McGuire-Welch v. House of the Good Shepherd

• Decision Date: 04 November 2016
• Docket Number: 6:14–CV–0278 (DNH/ATB)
• Citation: 219 F.Supp.3d 330
• Parties: Kathleen MCGUIRE–WELCH, Plaintiff, v. The HOUSE OF THE GOOD SHEPHERD; The House of the Good Shepherd's Tilton School; Shannon Perri in her individual and official capacity ; Zygmunt Malowicki in her individual and official capacity ; John Doe(s) and Jane Doe(s), Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

219 F.Supp.3d 330

Kathleen MCGUIRE–WELCH, Plaintiff,

v.The HOUSE OF THE GOOD SHEPHERD; The House of the Good Shepherd's Tilton School; Shannon Perri in her individual and official capacity ; Zygmunt Malowicki in her individual and official capacity ; John Doe(s) and Jane Doe(s), Defendants.

6:14–CV–0278 (DNH/ATB)

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

Signed November 4, 2016

A.J. BOSMAN, ESQ., DANIEL W. FLYNN, ESQ., BOSMAN LAW FIRM, LLC, 201 West Court Street, Rome, New York 13440, Attorneys for the Plaintiff.

JOHN T. MCCANN, ESQ., ROBERT J. THORPE, ESQ., HANCOCK, ESTABROOK LAW FIRM, 1500 AXA Tower I, 100 Madison Street, Suite 1500, Syracuse, New York 13202, Attorneys for the Defendants.

MEMORANDUM–DECISION and ORDER

DAVID N. HURD, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

On February 12, 2014, plaintiff Kathleen McGuire–Welch ("plaintiff" or "McGuire–Welch") filed this action against defendants The House of the Good Shepherd ("HGS"), The House of the Good Shepherd's Tilton School (the "Tilton School"), Shannon Perri ("Perri"), and Zygmunt Malowicki ("Malowicki", and collectively, the "defendants") alleging age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 –634 ("ADEA") and New York State Human Rights Law, New York Executive Law § 296 ("NYSHRL") and retaliation claims pursuant to Title V of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA"), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (the "RA") and the NYSHRL. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, and declaratory and injunctive relief. Defendants have filed an answer and the parties have completed extensive discovery.

Currently pending is defendants' motion for summary judgment. The motion is fully briefed and oral arguments were held on June 3, 2016 in Utica, New York.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts, taken from the Complaint, the parties' statements pursuant to Northern District of New York Local Civil Rule 7.1(a)(3) and other submitted evidence, are undisputed unless otherwise indicated. Consideration has been given to whether the parties have proffered admissible evidence in support of their positions and the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving plaintiff.

McGuire–Welch was hired by HGS in 1991 to serve as the Chairperson for the Committee on Special Education ("CSE") at HGS's Tilton School, a position she held for the duration of her time of employment with HGS. See McGuire–Welch Affidavit, at ¶¶ 3, 4. The Tilton School is a New York State Education Department ("NYSED") certified program that provides educational services to students ages 5 to 21 in connection with other services offered at HGS. During the relevant times, defendant Zygmunt Malowicki served as the Assistant Executive Director of the Tilton School. In her position, plaintiff oversaw the CSE process for students at the Tilton School, including notifying parents of any change in a student's Individualized Education Program ("IEP"), changes in such student's Behavioral Intervention Program ("BIP") and coordinating the special education materials with the local school district such student attends.

In July 2011, Perri was promoted to the position of Coordinator of Education Services and became McGuire–Welch's direct supervisor. Id. at ¶ 5. Plaintiff alleges that soon after Perri became her supervisor, Perri asked her when she planned on retiring. Id. at ¶ 6. Plaintiff also alleges that Perri began to criticize her work product and challenging the performance of plaintiff's duties. Id. at ¶ 7. Soon thereafter, Perri discontinued plaintiff's access to reports of student incidents, such as fights, that plaintiff states she was required to investigate and subsequently notify the appropriate school district of any conduct which could affect the student's IEP. Id. at ¶ 8. In February 2012, Perri completed a performance evaluation of plaintiff, noting deficiencies in plaintiff's performance, including that the quality of plaintiff's work needed improvement in its accuracy, that plaintiff needed to take more initiate in completing tasks and improve her planning and organizational skills. See Malowicki Affidavit, Ex. 1.

