McInnis v. Weinberger

Decision Date10 January 1975
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 74-1481-T.
PartiesDorothy McINNIS et al., Plaintiffs, v. Caspar W. WEINBERGER, Individually and in his capacity as Secretary, United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Valerie Vanaman, Harvard Legal Aid Bureau, Cambridge, Mass., Charles Capace, Boston, Mass., for plaintiffs.

William A. Brown, Asst. U. S. Atty., Boston, Mass., Danielle E. DeBenedictis, Boston, Mass., for defendants.

OPINION

TAURO, District Judge.

Dorothy McInnis, Richard Cardeiro and Blanche Davis are residents of Massachusetts who are currently receiving benefits under the new federal Supplemental Security Income Program (S.S. I.)1, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. They bring this action on behalf of themselves and all Massachusetts S.S.I. recipients challenging a decision by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare that they are no longer eligible to receive food stamps under the Food Stamps and Commodity Distribution Program. 7 U.S.C. § 2011; 7 U.S.C. § 1431 et seq.2

Jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1337.

Defendant Caspar W. Weinberger is Secretary of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare. HEW is the implementing agency for the S.S.I. program. 42 U.S.C. § 1383. Defendant Earl Butz is Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture. As such, he is required to administer the Food Stamps and Commodity Distribution program. 7 U.S.C. § 2019.

Defendant Stephen A. Minter is the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare. His department administers public assistance programs in Massachusetts, including certification and issuance of food stamps. Com. ¶ 8, Defendant John F. Mungoran is responsible for the administration of grant-in-aid programs for bind public assistance recipients. He is the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Commission For the Blind.

Plaintiffs seek a declaration that Secretary Weinberger's action resulting in the elimination of Food Stamp and Commodity Distribution eligibility for Massachusetts recipients of S.S.I. benefits was invalid because it violated the requirements of the Food Stamp Act Amendments of 1973. P.L. 93-233 § 8(c). In addition, plaintiffs contend that defendant Weinberger's determination was violative of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

The defendants maintain that they complied with the statute, and in so doing, did not violate the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.

Plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order against the defendants was granted following a hearing on May 8, 1974. At a further hearing on June 19, the parties agreed to postpone further action on the case until Congress either extended, amended or ignored P. L. 93-233 before its expiration date of June 30. On October 8, 1974, the parties submitted, on the pleadings and papers filed, for a decision on the merits.

I.
A.

On October 31, 1972, President Nixon signed into law H.R. 1 (P.L. 92-603, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq.), a bill providing a guaranteed annual income for the aged, blind, and disabled. The bill amended Title XVI of the original Social Security Act (49 Stat. 620) and replaced a patchwork of state-administered assistance programs for the adult aged, blind and disabled with a streamlined plan for direct federal payments to eligible recipients. The new program, entitled Supplemental Security Income, was to take effect on January 1, 1974. See 58 Cornell L.Rev. 803 (1973).

Under the old "categorical" programs, the states had broad discretion to establish grant levels, resulting in wide disparities in the amount of assistance received by individuals throughout the country, and inadequate aid for many of the nation's most needy citizens. 42 U. S.C. § 301. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970); cf., Baxter v. Minter, 378 F. Supp. 1213 (D.Mass.1974). See also Musgrave, Heller & Peterson, Cost Effectiveness of Alternative Income Maintenance Schemes, 23 Nat'l Tax J. 140 (1970). Under S.S.I., however, all recipients receive at least a minimum payment of $140 per month regardless of where they live.3 See H.R.Rep. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 147 (1971). States then have the option of supplementing the federal payment to any level they choose.4 42 U.S.C. § 1382e; Welfare Law Survey—Developments in Welfare Law—1973, 59 Cornell L.Rev. 859, 887-92 (1974) hereinafter Welfare Law Survey.

If a state decides to supplement the basic S.S.I. grant, it must chose between two supplementation plans. Welfare Law Survey 889. It can either administer the payment of S.S.I supplements itself or it can enter into an agreement with the Secretary of H.E.W. under which the federal government would administer the entire program. The second alternative would be vastly more efficient because a single agency would administer all state supplemental programs from Washington. See H.R.Rep. No. 24, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 199 (1971).

In order to encourage the states to chose federal administration, Congress offered two financial incentives. First, all administrative costs would be borne by the federal government. 42 U.S.C. § 1382d; Blong & Thorkelson, State Supplementation of Benefits Under the Supplemental Security Income (S.S.I.) Program, 6 Clearinghouse Review 655 (March 1973). See Stipulation of Facts & Documents ¶ 12 hereinafter Stipulation. Second, and most significantly, if a state chose federal administration, it would be reimbursed for the costs resulting from increasing S.S.I. caseloads. 42 U.S.C. § 1382e note, as amended, Pub.L. No. 93-233, 87 Stat. 969; Stipulation ¶ 12. In the language of the commentators, a state would be "held harmless" for the costs of supplementary payments over a predetermined level. Welfare Law Survey 889.

