McKay v. Corwine
Decision Date | 12 March 1918 |
Docket Number | 9,486 |
Citation | 118 N.E. 978,69 Ind.App. 238 |
Parties | MCKAY v. CORWINE ET AL |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Rehearing denied May 28, 1918. Transfer denied January 24 1919.
From Marion Superior Court (95,955); Theophilus J. Moll, Judge.
Action by Dessie M. Corwine against Martha N. McKay and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, the defendant named appeals.
Affirmed.
Elmer E. Stevenson, for appellant.
Charles W. Miller and Henry M. Dowling, for appellee.
This action was brought by appellee, Dessie M. Corwine, against appellant on a note signed by Horace McKay and appellant, payable to plaintiff, and to foreclose a mortgage on certain real estate given to secure it. Certain other junior lienholders were made parties defendant to answer to their interests.
The complaint is in one paragraph, and is in the usual form in such actions. Appellant answered by general denial and three special paragraphs, setting up with slight variations the defense of suretyship. Other pleadings were filed, but what we have indicated is sufficient for an understanding of the questions presented.
The trial court found that appellant was a principal on the note and mortgage, decreed a foreclosure of the mortgage, and rendered personal judgment against her for the deficiency.
The controlling question is whether or not there is evidence to sustain the decision of the trial court that appellant was a principal on the note and mortgage. If her obligation was that of a surety it is admitted in effect that she is not liable.
In considering the sufficiency of the evidence, we must take the evidence most favorable to the appellee and the inferences to be drawn in appellee's favor. Southern Product Co. v. Franklin Coil Hoop Co. (1915), 183 Ind. 123, 129, 106 N.E. 872.
The undisputed facts show that for a period of about twenty-five years Horace McKay (appellant's husband), hereinafter referred to as McKay, was the trusted agent of various persons, including appellee, in handling of trust funds, making investments, collecting the principal and interest in such investments, and similar service. About the year 1907 McKay's health began to fail, and at that time he wanted to close his business with appellee, but at her solicitation continued to act as her agent until in 1909, when his health became such that he sent for appellee to come and they would close their business. Appellee, together with her attorney, came to Indianapolis, and an audit of the books was made. It was found that McKay had approximately $ 25,000 in property belonging to appellee to surrender, and it was also found that he was indebted to her in a considerable sum, approximating $ 5,500. In making the final settlement between them, McKay and appellee executed a contract, which was introduced in evidence, and provides, among other things, that "Dessie M. Corwine will take, also the following described real estate, which now stands in her name or will, at the time of this settlement, be conveyed to her," and that McKay and appellant "will execute to Dessie M. Corwine their promissory note * * * for $ 2,500 * * * secured by a mortgage" on the property in question, and provided also that when the details of said agreement had been carried out it would stand as a release of all claims of whatsoever, nature between the parties.
Appellant was present during the negotiations between McKay and appellee, through their attorneys, but she is not shown to have taken any part in the negotiations, except that on the same date the agreement was entered into she joined with her husband in the execution of the note and mortgage sued on. Appellant knew of the kind of business her husband was doing and that he was investing money of others and making his livelihood out of the commission earned thereby. Appellant had inherited a considerable amount of property from an ancestral estate, which she turned over to her husband to invest, and which he did invest, together with money from his business, in property which was taken in their joint names. At the time of making the agreement and at the time of his death in May, 1914, McKay held no property in his own name. Appellant and her husband kept a joint bank account in which all the rents from real estate and other money, with the exception of very limited personal accounts, were deposited in their joint names and checked out on their joint order.
Thomas D. Stevenson as witness for appellant testified as to certain facts disclosed by the audit of the books, in substance, as follows: McKay had been managing appellee's property for several years. His books showed that he had received money from her and that he had loaned it out to different people and sometimes collected loans and reloaned the money and in many cases sent money to her in New York. As a result of the audit of the books we found that there was a balance of property belonging to appellee in McKay's hands that should be turned over to her.
Appellant as a witness for appellee testified: ...
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