McGuire v. United Parcel Service
Decision Date | 10 August 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 97-3455,97-3455 |
Parties | 158 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3085, 135 Lab.Cas. P 10,219 David A. McGUIRE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
John A. Dienner, III, Kubasiak, Cremieux, Fylstra, Reizen & Rotunno, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
D. Scott Watson, Keck, Mahin & Cate, John A. McDonald (argued), McDermott, Will & Emery, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before MANION, KANNE and DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judges.
David McGuire served in the United States Army during Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia. When he returned from active duty, he wanted to resume his former employment at United Parcel Service. After a series of communications with United Parcel Service, McGuire brought this suit under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994. The district court granted summary judgment to United Parcel Service. We affirm.
McGuire, the non-moving party, did not comply with the Local Rules of the Northern District of Illinois. Those rules require the moving party to submit a statement of uncontested facts, N.D. Ill. Local Rule 12(M), and the non-moving party to respond "to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement, including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon," N.D. Ill. Local Rule 12(N)(3)(a). The United Parcel Service ("UPS") submitted a 12(M) statement of uncontested facts. McGuire submitted a response, but his response did not comply with Rule 12(N). McGuire responded to UPS's numbered paragraphs, but he frequently used such language as "Petitioner has no personal knowledge of Segovia's conversation with LeBel and therefore neither admits nor denies said allegation, but demands strict proof thereof." Pet'rs Resp. to Resp'ts Rule 12M Mot. for J. on the Pleadings, McGuire v. United Parcel Service, No. 97 C 0232, 1997 WL 543059 (N.D.Ill. July 8, 1997). McGuire also did not include a separate statement of additional facts requiring denial of summary judgment. He included additional facts in his response to the 12(M) statement as well as in his supporting memorandum of law--neither method is appropriate.
"All material facts set forth in the statement required of the moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement of the opposing party." N.D. Ill. Local Rule 12(N)(3)(b). An answer that does not deny the allegations in the numbered paragraph with citations to supporting evidence in the record constitutes an admission. See Karazanos v. Madison Two Assocs., 147 F.3d 624, 626-27 (7th Cir.1998); Brasic v. Heinemann's Inc., 121 F.3d 281, 284 (7th Cir.1997). The district court strictly enforced the local rules against McGuire, and we will do likewise. We will recite the facts in the light most favorable to McGuire where he properly asserted or controverted those facts. We will not take into consideration those additional facts improperly inserted into his pleadings.
UPS employed McGuire as an air sales representative in Chicago since April 1993. During his time at UPS, McGuire was a member of the United States Army Reserve. In late 1995, McGuire told UPS that the Army was dispatching his activated reserve unit to Bosnia. McGuire provided UPS with written notice on December 22, 1995, and he followed up with a copy of his official orders on January 2, 1996. During McGuire's absence, UPS did not hire a replacement. Rather, other employees performed McGuire's duties.
While still in Bosnia on April 27, 1996, McGuire sent a letter to his supervisor, John Segovia, asking about the procedures for reemployment. UPS received the letter, but Segovia never saw it. On June 6, 1996, McGuire telephoned UPS. Segovia was not available. McGuire spoke instead with Brad Call, who said that Segovia must have received the letter and was looking into reemployment procedures.
McGuire was discharged from active military service on June 30, 1996. On July 11, he sent a letter to Segovia asking about Segovia contacted Ed LeBel in the Human Resources Department ("HR") at UPS. LeBel told Segovia that there were no particular procedures or requirements--the employee simply submits an employee update form. Segovia then responded to McGuire's letter:
Dave--
The law specifies there are no requirements for reemployment.
Please touch bases w/ Ed LeBel (HR) upon your return.
Look to see you--
John Segovia.
McGuire received the letter. He interpreted the first sentence to mean that UPS was not required to reemploy him. McGuire did not contact Ed LeBel. Rather, he tried to contact Segovia. He and Segovia each left several telephone messages for each other.
McGuire contacted an attorney. Segovia received a letter from the attorney informing him that McGuire thought UPS was refusing to reemploy him. Segovia telephoned the attorney and explained that UPS was not refusing to reemploy him and that all he needed to do was contact HR. The attorney told McGuire that UPS was not refusing to reemploy him and that he needed to contact Segovia, not HR.
McGuire never contacted Ed LeBel. He brought this suit claiming that UPS was refusing to reinstate him in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 ("USERRA"). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of UPS. McGuire appeals.
We review a district court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo, drawing our own conclusions of law and fact from the record before us. See Thiele v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 68 F.3d 179, 181 (7th Cir.1995). Summary judgment is proper where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, courts must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable and justifiable inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). However, neither "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties," id. at 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, nor the existence of "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), is sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.
Congress enacted the USERRA in 1994 to provide "prompt reemployment," 38 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(2), to those who engage in "noncareer service in the uniformed services," id. § 4301(a)(1). The USERRA replaced the Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act ("VRRA"), but Congress intended for the case law developed under the VRRA to aid in interpreting the USERRA. See H.R.Rep. No. 103-65, at 21 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2449, 2454 (). Like the VRRA, the USERRA is to be liberally construed in favor of those who served their country. See Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285, 66 S.Ct. 1105, 90 L.Ed. 1230 (1946). But the plaintiff at all times bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to reemployment. See Trulson v. Trane Co., 738 F.2d 770, 772-73 (7th Cir.1984).
The USERRA provides in relevant part as follows:
(a) [A]ny person whose absence from a position of employment is necessitated by reason of service in the uniformed services shall be entitled to the reemployment rights and benefits and other employment benefits of this chapter if--
(1) the person (or an appropriate officer of the uniformed service in which such service is performed) has given advance written or verbal notice of such service to such person's employer;
(2) the cumulative length of the absence and of all previous absences from a position of employment with that employer by reason of service in the uniformed service does not exceed five years; and
(3) except as provided in subsection (f), the person reports to, or submits an application for reemployment to, such employer in accordance with the provisions of subsection (e).
38 U.S.C. § 4312(a)(1-3). The issue for our decision is whether McGuire submitted an "application for reemployment" in accordance with 38 U.S.C. § 4312(a)(3).
The statute does not further define what it means to submit an application for reemployment. However, cases under the VRRA have elaborated this term. An application for reemployment "involves more than a mere inquiry." Baron v. United States Steel Corp., 649 F.Supp. 537, 541 (N.D.Ind.1986); Lacek v. Peoples Laundry Co., 94 F.Supp. 399 (M.D.Pa.1950) ( ). Shadle v. Superwood...
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