McInnis v. Shapiro, 68 C 673.
| Decision Date | 24 March 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 68 C 673.,68 C 673. |
| Parties | Linda McINNIS, a minor, etc., et al., Plaintiffs, v. Samuel H. SHAPIRO, Governor of the State of Illinois, Ray Page, Superintendent of Public Instruction of the State of Illinois, Adlai E. Stevenson, III, Treasurer of the State of Illinois, Michael J. Howlett, Auditor of the State of Illinois, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Cecil C. Butler, Edward G. Thomson, Stanley A. Bass and Zane M. Cohn, Community Legal Counsel, and Curtis Heaston and Leo Holt, Cook County Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.
William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., and Thomas E. Brannigan and Peter C. Alexander, Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago, Ill., for defendants.
Harry S. Miller, Chicago, Ill., for amici curiae.
Before HASTINGS, Circuit Judge, and DECKER and MAROVITZ, District Judges.
Judgment Affirmed March 24, 1969. See 89 S.Ct. 1197.
This is a suit filed by a number of high school and elementary school students attending school within four school districts of Cook County, Illinois, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated challenging the constitutionality of various state statutes dealing with the financing of the public school system.1
Plaintiffs claim that these statutes2 violate their fourteenth amendment rights to equal protection and due process because they permit wide variations in the expenditures per student from district to district, thereby providing some students with a good education and depriving others, who have equal or greater educational need. Plaintiffs claim to be members of this disadvantaged group.
To correct this inequitable situation, they seek a declaration that the statutes are unconstitutional and a permanent injunction forbidding further distribution of tax funds in reliance on these laws.
The defendants are state officials charged with the administration of the legislation which allegedly permits this discrimination.
A three-judge district court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284. Defendants then moved to dismiss the complaint (1) for lack of jurisdiction and (2) for failure to state a cause of action.
We conclude that we have jurisdiction. After examining the complaint, and studying the extensive briefs filed by the respective parties as well as the brief of the amici curiae,3 we further conclude that no cause of action is stated for two principal reasons: (1) the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that public school expenditures be made only on the basis of pupils' educational needs,4 and (2) the lack of judicially manageable standards makes this controversy nonjusticiable. After explaining the structure of the existing Illinois legislation, this opinion will discuss these two conclusions in detail.
The federal courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter of this controversy. As stated in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 200, 82 S.Ct. 691, 701, 7 L. Ed.2d 663 (1962):
"Since the complaint plainly sets forth a case arising under the Constitution, the subject matter is within the federal judicial power defined in Art. III, § 2, and so within the power of Congress to assign to the jurisdiction of the District Courts."5
Similarly, the allegations do not present a political question because there is no potential conflict between coordinate branches of the federal government.6 Both the equal protection and the due process clauses have long been used to scrutinize state legislative action. See, e. g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 488-489, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955).7
The General Assembly has delegated authority to local school districts to raise funds by levying a tax on all property within the district. In addition, the school districts may issue bonds for constructing and repairing their buildings. Legislation limits both the maximum indebtedness and the maximum tax rate which localities may impose for educational purposes. In 1966-67, the approximately 1300 districts had roughly $840 per pupil with which to educate their students, of which about 75% came from local sources, 20% was derived from state aid, and 5% was supplied by the federal government. Since the financial ability of the individual districts varies substantially, per pupil expenditures vary between $480 and $1,000. State statutes which permit such wide variations allegedly deny the less fortunate Illinois students of their Constitutional rights.
Article VIII, section 1 of the Illinois Constitution, S.H.A. requires the legislature to "provide a thorough and efficient system of free schools, whereby all children of this state may receive a good common school education." Accordingly, a state common school fund supplements each district's local property tax revenues, guaranteeing a foundation level of $400 per student. The common school fund has two main components: (1) a flat grant to districts for each pupil, and (2) an equalization grant awarded to each district which levies a minimum property tax rate.8 The equalization grant is calculated on the assumption that the district only assesses the minimum rate. Total revenues from the state common school fund account for about 15%—18% of all districts' income.
The local tax revenue per student which is necessarily generated by the preceding minimum rate9 is added to the flat grant per pupil. If this sum is less than $400, the difference is the equalization grant. Therefore, every district levying the minimum rate is assured of at least $400 per child. On the other hand, if a locality desires to tax itself more heavily than the minimum rate, it is not penalized by having the additional revenue considered before determination of the equalization grant. Since the hypothetical calculation uses the same tax rate for all localities, the assumed revenue per child depends upon the total assessed property value in a district and the number of students. Thus, the equalization grant tends to compensate for variations in property value per pupil from one district to another.
Finally, numerous special programs, both state and federal, supply about 10% of the districts' revenues. This "categorical aid" is allocated for particular purposes such as bus transportation or assistance to handicapped and disadvantaged children. Plaintiffs do not challenge these programs, conceding that they are rationally related to the educational needs of the students.10
The underlying rationale of the complaint is that only a financing system which apportions public funds according to the educational needs of the students satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment.11 Plaintiffs assert that the distribution of school revenues to satisfy these needs should not be limited by such arbitrary factors as variations in local property values or differing tax rates.
Clearly, there are wide variations in the amount of money available for Illinois' school districts, both on a per pupil basis and in absolute terms. Presumably, students receiving a $1000 education are better educated that those acquiring a $600 schooling.12 While the inequalities of the existing arrangement are readily apparent, the crucial question is whether it is unconstitutional. Since nearly three-quarters of the revenue comes from local property taxes, substantially equal revenue distribution would require revamping this method of taxation, with the result that districts with greater property values per student would help support the poorer districts.
While the state common school fund tends to compensate for the variations in school districts' assessed valuation per pupil, variation in actual expenditures remains approximately 3.0 to 1, 2.6 to 1, and 1.7 to 1 for elementary, high school and unit districts respectively. Though districts with lower property valuations usually levy higher tax rates, there is a limit to the amount of money which they can raise, especially since they are limited by maximum indebtedness and tax rates. Plaintiffs argue that state statutes authorizing these wide variations in assessed value per student are irrational, thus violating the due process clause. Moreover, under the equal protection clause, the students contend that the importance of education to the welfare of individuals and the nation requires the courts to invalidate the legislation if potential, alternative statutes incorporating the desirable aspects of the present system can also achieve substantially equal per pupil expenditures.13
Illustrating how the school financing could be improved, plaintiffs suggest two alternatives:14 (1) all students might receive the same dollar appropriations, or (2) the state could siphon off all money in excess of $ × per pupil which was produced by a given tax rate, in effect eliminating variations in local property values while leaving the districts free to establish their own tax rate.15
Without doubt, the educational potential of each child should be cultivated to the utmost, and the poorer school districts should have more funds with which to improve their schools. But the allocation of public revenues is a basic policy decision more appropriately handled by a legislature than a court. To illustrate, the following considerations might be relevant to a financing scheme: state-wide variations in costs and salaries, the relative efficiency of school districts, and the need for local experimentation.
As stated in Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co. v. Brownell,16 294 U.S. 580, 584, 55 S.Ct. 538, 540, 79 L.Ed. 1070 (1935):
"The burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of a statute rests on him who assails it * * * A statutory discrimination will not be set aside as the denial of equal protection of the laws if any state of facts reasonably may...
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...no such conflict here under the Guarantee Clause of the United States Constitution, Article IV, § 4, or otherwise. McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F.Supp. 327, 329-330 (N.D.Ill.1968); aff'd sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322, 89 S.Ct. 1197, 22 L.Ed.2d 308 Defendants argue that the action is ......
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