McHuron v. Grand Teton Lodge Co., 93-281

Decision Date28 June 1995
Docket NumberNo. 93-281,93-281
PartiesGregory I. McHURON and Linda L. McHuron, Appellants (Defendants), v. GRAND TETON LODGE COMPANY, a Wyoming corporation, Appellee (Plaintiff).
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

James K. Lubing, Jackson, for appellants.

Bret F. King of King & King, Jackson, for appellee.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

The focus of concern in this case is a restrictive covenant which required approval by a development company of "proposed building plans, specifications, exterior color or finish, building materials, plot plan * * *, landscaping plan and construction schedule" with respect to lots within the development. More precisely, the question is whether Grand Teton Lodge Company (Company), acting through an Architectural Review Committee (Committee), unreasonably withheld approval of the use of fiberglass shingles by Gregory I. McHuron and Linda L. McHuron (McHurons) on the ground their use was "not in keeping with the surrounding landscape and natural beauty of the area." Following the filing of appropriate materials in support of, and in opposition to, a motion for summary judgment presented by the Company, the district court granted a summary judgment in favor of the company. We hold the language of the restrictive covenants in issue is not ambiguous; there is no genuine issue of material fact; and the Company was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. We affirm the Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.

In their Brief of Appellant, the McHurons set forth these issues:

I. Did the District Court err when it held, as a matter of law that, the restrictive covenants and the subsequent decisions of the Architectural Review Committee establish an enforceable general scheme or plan with regard to building materials used by homeowners within the Grand Teton Lodge Company subdivision when the Appellant presented evidence that no such plan exists?

II. Are the covenants specific enough to allow clear interpretation when no plan or scheme is provided for by them and when they provide only that the building materials be "in keeping with the natural beauty of the surrounding environment?"

III. Did the District Court err when it held, as a matter of law, that the Architectural Review Committee had not arbitrarily or unreasonably withheld its consent to use high quality asphalt shingles when the Appellant presented evidence that it had received no reasoning behind the decision, and the Covenants require only that the building material be in keeping with the natural beauty of the surrounding landscape and enhance the value, desirability, and attractiveness of the homes subject to such covenants?

The Company, in its Brief of Appellee, does not articulate a separate statement of the issues, however, it titles the following arguments in its brief:

I. Standard of Review.

II. The Restrictive Covenants and the decisions of the Architectural Review Committee establish a general scheme or design in the Jackson Hole Golf and Tennis Club Estates.

III. The Covenants manifest the Declarant's clear intention of a general scheme or plan.

IV. The decision of the Architectural Design Committee in not allowing the Appellants to use asphalt shingles was reasonable.

V. The Affidavit of Greg McHuron is based in part on hearsay and lacks foundation and the letter of Jim Cress was not authenticated, therefore should not be considered in the Appellants' Arguments.

In May of 1975, the McHurons purchased a lot in a subdivision in Teton County called the Jackson Hole Golf and Tennis Club Estates--Second Filing. Their warranty deed stated their lot was subject to the covenants, conditions, and restrictions set forth in an instrument recorded by the Company on May 24, 1973. The document referred to is entitled "Declaration of Protective Covenants Jackson Hole Golf and Tennis Club Estates--Second Filing." The covenants are comprehensive in nature and, with respect to the issues in this case, they provide:

2. APPROVAL OF PLANS. No building, fence or other structure shall be erected, placed or altered on any lot * * * until the proposed building plans, specifications, exterior color or finish, building materials, plot plan * * *, landscaping plan and construction schedule shall have been approved in writing by Grand Teton Lodge Company * * *, its successors or assigns. Approval of plans, location and specifications may not be unreasonably withheld by Company, but refusal may be based by the company upon particularly the ground that the exterior is not in keeping with the surrounding landscape and natural beauty of the area. (Emphasis added.)