In March 2012, NYSED audited the Tilton School's compliance with NYSED regulations and found numerous instances of noncompliance. As a result, NYSED required the School to develop and implement a corrective action plan (the "Corrective Action Plan"), which defendants contend directly related to McGuire–Welch's responsibilities as CSE chairperson. In December 2012, there was an administrative meeting between representatives of HGS and NYSED to address HGS's outstanding noncompliance and the Corrective Action Plan. See Pl's Rule 7.1 Statement, at ¶ 10. Plaintiff did not attend any of the relevant meetings with NYSED nor did she participate in the development of the Corrective Action Plan. Id. at ¶ 14.

NYSED required that the Corrective Action Plan be completed by April 30, 2013. The HGS internal target date for completion of plan was March 15, 2013 and many employees, including McGuire–Welch, were tasked with responsibilities concerning the plan. Defendants contend that plaintiff was specifically tasked with ensuring that the School's files evidenced decisions regarding revisions to students' BIPs or IEPs and for sending copies of such documents, progress reports and meeting minutes to the students' parents or guardians and local school district. Perri alleges that she frequently had to follow up with plaintiff regarding her responsibilities and was often frustrated with plaintiff's lackadaisical approach to NYSED's demands. After NYSED's deadline had passed, Perri contends that plaintiff had failed to correct mistakes previously pointed out to her and that representatives of the School had to scramble to meet NYSED's requirements. Plaintiff contends that she did not receive updated training to properly complete the tasks assigned to her until March 15, 2013 and suffered from her exclusion from relevant meetings and the failure of defendants to provide guidance or information regarding the Corrective Action Plan. See McGuire–Welch Affidavit, at ¶ 17. In June 2013, Perri completed the 2012–2013 performance evaluation of plaintiff, again noting numerous deficiencies in plaintiff's work performance.

Additionally in June 2013, a Tilton School student was placed in jail. When the student was released, McGuire–Welch states that the student or his or her teacher approached plaintiff hoping to take a Regents examination the student was signed up for. Plaintiff alleges that she informed Mary Palmer, a staff member identified as a team leader by plaintiff, that the student had the right to take the test. However, she believes Perri prevented the student from taking the test.

McGuire–Welch was terminated from her position on June 21, 2013 and was over 60 years old at the time of her termination. Plaintiff's position was filled by an individual who was 29 years old at the time of hiring.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because there is no issue of material fact as to whether McGuire–Welch was properly discharged for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons relating to her job performance and that such discharge was wholly unrelated to plaintiff's age or any alleged protected activities undertaken by plaintiff.

A. Summary Judgment Standard .

Summary judgment is appropriate where, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) ; Richardson v. Sel s ky , 5 F.3d 616, 621 (2d Cir. 1993). "The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts establish her right to judgment as a matter of law." Bowen v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. , 363 F.Supp.2d 370, 373 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Rodriquez v. City of New York , 72 F.3d 1051, 1060–61 (2d Cir. 1995)).

"[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248–49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "[A] party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [their] pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ " Id. (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Svcs.Co. , 391 U.S. 253, 288, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968) ). Those specific facts must be supported by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A). "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted). Affidavits submitted to defeat summary judgment must be admissible themselves or must contain evidence that will be presented in an admissible form at trial. See H. Sand & Co. v. Airtemp Corp. , 934 F.2d 450, 454–55 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that "hearsay testimony ... that would not be admissible if testified to at the trial may not properly be set forth in [a Rule 56 ] affidavit.").

Although discrimination claims may involve questions of intent that are ill-suited to resolution at the summary judgment stage, the Second Circuit has gone "out of [its] way to remind district courts that the ‘impression that summary judgment is unavailable to defendants in discrimination cases is unsupportable.’ " Weinstock v. Columbia Univ. , 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting McLee v. Chrysler Corp. , 38 F.3d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1994) ). "[T]rial courts should not treat discrimination differently from other ultimate...