McHann v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co.
| Decision Date | 02 September 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 82-4401,82-4401 |
| Parties | , 13 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1611 William D. McHANN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
James E. Brown, Starkville, Miss., for plaintiff-appellant.
Cox & Dunn, Jackson, Miss., William H. Cox, Jr., Mitchell, McNutt, Bush, Lagrone & Sams, Fred M. Bush, Jr., Tupelo, Miss., for defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi.
Before BROWN, WISDOM and JOHNSON, Circuit Judges.
This case involves the explosion of a Firestone tire which seriously injured the plaintiff-appellant, William McHann, and a tire mechanic, Mark Ivy. The jury rejected McHann's contention that manufacturing defects in the tire caused the explosion. We reverse the judgment that was in Firestone's favor and remand the case. We conclude that the district court erred in instructing the jury that Mark Ivy was negligent as a matter of law and in admitting in evidence a covenant not to sue between McHann and Ivy's employer.
On August 7, 1978, McHann purchased a Firestone automobile tire from a Firestone dealer in Starkville, Mississippi. The parties stipulated that the tire was a "blemish" or "blem" tire, which means that the tire has a cosmetic defect that does not affect its structural soundness. The "blem" in this case was a discoloration in the white sidewall of the tire. 1
McHann took the tire to Green Oaks Exxon Service Station for mounting on a tire rim. During the mounting, Mark Ivy, Green Oak's tire mechanic, encountered considerable difficulty making the tire beads seat properly. 2 Ivy removed the tire and rim from the tire mounting machine and placed them on the floor in the bay area of the station. Ivy successfully seated the bead on the whitewall side of the tire, but still could not seat the back or under side of the tire. Ivy then proceeded to use a rubber donut, a rubber device which helps to seat the beads by trapping air in the tire, along the back side of the tire. At some point, after inflating and deflating the tire and lubricating the donut, Ivy asked McHann to assist in mounting the tire by standing on the whitewall side, or top side, of the tire while McHann attempted to seat the rear bead to the rim. 3 While the tire was being inflated, the bead wire broke on the back side, or under side, of the tire causing it to explode with such force that McHann was thrown twenty feet in the air. McHann was knocked unconscious and sustained serious ankle injuries. Ivy was also injured.
McHann brought suit against Firestone alleging that a manufacturing defect in the tire was the proximate cause of his injuries. At trial, McHann's expert, John Forney, 4 testified that the beads were weakened and shortened by kinks, loose bead wires, and excessive spacing in the bead wires. Forney's examination of the tire showed that the circumference of the tire was too small to seat properly on the rim because of the presence of these defects. Forney concluded that these defects were manufacturing defects and that the defects, rather than Ivy's handling of the tire, caused the explosion and injury to McHann.
Firestone presented expert testimony 5 that the tire was not defective but was damaged by the handling of Ivy and the force of the explosion. Firestone argued that the tire did not seat because Ivy failed to lubricate the rim and that it exploded because of too much air pressure on the bead. Firestone contends that Ivy's negligence was the sole cause of the explosion because Ivy failed (1) to secure the tire down during inflation; (2) to use an air gauge to check tire pressure; (3) to lubricate the tire bead and rim; (4) to heed an express warning from a fellow employee that the tire bead was being dangerously overinflated; and (5) to follow industry standards with respect to the recommended pressure to use in inflating tires. Firestone also presented the testimony of Chuck Bassett, an employee at the service station, who stated that Ivy had consumed several small "pony" beers and ignored Bassett's warnings that the tire was about to explode.
The district court made two evidentiary rulings that were critical to the outcome of the case. The district court allowed Firestone to introduce into evidence a Covenant Not to Sue executed between McHann and Green Oaks Exxon under which McHann received $27,500 in complete satisfaction of his claim against Green Oaks. The district court, however, refused to allow McHann to examine Firestone's witnesses concerning Firestone's settlement with Ivy for $18,000. The district court also instructed the jury that Ivy was negligent as a matter of law. The jury returned a verdict for Firestone, and the district court rejected McHann's request for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial.
