McIntosh v. State
| Citation | 51 N.E. 354,151 Ind. 251 |
| Decision Date | 13 October 1898 |
| Docket Number | 18,580 |
| Parties | McIntosh v. The State |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Cass Circuit Court.
Affirmed.
Lairy & Mahoney and McConnell & Jenkines, for appellant.
William A. Ketcham, Attorney-General, G. S. Kistler and F. M Kistler, for State.
Appellant was charged by indictment, tried by a jury, and convicted of murder in the first degree, and his punishment fixed at imprisonment in the State prison for life, and, over his motion for a new trial, judgment was rendered accordingly. The only reasons which are urged for a reversal of this judgment are that the trial court erred in giving instructions number fourteen, fifteen, twenty, and thirty. The evidence upon which appellant was convicted has not been certified to this court. Therefore, in accordance with the well settled rule, we will not consider the instructions erroneous if they would have been correct under the issues upon any supposable state of the evidence. Johns v State, 104 Ind. 557, 4 N.E. 153; Wenning v. Teeple, 144 Ind. 189, 41 N.E. 600.
By the fourteenth instruction, the court advised the jury that, under the law, the defendant was a competent witness in his own behalf, but that they were the judges of the weight which ought to be given to his testimony, and that, in deciding upon such weight, they should take into consideration all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case, as disclosed by the evidence, and give defendant's testimony such weight only as they believed it to be entitled to in view of all the facts and circumstances proved on the trial. Surely this instruction, so far as it professed to go, cannot be said to be prejudicial to the appellant.
Charge number fifteen is as follows: It is contended by counsel for appellant that this instruction, in effect, informed the jury that, as a legal rule, the testimony of the defendant was not entitled to as much weight as that of other witnesses, or, in other words, that his testimony must be tested by a more rigid rule than that which is applicable to other witnesses. Appellant's insistence is that the court, by advising the jury that they were not required to receive blindly the testimony of the accused as true, cast discredit in the minds of the jury upon his testimony. It appears, however, that the court, in the same charge, told the jury that they were not at liberty to disregard the testimony of the defendant, but must give it due consideration, and determine whether or not his statements were true. This part of the instruction, certainly, was as favorable to the defendant as he could desire. It must be evident, also, if the jury blindly received his testimony as true, it would be the equivalent of their receiving or accepting it as it came from his lips, without the exercise upon their part of any judgment in the determination of its truth or falsity. Certainly, an admonition to the jury against acting in such a manner in receiving the testimony of the defendant, or that of any other witness in the case, if the court under the circumstances deemed it essential, would be proper. When the accused made himself a witness in his own behalf, his testimony became subject to the same rules as other witnesses, and his interest or lack of interest in the result of the trial, his manner of testifying, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of his statements, and all other facts or circumstances disclosed by the evidence in the case, which could in any manner aid the jury in weighing his testimony, were matters which they were authorized to consider in testing the weight or credibility thereof. The statements of the defendant, as a witness in the case, were subject to the same tests as that of other witnesses, no more or no less. Anderson v. State, 104 Ind. 467, 4 N.E. 63; Deal v. State, 140 Ind. 354, 39 N.E. 930.
While this instruction standing alone cannot be said to be a complete or accurate statement to the jury of the rules by which they ought to be guided in weighing the testimony of the defendant, and while it may also be said that it is possibly open to the criticism that it singles out the defendant, and directs the admonition or advice therein given alone to his testimony, yet, in the absence of the evidence, we would not be in a position to adjudge that appellant was prejudiced in any of his substantial rights thereby. But, aside from this view of the question, the court, by instruction number eighteen, given at the request of the defendant, instructed the jury that it was their duty to consider the defendant's testimony, together with all of the other evidence in the case; and, while it was their right to consider his interest in the result of the suit, still they were not, on that account, authorized to disregard his evidence; neither should they disregard it because he was charged with the crime described in the indictment. The court in this charge further informed the jury that, under the law, the defendant had the right to testify in his own behalf, and that they should consider and weigh his testimony, in the determination of his guilt or innocence, in like manner as that of any other witness, and to give to it such weight as in their opinion it merited; and if, from all of the evidence, when so considered together, they had a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, they should acquit him.
By instruction number twenty-four, given also at the request of the defendant, the jurors were advised that they were not at liberty to discredit the defendant's testimony because he is the defendant, but that it was their duty to consider it in the light of all the evidence and circumstances in the case, and if his evidence, when so considered, together...
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