"Held harmless" is a term of art which means that the state is protected from future fiscal liability due to increasing caseloads by limiting such liability to the total amount of money that it paid under grant-in-aid programs in effect in calendar year 1972. However, the hold harmless amount only protects states against the costs of increased caseloads, not against increases in state supplementary payment levels.

Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 5. See California Legislative Council For Older Americans v. Weinberger, 375 F.Supp. 216, 219-220 (E.D.Cal.1974).

In order to determine whether a state is eligible for hold harmless benefits, and if so, to what degree, the state must make two calculations. First it must compute its adjusted payment level (A. P.L.). A.P.L. is an actuarial figure equal to the average amount of relief an otherwise indigent recipient would have received under the old categorical programs in January, 1972. 42 U.S.C. § 1382e note, as amended Pub.L. No. 93-233, 87 Stat. 969; Stipulation ¶ 13. The figure would no doubt differ from state to state and would also vary within each state for each of the categorical programs (i. e., aid to the aged, blind, disabled). In some states the A.P.L. would also include the "bonus value" of food stamps; a point which becomes important in determining whether S.S.I. recipients in that state are eligible to participate in the Food Stamp Program. Stipulation ¶ 13.

The second step is a calculation of the state's supplementary payment level (S. P.L.). This figure equals the total of the planned federal S.S.I. grant plus the state supplement. Like the A.P.L., the S.P.L. might also include the bonus value of food stamps. Id.

After these two calculations are made, the figures are then compared. If the A.P.L. and the S.P.L. are equal, the federal government will pay the state the difference between its 1972 expenditures for categorical assistance and its current expenditures under S.S.I. However, if the S.P.L. exceeds the A.P.L. the increased costs to the state attributable to that difference will not be assumed by Washington. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382e note, as amended, Pub.L. No. 93-233, 87 Stat. 969.

From a fiscal vantagepoint, it is to a state's advantage to set a supplementary payment level equal to, but not greater than, the adjusted payment level. See Irizarry v. Weinberger, 381 F.Supp. 1146, 1152-1153 (S.D.N.Y.1974).

B.

On another front, Massachusetts, like other states, has participated in programs administered by the United States Department of Agriculture to increase the food purchasing power of improverished Americans. Two alternative programs exist to accomplish this goal: the Food Stamp Program, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq. and the Commodities Distribution Program, 7 U.S.C. § 1431. See generally Welfare Law Survey 892-93 ns. 196 & 197. By June 30, 1974, however, Massachusetts residents were eligible for benefits only under the Food Stamp Program. 7 U.S.C. § 2019(e) (8).

The Food Stamp Act of 1964 was enacted by Congress as one of the keystones of the War on Poverty. Welfare Law Survey 892. It was designed to provide an alternative to direct distribution of federal foodstuffs, to more efficiently provide an adequate nutritional level for low income households and to boost the agricultural economy. 7 U.S. C. § 2011.

Under the program, every eligible household receives a monthly coupon allotment for which it pays a percentage of its face value. 7 U.S.C. § 2013(a). The coupons may be used to purchase domestic and imported foods at stores certified by the Agriculture Department, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2012(b), 2015(b), 2019(h), cf. Kentucky Fried Chicken v. United States, 449 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1971).

The number of coupons each household receives depends upon the number of individuals in that household. See, e. g., 38 Fed.Reg. 8287 (1973); Parker, King & Maloney, Polyunsaturated Placebos for the Poor: Food Stamps, the Food Industry and Government Regulation, 17 How.L.J. 489, 505 (1972). The cost of those coupons, however, varies depending upon the...

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3 cases
  • Hein v. Burns
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa
    • 10 Octubre 1975
    ...Even if the case is interpreted to be contrary to the result reached here, we would not be inclined to follow it. McInnis v. Weinberger (D.C.Mass., 1975), 388 F.Supp. 381 and Irizarry v. Weinberger (S.D.N.Y., 1974), 381 F. Supp. 1146, involved the problems created by the differing effect of......
  • McInnis v. Weinberger, No. 75--1119
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
    • 5 Febrero 1976
    ...the Fifth Amendment. The district court upheld the Secretary's interpretation of the statute and found no constitutional defect. 388 F.Supp. 381 (D.Mass.1975). We Resolution of the statutory issue involves threading our way through a sequence of statutes enacted to accomplish significant ch......
  • Ashley v. Butz, Civ. A. No. 75-0333-R.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
    • 23 Febrero 1976
    ...These cases are: Patrick v. Tennessee Department of Public Welfare et al., 386 F.Supp. 944 (E.D.Tenn., 1974); McInnis v. Weinberger et al., 388 F.Supp. 381 (D.Mass., 1975). There being no binding authority in the Fourth Circuit, this Court is persuaded by the reasoning of those judges who u......

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