On appeal, McHann argues that Ivy's negligence was a question of fact and contends that the district court erred in instructing the jury that Ivy was negligent as a matter of law. McHann also contends that the district court should not have allowed the introduction of the Covenant Not to Sue but should have allowed Firestone's settlement with Ivy into evidence. McHann's final contentions are that the district court did not allow McHann to cross-examine fully one of Firestone's expert witnesses and that the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Firestone contends that the evidence supported the jury verdict and that the district court's evidentiary rulings and jury instructions were correct.
McHann's first contention is that the district court improperly took the issue of Ivy's negligence away from the jury when it stated in Instruction D-1:
The Court instructs the jury that Mark Ivy, as an employee of Valentine's Exxon Service Station, was guilty of negligence as a matter of law in attempting to mount and inflate the tire in the manner in which he did.
If you believe that this negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident, then you must return a verdict in favor of Firestone.
McHann argues that there was sufficient conflicting evidence over Ivy's negligence to warrant sending the question to the jury. McHann also contends that this instruction focused the guilt on Ivy in a way that virtually assured a favorable verdict for Firestone.
Firestone contends that Ivy was negligent as a matter of law in four ways. First, Ivy did not secure the tire, and he allowed McHann to stand on the unsecured tire. Second, Ivy failed to use an air gauge to check the tire pressure. These two facts are undisputed. Third, Ivy allegedly failed to heed Bassett's warning that the tire was about to explode. Fourth, Ivy allegedly did not lubricate the tire bead but simply lubricated the rubber donut. According to Firestone, these facts establish that Ivy's negligence was an undisputed issue for the judge to decide.
In this diversity suit, the substantive law of Mississippi applies. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 1938, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188. 6 A federal court, however, applies a federal rather than a state standard for determining whether there is sufficient evidence to create a jury question. See Hagan v. EZ Manufacturing Co., 5 Cir.1982, 674 F.2d 1047, 1051; Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 5 Cir.1982, 665 F.2d 1367 (en banc). The sufficiency of the evidence on any issue to make a case for jury consideration is a question of law for the trial judge:
The judge must determine whether the evidence is sufficiently in conflict to permit differing views concerning disputed issues of fact and, whether, even if the evidence is not contradicted, conflicting inferences can be drawn from it. An issue cannot be taken from the jury if there are facts on which reasonable and fair minded men and women in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions.... It is also clear that the fact-finding power that belongs to the jury includes the drawing and rejecting of inferences from the facts.
Johnson v. William C. Ellis & Sons Iron Works, 5 Cir.1979, 604 F.2d 950, 958 (citations omitted). See Maxey, 665 F.2d at 1371; Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 5 Cir.1969, 411 F.2d 365, 374-75 (en banc).
Our examination of the record leads us to conclude that reasonable and fair-minded persons in the exercise of their judgment might reach different conclusions with respect to Ivy's negligence. Although it is undisputed that Ivy did not secure the tire, the testimony of Ivy and Forney established that the tire could not be mounted in the usual manner. Forney also testified that a non-defective tire could be mounted safely off the tire machine, although he conceded that it is ideal from a safety standpoint to secure the tire. Ivy testified that he had safely mounted tires off the tire machine and on the floor a number of times. From this testimony, the jury could have rationally concluded that Ivy was not negligent in these circumstances.
We also find that the jury might not have concluded that Ivy was negligent for failing to use an air gauge. Ivy, an experienced tire mechanic, testified that he could accurately estimate the amount of air in a tire by the sound of the air as it entered the tire. Forney's testimony that experienced tire mechanics can accurately estimate air pressure within tires and fill a tire within a pound or two of its recommended pressure supports Ivy's testimony. Forney also testified that the explosion occurred at the relatively low pressure of 40 to 50 pounds per square inch, based on the fact that the rubber and fabric near the break of the bead was in good shape and not torn or split. The jury could have inferred from this evidence that Ivy did not act unreasonably in failing to use the tire gauge in the time period before the explosion and that the tire had not been overinflated.
The final two grounds on which Ivy was allegedly...
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