McGuire v. Wallace
| Decision Date | 25 January 1887 |
| Docket Number | 13,552 |
| Citation | 10 N.E. 111,109 Ind. 284 |
| Parties | McGuire v. Wallace |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Fulton Circuit Court.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs.
C. H Blackburn, M. L. Essick and O. F. Montgomery, for appellant.
G. W Holman, J. S. Slick and C. P. Drummond, for appellee.
On the 1st day of October, 1885, the grand jury of Fulton county, by an indictment duly returned, presented to the Fulton Circuit Court, then in session, that Patrick McGuire had theretofore on the 5th day of August, 1885, wilfully, purposely and with premeditated malice, feloniously killed and murdered one Michael Kain.
On the 19th day of the following November, the accused was taken into custody by Robert C. Wallace, sheriff of Fulton county upon a warrant duly issued in that behalf, and committed to the jail of the county. He has remained in confinement continuously ever since, awaiting trial on a charge of murder in the first degree.
At the September term, 1885, that being the term at which the indictment was returned, the cause was continued by agreement.
At the succeeding February and April terms, continuances were ordered, over the defendant's objection, upon the written application of the prosecuting attorney, the ground of the application being at each term the alleged absence of one Mary E. Graul, an important witness on the State's behalf.
At the ensuing September term, the prisoner made an application to the court to be discharged, on the ground that he had been confined in the Fulton county jail without trial for a continuous period embracing more than two terms, after his presentment and arrest. His application was overruled, the cause was continued until the next term, and the defendant remanded into the custody of the sheriff.
At the succeeding term, the defendant renewed his application to be discharged, alleging as a ground therefor, that two previous continuances upon the application of the State had theretofore been granted without his consent, and that he had theretofore applied to be discharged at the preceding September term, and that such application had been refused and the cause continued over his objection. He averred that the delay and continuances had not been caused by any act of his, nor by any person at his instance or request, and that at each previous term there had been sufficient time for the trial. This last application was denied, and the prisoner again remanded to the custody of the sheriff.
On the 1st day of December, 1886, the appellant filed his petition to the circuit court of Fulton county, in which he set forth substantially the facts above recited, and added that he was unlawfully imprisoned in the Fulton county jail, and restrained of his liberty by the appellee as sheriff. It is again alleged in this petition that all of the continuances above recited, except the first, were without the appellant's consent, and over his objection, and that neither of the continuances was caused by any act of his, or of any one acting for him or with his knowledge or consent, and that he had been denied a trial without cause or fault on his part, there having been at each term sufficient time to have tried him.
He prayed for the writ of habeas corpus against Robert C. Wallace, sheriff of Fulton county, and asked to be discharged from the alleged unlawful restraint and imprisonment.
The writ was awarded accordingly, and with the body of the prisoner, the sheriff returned the facts, in nowise substantially different from those already recited.
Upon an inspection of the record of the cause pending upon the indictment, the court gave judgment against the petitioner, and again remanded him to the custody of the sheriff. From this judgment the appeal before us is prosecuted.
On the appellant's behalf it is contended, that upon the record as stated in the petition, and substantially admitted in the sheriff's return, the prisoner was illegally restrained, and that the order made at the November term, 1886, remanding him to the custody of the sheriff, was beyond the jurisdiction of the court, and consequently void.
The insistence of the appellant is, that after two continuances have been had by the State, after the term at which an indictment has been returned, a defendant, who has not consented to such continuances, and who has been detained in jail without a trial on a criminal charge, for a continuous period embracing more than two terms after his arrest and commitment, may then make application to be discharged; that, upon such application, the court, if satisfied that there is evidence for the State which can not then be had, that reasonable effort has been made to procure the same, and that there is just ground to believe that such evidence may be had at the next term, may continue the cause until the next term, and that at such next term it is imperatively required that the prisoner should be either brought to trial or discharged.
This result is said to follow from a construction, or by the terms, of sections 1782 and 1784, of the code of criminal procedure, R. S. 1881.
Plausible and ingenious as the argument is in support of this view, we can not give it our approbation.
Section 1782 provides the method by which the prosecuting attorney may obtain the postponement of a criminal trial on account of the absence of any witness whose name is endorsed on the indictment. It provides further that no defendant shall be detained in jail without a trial on a criminal charge, for a continuous period embracing more than two terms after the term at which the indictment was found, "except where a continuance was had on his motion, or the delay was caused by his act, or where there was not sufficient time to try him during said terms."
This section, as also the two sections following it, was enacted in aid of section 12 of the Bill of Rights, which provides, among other things, that justice shall be administered "completely, and without denial; speedily, and without delay."
The State may not, therefore, as was the case in those times when the liberty of the citizen was subject to the unbridled will of the crown, detain any person in prison upon any pretext whatever, without bringing him to trial as the statute prescribes. These beneficent provisions of the law were enacted to promote justice, and as a means for the vindication of the innocent and oppressed. They were not intended as a shield for the guilty and lawless, nor are they to be so construed as to offer inducements for those...
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