McHugh v. Mason

• Decision Date: 16 December 1929
• Docket Number: 21905.
• Citation: 154 Wash. 572,283 P. 184
• Parties: McHUGH v. MASON.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

283 P. 184

154 Wash. 572

McHUGH v. MASON.

No. 21905.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 16, 1929

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Robert M. Jones, Judge.

Action by James A. McHugh, Sr., against F. E. Mason. From a judgment of dismissal, plaintiff appeals. Reversed, with directions.

Jno. Mills Day, of Auburn, for appellant.

Roberts Skeel & Holman and Frank Hunter, all of Seattle, for respondent.

BEALS J.

Plaintiff sues for damages resulting from personal injuries received by him in a collision between an automobile in which he was riding and one owned and operated by defendant. The case was tried to a jury, and, at the close of all the evidence, the court sustained defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the same to support any verdict or judgment in plaintiff's favor, and, holding that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, withdrew the case from the consideration of the jury and dismissed the action. From the judgment of dismissal, plaintiff appeals.

The facts giving rise to this litigation are as follows: During the evening of December 26, 1927, appellant, at the northeast corner of the intersection of Auburn avenue and Main Street East, in the city of Auburn, entered a Ford coupé owned by his son Michael, which on that occasion was being driven by his son Thomas, with the intention of proceeding west on Main street, that being an east and west street. Auburn avenue runs into Main street at an angle of a few degrees east of north, the easterly margin of Auburn avenue breaking to a direct north and south line at a point a little over 60 feet north of the north curb on Main street, thus causing the paved portion of Auburn avenue to flare out from its normal width of a trifle over 36 feet to approximately 59 1/2 feet at the Main street curb line.

The Ford, proceeding west along Main street, was run into on its right side by respondent's Studebaker sedan somewhere in the northwest portion of the street intersection.

The trial court was of the opinion that the evidence clearly showed that respondent, in the operation of his car just prior to the accident, was guilty of negligence, but was also of the opinion that, from the evidence, the court was required to hold as matter of law that the driver of the car in which appellant was riding was guilty of contributory negligence which under the circumstances must be imputed to appellant, and that appellant was thereby barred from the recovery of judgment against respondent.

The court ruled that under paragraph (14), § 41 c. 309, Laws of 1927, regulating the operation of motor vehicles, the driver of the car in which appellant was...