McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., U.S.A., Inc.

• Decision Date: 12 May 1997
• Docket Number: No. 95-5617,95-5617
• Citation: 110 F.3d 369
• Parties: , 6 A.D. Cases 933, 9 NDLR P 300 Pamela McKAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TOYOTA MOTOR MANUFACTURING, U.S.A., INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 369

110 F.3d 369

65 USLW 2653, 6 A.D. Cases 933, 9 NDLR P 300

Pamela McKAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TOYOTA MOTOR MANUFACTURING, U.S.A., INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 95-5617.

United States Court of Appeals,Sixth Circuit.

Argued May 13, 1996.

Decided April 8, 1997.

Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied May

12, 1997. ^*

Thomas W. Moak (argued and briefed), Stumbo, Bowling & Barber, Prestonsburg, KY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

John A. West, Jeffrey A. Savarise (argued and briefed), Thomas M. Williams, Greenebaum, Doll & McDonald, Louisville, KY, for Defendant-Appellee.

Susan L. Starr (argued), Gail S. Coleman (briefed), Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of General Counsel, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

Before: NORRIS and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges; HILLMAN, District Judge. ^**

NORRIS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAUGHTREY, J., joined. HILLMAN, D.J. (pp. 374-82), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Pamela McKay appeals the district court's order granting summary judgment to defendant Toyota Motor Manufacturing, U.S.A. Plaintiff alleged that she was terminated from her assembly-line position with Toyota in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, because of a physical disability caused by carpal tunnel syndrome. We affirm the judgment of the district court because we conclude that plaintiff's impairment disqualified her from only a narrow range of repetitive-motion positions and not from working in the broader class of manufacturing jobs. She was therefore not an individual with a disability who qualified for protection under the Act.

I.

Plaintiff began working in Toyota's Georgetown, Kentucky, plant in March 1992, shortly before her twenty-third birthday. She initially worked in the body-weld division, but reported to the company's health service after just ten days on the production line.

The health service placed her on a modified work program consistent with company policy. She was restricted to lifting weights of less than ten pounds, was to avoid pushing or pulling, and was told to avoid vibrating tools. Despite an attempt to re-introduce her to the line, she suffered pain in her right forearm and was sent home for rest on April 22. She returned to work on May 11, but complained of pain and swelling after one day of restricted duty. After another furlough, she returned to modified duty in the body-weld department on June 8.

On September 22, an orthopedic surgeon diagnosed plaintiff with carpal tunnel syndrome and muscle inflammation. After undergoing a physical therapy program in December, plaintiff returned to work on a modified duty assignment in the plastics department. Eventually, plaintiff began working full-time in the plastics department with some physical restrictions: maximum lifting of twenty pounds; no vibrating tools; and no repetitive use of her right hand. Nonetheless, on May 24, 1993, plaintiff advised her group leader that she continued to have considerable pain in her arm and was sent home for rest by the in-house health service. On June 4, Toyota terminated her for excessive absences, pursuant to its medical leave of absence policy. In her complaint, plaintiff alleged she is a "qualified individual with a disability" and that defendant discharged her "because of her disability."

II.

The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating "against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A person seeking relief under the ADA for termination must establish (1) that she is a disabled person within the meaning of the Act, (2) that she is qualified to perform the essential functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) that she suffered an adverse employment decision because of her disability. Monette v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1179 (6th Cir.1996). Because the district court concluded that plaintiff had not established she was a disabled person as contemplated by the Act, it did not consider whether she was qualified to perform the essential functions of her job with or without accommodation, or whether she was discharged because of her disability.

The ADA provides this definition of disability:

The term "disability" means, with respect to an individual--

(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;

(B) a record of such an impairment; or

(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). The ADA empowers the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") to promulgate regulations that will further define the scope and reach of the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 12116. The EEOC has defined "major life activity" to include both caring for oneself and working. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). Plaintiff contends that her disability limits both of these activities. In reaching its decision as to whether plaintiff was in fact a disabled person, the district court held:

In order to show that she is substantially limited in the major life activity of working, McKay must prove that she is "significantly restricted in ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person with comparable training, skills, and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).

....

At the time of her termination from [Toyota], McKay was a 24 year old college graduate, working on earning her teaching certificate. Given her educational background and age, she is qualified for numerous positions "not utilizing" the skills she learned as an automobile assembler. Merely because she can no longer perform repetitive factory work does not render her significantly limited under the ADA.... McKay has not established that she is significantly restricted in her ability to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to similarly-situated persons with comparable training, skills and abilities. Therefore, she is not substantially limited in the major life activity of working.

McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., U.S.A., Inc., 878 F.Supp. 1012, 1015 (E.D.Ky.1995). The court also concluded that plaintiff was not limited in the "major life activity" of caring for herself because "the only household function McKay claims to be substantially limited in is mopping." Id. Finally, the court concluded that a diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome, by itself, was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether plaintiff was disabled within the contemplation of the ADA. Id. at 1016.

On appeal, plaintiff contends that genuine issues of material fact concerning whether she is an individual with a disability precluded summary judgment. The EEOC, as amicus curiae, joins the argument on her side of the table, contending that:

The ADA and its implementing regulations require the court to look at the class of jobs from which McKay is disqualified, not the class of jobs that she can perform. Because of her carpal tunnel syndrome, McKay is disqualified from performing any manual labor exceeding light duty. She therefore cannot perform (without accommodation) the job at issue with Toyota. She also cannot perform (without accommodation) manual labor for any other employer. Accordingly, McKay is disqualified from an entire class of jobs. Her ability to perform completely unrelated work has no bearing on whether she is "disabled" with respect to manual labor....

....

... The court should have looked at the extent to which McKay's impairment disqualifies her from the type of job at issue, not the extent to which she can do other work.

This court reviews the award of summary judgment de novo, using the same standard as the district court. Cox v. Kentucky Dep't of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 149 (6th Cir.1995). Having conducted such a review, we now affirm the judgment below.

Under the terms of the ADA, all parties agree that carpal tunnel syndrome constitutes a "physical impairment." The next question, then, is whether plaintiff's condition "substantially limits" a major life activity. As already noted, working falls within the definition of major life activity. According to the relevant regulation, "The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (emphasis added). Plaintiff appears to contend that the district court based its ruling upon a holding that her carpal tunnel syndrome only rendered her unable to perform a single, particular job. The EEOC, on the other hand, argues the district court's holding is predicated on the jobs plaintiff could perform, rather than those she could not perform. We think both read the district court's opinion too narrowly.

As the regulations make clear, the question before the district court concerned whether plaintiff had carried her burden of establishing that her physical impairment significantly restricted her ability to perform "either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes." In making this determination, a court should consider:

(i) The nature and severity of the impairment;

(ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and

(iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2). In addition, courts may consider several...