MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Crowley

• Decision Date: 12 May 1995
• Docket Number: No. 2-95-058-CV,2-95-058-CV
• Citation: 899 S.W.2d 399
• Parties: MCI TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, Relator, v. Honorable George A. CROWLEY, Judge, 67th District Court, Tarrant County, Texas, Respondent.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 399

899 S.W.2d 399

MCI TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, Relator, v.Honorable George A. CROWLEY, Judge, 67th District Court Tarrant County, Texas, Respondent.

No. 2-95-058-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas Fort Worth.

May 12, 1995.

Rehearing Overruled June 29, 1995.

David E. Keltner, Keith D. Calcote, G. Dennis Sheehan, Haynes & Boone, Fort Worth, for relator.

Robert E. Aldrich, Jr., Gardner & Aldrich, Art Brender, Brender & Colosi, Fort Worth, for real parties in interest.

Before LIVINGSTON, DAUPHINOT and BRIGHAM, JJ.

OPINION

BRIGHAM, Justice.

In this original proceeding, the trial court ordered relator MCI Telecommunications Corporation to answer interrogatories inquiring about its attorneys' fees incurred in defending the underlying suit.We conditionally grant the writ of mandamus.

THE UNDERLYING SUIT

Two women, plaintiffMary Lynn Aldrich and plaintiff and intervenorMarilyn Scamardo, sued MCI, their employer, and Mark Smith(not a party to this proceeding) who was their supervisor at MCI, for sexual harassment and sex discrimination.The details of their allegations are immaterial to this proceeding.

Specifically, Aldrich's causes of action are: sex discrimination and sex harassment (quid pro quo) under section 21.051 of the Texas Labor Code; sex discrimination and sex harassment (hostile environment) under section 21.051 of the Texas Labor Code; defamation; intentional infliction of emotional distress; invasion of privacy; gross negligence; assault and battery; negligence; and conspiracy.She alleges the following damages--physical pain and emotional distress, constructive discharge, lost earnings and lost earning capacity, mental anguish, and injury to reputation--for which she seeks both actual and punitive damages, along with injunctive and declaratory relief.

Scamardo's specific causes of action are: sex discrimination and sex harassment (quid pro quo) under section 21.051 of the Texas Labor Code; sex discrimination and sex harassment (hostile environment) under section 21.051 of the Texas Labor Code; intentional infliction of emotional distress; assault and battery; negligence; invasion of privacy; breach of contract; and conspiracy.Scamardo alleges damages for mental anguish, physical injury, lost wages, lost earning capacity, and medical expenses.She seeks both actual and punitive damages, along with injunctive and declaratory relief.

All of Aldrich's and Scamardo's causes of action are brought under state law.They both seek recovery of their attorneys' fees as provided for in the Texas Labor Code¹ and the Declaratory Judgments Act.²MCI does not seek recovery of its attorneys' fees under any theory.

Aldrich propounded interrogatories to MCI inquiring about:

the names and billing rates of all attorneys (in-house and outside counsel) and paralegals who have represented MCI and Smith in the case; the number of hours that those attorneys and paralegals have worked on this case; and the total amount of legal fees and expenses incurred by MCI in this case.

While MCI asserted numerous objections to these interrogatories, the only objection at issue in this proceeding is that the interrogatories seek information that is irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.When Aldrich filed a motion to compel, the trial court held a hearing on MCI's objections, and in a March 30, 1994 order, the trial court ordered MCI to answer the interrogatories.MCI then filed this mandamus proceeding, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the discovery and that MCI has no adequate remedy by appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In deciding whether a writ of mandamus is appropriate, we recognize that mandamus will issue only to correct a clear abuse of discretion or the violation of a duty imposed by law when there is no other adequate remedy by law.Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839(Tex.1992);Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917(Tex.1985).A trial court clearly abuses its discretion when it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839;Johnson, 700 S.W.2d at 917.

With respect to the resolution of factual issues or matters committed to the trial court's discretion, the appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court unless the trial court could reasonably have reached only one decision and the trial court's decision is shown to be arbitrary and unreasonable.Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839-40;Johnson, 700 S.W.2d at 917-18.

With respect to a trial court's determination of the legal principles controlling its ruling, our review is much less deferential because a trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts.Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840.Thus, a clear failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion and may result in mandamus.Id.

