plaintiffs argue that their claims for prospective relief are not moot because of the voluntary cessation doctrine. Id. (citing Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013)) ( that “a defendant cannot automatically moot a case simply by ending its [allegedly] unlawful conduct once sued” because the defendant could simply “pick up where he left off'). This argument has been rejected by the Ninth Circuit in a similar context. See Brach v. Newsom, 38 F.4th 6, 9 (9th Cir. 2022) ( that “the mere possibility that California...
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