Mcinnis v. State
| Decision Date | 28 March 1934 |
| Docket Number | 25,991 |
| Parties | McInnis v. State of Indiana |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From Sullivan Circuit Court; Arthur E. Debaun, Judge.
James D. McInnis was convicted of employing a miner not holding a certificate or permit, and he appealed.
Reversed.
Charles D. Hunt, for appellant.
James M. Ogden, Attorney-General, and Merl M. Wall Deputy Attorney-General, for the State.
This is a criminal prosecution against the appellant by affidavit charging him with violating §§ 10068, Burns, 1926, §§ 46-1009, Burns 1933, §§ 11073, Baldwin's 1934, by unlawfully permitting a person to be employed under him in a mine under his charge or supervision, as a miner, who did not hold a certificate or permit.
Omitting the formal parts, the affidavit is as follows:
"Frank Barnhart being duly sworn upon his oath says that one, James D. McInnis, a person late of said County, on the 11th day of October A.D. 1930, did then and there unlawfully suffer and permit one, Raymond Dorman to be employed as a coal miner under him, the said James D. McInnis in the coal mine known as the City Mine, then and there in the said County of Sullivan and State of Indiana, said mine being then and there under the charge and supervision of him, the said James D. McInnis; when he, the said Raymond Dorman did not then and there hold a certificate or permit to work as such coal miner in said mine as required by section 17 of the Acts of 1923 of the laws of the State of Indiana, said act being then and there entitled, 'An act concerning Coal Mines' contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana."
The defendant moved to quash the affidavit; the motion was overruled; the defendant pleaded not guilty; he was tried by the court and found guilty and fined one hundred dollars ($ 100.00) and costs. The appellant filed a motion in arrest of judgment; said motion was overruled and he then filed a motion for a new trial which motion was overruled.
The appellant relies upon three assignments of error for a reversal of this case which are as follows:
(1) The court erred in overruling appellant's motion to quash the affidavit.
(2) The court erred in overruling appellant's motion in arrest of judgment.
(3) The court erred in overruling appellant's motion for a new trial.
The motion for a new trial sets out several reasons but, as the judgment must be reversed, we will consider only the first two reasons assigned which are as follows:
(1) The finding of the court is contrary to law.
(2) The finding of the court is not sustained by sufficient evidence.
We do not think the court committed error in overruling the motion to quash and the motion in arrest of judgment. The affidavit is based upon §§ 10068 and 10080, Burns 1926, §§ 46-1009, 46-1108, Burns 1933, §§ 11073, 11081, Baldwin's 1934. Section 10068 is as follows:
The affidavit follows substantially the language of the statute, and, as said in Faulkner v. State (1923), 193 Ind. 663, 141 N.E. 514:
"Where the statute defines an offense and states what acts shall constitutes a violation thereof, it is sufficient to charge the offense in the language of the statute."
We now come to the question, Did the court err in overruling appellant's motion for a new trial? The answer to this question depends upon the construction to be placed upon § 10080, s...
To continue reading
Request your trial