* * * * * *

24. VARIANCES. The Company may allow reasonable variances and adjustments of the within conditions and restrictions in order to overcome practical difficulties, and prevent unnecessary hardships in the application of regulations contained herein, provided this may be done in conformity with the intent and purposes hereof and also provided in every instance that such variance or adjustment will not be materially detrimental or injurious to other property or improvements in the neighborhood.

The Company established the Committee for the purpose of enforcing the covenants.

Almost fifteen years after they acquired their lot, the McHurons sought approval by the Committee of the building plans for a home to be constructed on their lot. After examining the proposed plans, the Committee sent a letter to the McHurons in which the plans as submitted were not approved. The Committee stated in its letter that the plans could not be approved until the McHurons submitted, among other items, a drawing showing the total height of the house to be no more than eighteen feet, and a letter requesting a variance for the roofing materials. That letter advised the McHurons they would have to present a sample of their proposed roofing materials to the Committee.

The McHurons responded to these requests in a letter in which they formally requested a "variance for the section of our proposed house that goes to 19 feet, as you have done for others in the past." The McHurons also asked permission from the Committee to install the fiberglass shingles after explaining their reasons for using them. The Committee granted the request of the McHurons for a variance on the height of the building, but denied the request for use of fiberglass shingles. The McHurons were advised they should "plan to use the standard cedar shakes used by all your neighbors when building your home."

Despite the disapproval by the Committee of the roofing material, the McHurons installed the fiberglass shingles on their home. The Committee demanded the McHurons stop installing those fiberglass shingles, and the demand letter specifically stated the Committee intended to "enforce our right to determine the architectural materials installed on all buildings on the Estates." The Committee did permit the McHurons to complete the roof with fiberglass shingles to prevent water damage to the home and, in a subsequent letter, the Committee agreed it would permit the fiberglass shingles to remain on the home if eighty percent of the homeowners in the subdivision, in a straw poll, agreed to the use of the fiberglass shingles. The results of the poll were not favorable to the McHurons.

The Company then brought this action seeking enforcement of the covenants by a mandatory injunction. The Company filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, and discovery materials, consisting primarily of affidavits, were presented in support of, and in opposition to, that motion.

The trial court held a hearing with respect to the Motion for Summary Judgment. At that hearing, the court sagaciously and prophetically remarked:

The fact is, of course, that this Court is not going to get itself in the position where it is determining whether a particular home and materials used in the home, the landscaping or any other feature, is in keeping with the natural beauty of the area, nor fitting with the general scheme of the developers in the subdivision.

If that were to happen, I can see great disaster, if the Court substitutes its judgment for that of the committee that was appointed to represent all of the homeowners and to represent the developer.

The real issue here is whether or not the decision of the committee was unreasonable, the denial of Mr. McHuron's application for a so-called variance was unreasonable. That's the only issue that this Court needs to determine either today or in a subsequent trial.

Now, what am I going to hear? What evidence concerning whether or not that denial was unreasonable? What am I going to hear differently at trial than what I read by the affidavits that are on file?

The court then entered its Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment requiring the McHurons to remove their fiberglass shingles and replace them with cedar shakes or a gravel roof. This appeal is taken from that order.

We agree with the trial court that the critical issue in this case is whether the decision of the Committee to disapprove the use of fiberglass shingles on the McHurons' home was unreasonable. The covenants in this case are contractual in nature and are to be interpreted in accordance with the principles of contract law. Kindler v. Anderson, 433 P.2d 268 (Wyo.1967). Aesthetic covenants such as these have been found to be enforceable by a majority of the courts if their purpose and intent can be ascertained. E.g., Rhue v. Cheyenne Homes, Inc., 168 Colo. 6, 449 P.2d 361 (1969); Palmetto Dunes Resort, Div. of Greenwood Dev. Corp. v. Brown, 287 S.C. 1, 336 S.E.2d 15 (1985).

We said in Bowers Welding and Hotshot, Inc. v. Bromley, 699 P.2d 299, 303 (Wyo.1985) (citing Dawson v. Meike, 508 P.2d 15 (Wyo.1973)):

A common way in which to uphold restrictive covenants is to find a general plan or scheme for the...

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