McJunkin v. Cellasto Plastic Corp., Docket No. 110940, Calendar No. 5
| Court | Supreme Court of Michigan |
| Citation | 608 N.W.2d 57,461 Mich. 590 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 110940, Calendar No. 5 |
| Parties | Gary L. McJUNKIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CELLASTO PLASTIC CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Decision Date | 29 March 2000 |
608 N.W.2d 57
461 Mich. 590
v.
CELLASTO PLASTIC CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant
Docket No. 110940, Calendar No. 5
Supreme Court of Michigan.
Argued October 13, 1999.
Decided March 29, 2000.
Grzanka, Grit (by Constance J. Grzanka and Mark A. Warber), Grand Rapids, for defendant-appellant.
Richard F. Zapala, Lansing, for amicus curiae Accident Fund Company.
Daryl Royal, Dearborn, for amicus curiae Michigan Trial Lawyers Association.
Opinion
MARILYN J. KELLY, J.
Does subsection 301(5) of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act (WDCA)1 require automatic renewal of benefits when a disabled employee revokes an unreasonable refusal of reasonable employment and the employer reneges? We find that it does. Hence, we affirm the result reached by the Court of Appeals, but modify its rationale.
We conclude that, where an employee ends a period of unreasonable refusal, subsection 301(5) requires reinstatement of disability benefits. The result does not change where, as here, the employment is no longer available when the period of unreasonable refusal ends.
I
Plaintiff suffered a work-related back injury in January 1991. He received worker's compensation benefits and was advised not to work until August, when he began to perform a light-duty "net-assembly" job four hours a day.
Then, in December 1991, plaintiff had surgery on his back. The surgeon required him not to work until June 22, 1992. At that time, his employer offered plaintiff a version of his former net-assembly job. The offer was reasonable in that the job was structured to accommodate plaintiff's disability.
Plaintiff made an effort to perform the work, but left after approximately five minutes, complaining of severe back pain. Several days later, he obtained written instructions from his surgeon that he not return to work until further notice.
In July of 1992, defendant referred plaintiff to another doctor who examined him. The doctor found substantiation for plaintiff's subjective complaints of back pain. However, he concluded that plaintiff could return to work, with numerous restrictions. The employer again offered plaintiff the net-assembly position, but plaintiff refused it, relying on the instruction from his surgeon that he was not to work until further notice.
Plaintiff's surgeon was deposed on February 12, 1993, and was shown a videotape of the light-duty net-assembly job. The surgeon concluded that plaintiff probably could perform the work, but that he would likely suffer pain and that he needed to be integrated into full-time work gradually.
Plaintiff, who had attended his surgeon's deposition, telephoned defendant the same day and offered to accept the employment. He was informed that the net-assembly job had just been restructured. Two people instead of three now
Plaintiff sought reinstatement of his disability benefits. The magistrate found that he suffered from a work-related injury that required surgery and restricted his ability to perform certain physical tasks. However, the magistrate terminated plaintiff's benefits, because he had unreasonably refused to perform work that was within his limitations.
The Worker's Compensation Appellate Commission affirmed the magistrate's ruling. Additionally, it found that defendant was not required to keep open the offer of reasonable employment indefinitely, but only for a reasonable period. By implication, the WCAC held that the seven months defendant kept the reasonable employment offer available before restructuring it was a reasonable period.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the WCAC that plaintiff unreasonably refused reasonable employment. However, it reversed the holding that plaintiff automatically forfeited his benefits when he refused the offer of employment. It held that, if an employer can no longer offer reasonable employment to a disabled employee willing to do it, benefits are reinstated for however long the employee is available to work.
Initially, we denied defendant's application. 459 Mich. 854, 584 N.W.2d 586 (1998). We later granted reconsideration to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred as a matter of law by holding that, under the circumstances, the WDCA never allows a permanent forfeiture of benefits.2 459 Mich. 927, 589 N.W.2d 780 (1998).
II
Defendant points out that there was no clear majority in this Court's opinion in Derr v. Murphy Motors Freight Lines, 452 Mich. 375, 550 N.W.2d 759 (1996). Therefore, it asserts, the Derr decision does not constitute binding authority under the doctrine of stare decisis. See Negri v. Slotkin, 397 Mich. 105, 109, 244 N.W.2d 98, 244 N.W.2d 98 (1976).
Defendant claims that the controlling authority is Russell v. General Motors Corp., 172 Mich.App. 627, 432 N.W.2d 738 (1988). In Russell, the employee unreasonably refused the employer's offer of favored work. The Court of Appeals held that the employer had to keep open its offer only for a reasonable time.
Defendant notes that plaintiff in this case unreasonably refused its offer of reasonable employment and that, nonetheless, it kept the position available for nearly seven months. Hence, applying the Russell "reasonable time limitation," plaintiff is not now entitled to reinstatement of benefits.
III
In 1981, the Legislature amended the WDCA, codifying the judicially created favored work doctrine into its present form. Pulver v. Dundee Cement Co., 445 Mich. 68, 74-75, 515 N.W.2d 728 (1994); see also 1981 PA 200, 1981 PA 199. Regarding the suspension of disability benefits when an employee unreasonably refuses an offer of reasonable employment, the Legislature an employee unreasonably refuses an offer of reasonable employment, the Legislature provided:
If disability is established pursuant to subsection (4), entitlement to weekly wage loss benefits shall be determined pursuant to this section and as follows:
(a) If an employee receives a bona fide offer of reasonable employment from the previous employer, another employer, or through the Michigan employment security commission and the employee refuses that employment without good and reasonable cause, the employee shall be considered to have voluntarily removed himself or herself from
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