A writ of mandamus is the proper vehicle to attack an order granting or denying discovery.SeeTilton v. Moye, 869 S.W.2d 955, 958(Tex.1994).In making the determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion, we are mindful that the purpose of discovery is to seek the truth so that disputes may be decided by what the facts reveal, not by what facts are concealed.Jampole v. Touchy, 673 S.W.2d 569, 573(Tex.1984).The rules governing discovery do not require as a prerequisite to discovery that the items sought be admissible evidence; it is enough that the information in question appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.Id.;seeTEX.R.CIV.P. 166b(2)(a).However, this broad grant is limited by the legitimate interests of the opposing party to avoid overly broad requests, harassment, or disclosure of privileged information.Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843;General Motors Corp. v. Lawrence, 651 S.W.2d 732, 734(Tex.1983).

ABUSE OF DISCRETION

To determine if mandamus relief is appropriate in this case, we first must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion.

Relevance and Discovery

Parties may obtain discovery of any matter that is relevant to the subject matter of the lawsuit.TEX.R.CIV.P. 166b(2)(a).Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable that it would be without the evidence.TEX.R.CIV.EVID. 401.Parties may not object to discovery on the ground "that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."TEX.R.CIV.P. 166b(2)(a).

Waiver

We begin by addressing the claim by Aldrich that MCI waived its relevance objection by not presenting any evidence on it at the hearing before the trial court.The burden is on the party objecting to discovery to plead the particular objection and to "produce any evidence necessary to support" its objection and why it should not be required to produce the discovery.TEX.R.CIV.P. 166b(4)(emphasis added);seeAxelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 553 n. 6(Tex.1990).A party is not required to support all objections to discovery with evidence.Gustafson v. Chambers, 871 S.W.2d 938, 942(Tex.App.--Houston[1st Dist.]1994, orig. proceeding).Information that is "clearly irrelevant" does not require proof.Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Jones, 733 S.W.2d 319, 321(Tex.App.--Texarkana 1987, orig. proceeding);seeFord Motor Co. v. Ross, 888 S.W.2d 879, 892(Tex.App.--Tyler 1994, orig. proceeding).Because, as we hold below, the information sought on MCI's attorneys' fees is "clearly" or "patently" irrelevant, MCI did not waive its relevance objection.Additionally, the attorneys' fees issue in this proceeding is a legal question answerable merely by looking at the plaintiffs' allegations and MCI's defenses, seeGustafson, 871 S.W.2d at 942, so it was not necessary for MCI to produce evidence on its relevancy objection.

Recovery of Attorneys' Fees in Texas

The plaintiffs have the burden of proof on their claims for attorneys' fees.SeeVan Waters & Rogers, Inc. v. Quality Freezers, Inc., 873 S.W.2d 460, 464(Tex.App.--Beaumont1994, writ denied).To meet their burden, they should present evidence of the hours spent on the case, the nature of the case's preparation, the complexity of the case, the experience of the attorney, and the prevailing hourly rates.Goudeau v. Marquez, 830 S.W.2d 681, 683(Tex.App.--Houston[1st Dist.]1992, no writ).Factors to consider in determining a reasonable attorneys' fee are:

time and labor required

novelty and difficulty of the questions involved

skill requisite to do the work properly

preclusion of other employment

fee customarily charged

whether the fee is fixed or contingent

amount at issue and the results obtained

time limits imposed by the client or circumstances

nature and length of relationship with the client

experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney doing the work

SeeTEX.R.DISCIPLINARY P. 1.04(b)(1992), reprinted inTEX.GOV'T CODE ANN., Tit. 2, Subtit.G, App. (VernonSupp.1995); Scott A. Brister, Proof of Attorney's Fees in Texas, 24 ST. MARY'S LAW J. 313, 328-29(1993);Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 320 n. 6(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 991, 114 S.Ct. 548, 126 L.Ed.2d 450(1993).Conspicuously absent from these factors is the opposing party's attorneys' fees incurred in the defense of the case.

MCI argues, and plaintiffs concede, that there is no Texas authority that allows a plaintiff to discover a defendant's attorneys' fees in a case like this one where only the plaintiff is seeking recovery of attorneys' fees.Based on this absence of authority, along with clearcut Texas law on what evidence is needed to prove attorneys' fees and the relevant factors to consider, MCI's...