McKee v. Home Buyers Warranty Corp. II
Decision Date | 27 February 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 94-30153,94-30153 |
Citation | 45 F.3d 981 |
Parties | Karen McKEE, Wife of/and Curtis K. Kilpatrick, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HOME BUYERS WARRANTY CORPORATION II, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Michael R. Allweiss, Steven M. Spiegel, Lowe, Stein, Hoffman, Allweiss & Hauver, New Orleans, LA, for appellants.
Jay H. Kern, Charles C. Coffee, Simon, Peragine, Smith & Redfearn, New Orleans, LA, for appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.
Before WHITE 1, Associate Justice (Ret.), BARKSDALE and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
Karen McKee, Wife of/and Curtis K. Kilpatrick (the "Kilpatricks") filed this action against Home Buyers Warranty Corporation II ("HBW") to recover for damage to their home which they contend was covered under HBW's structural warranty. HBW filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the dispute was conclusively resolved in a prior arbitration. The district court granted the motion. The Kilpatricks now appeal, contending that the arbitration was not binding. Because the district court correctly determined that HBW was entitled to summary judgment based on the prior arbitration, we affirm.
The Kilpatricks bought a house in 1985. The builder enrolled the house in HBW's limited ten-year structural warranty program.
The house suffered from excessive differential settlement and the Kilpatricks filed a claim with HBW. HBW sent the Kilpatricks a letter notifying them that it had denied their claim because HBW had determined that the defect did not render the house "unsafe, unsanitary, or otherwise unlivable" as required to invoke coverage under the warranty. HBW stated that arbitration was required before any litigation and referred the Kilpatricks to the provision in their warranty booklet requiring conciliation or arbitration as a condition precedent to any attempted litigation.
The Kilpatricks requested through their attorney that the matter be submitted to arbitration with the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") as provided in the warranty booklet. The Kilpatricks' attorney reviewed the AAA rules and represented them at the arbitration. The arbitrator determined that the problems with the Kilpatricks' house were not covered by the warranty and ruled in favor of HBW. The Kilpatricks did not appeal the arbitrator's decision or file a proceeding in court to have it vacated, modified, or corrected. Instead the Kilpatricks filed suit on the contract in Louisiana state court, and HBW removed to federal court based on diversity of citizenship.
Along with its answer, HBW filed a counterclaim for confirmation of the earlier arbitration. HBW also filed a motion for summary judgment based on arbitration and award. The district court granted the motion and the arbitration award was confirmed.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. E.g., Insurance Company of North America v. Dealy, 911 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir.1990). Our review of the district court's confirmation of an arbitrator's award is likewise de novo. Executone Information Systems, Inc. v. Davis, 26 F.3d 1314 (5th Cir.1994). We also approach this case in the light of the "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration." Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 941, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983).
The central issue in this case is whether the district court correctly determined that the parties agreed to binding arbitration. The Kilpatricks contend that the warranty called for non-binding arbitration based on a provision in the warranty that "[t]he dispute resolution process shall precede any litigation attempted by either party." 2 The Kilpatricks argue that the fact that the warranty makes arbitration a condition precedent to litigation indicates that the arbitration is non-binding. We disagree.
Numerous courts have held that arbitration is binding where the rules under which the arbitration is conducted call for binding arbitration. E.g., Rainwater v. National Home Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 190 (4th Cir.1991) ( ); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 541 F.2d 1263, 1273 (7th Cir.1976) ( ); I/S Stavborg (O.H. Meling, Manager) v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424 (2d Cir.1974) ( ); see also Varley v. Tarrytown Associates, Inc., 477 F.2d 208, 210 (2d Cir.1973) ( ); cf. Dowling v. Home Buyers Warranty Corp. II, 428 S.E.2d 709 (S.C.1993) ( ). The decisions holding that reference to AAA rules as permitting entry of judgment are longstanding. Consequently, all parties are on notice that resort to AAA arbitration will be deemed both binding and subject to entry of judgment unless the parties expressly agree otherwise. Rainwater, 944 F.2d at 194.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that the warranty provided that AAA rules would govern if the dispute were submitted to AAA arbitration. The arbitration was conducted under AAA rules and those rules provided for binding arbitration unless the applicable law or the terms of the warranty specified otherwise. 3 We must therefore determine whether there is anything in the warranty that specifies non-binding arbitration.
We find the Kilpatricks contention that the "condition precedent" language in the warranty calls for non-binding arbitration unpersuasive. We agree with the Fourth Circuit's treatment of this issue in Rainwater:
Though [the Kilpatrick's] claim has some surface appeal, we think that the "condition precedent" language cannot carry all the weight [the Kilpatricks] would ascribe to it. Traditionally, federal courts were hostile to arbitration clauses since it was thought they could be avoided at the whim of either party. See generally Continental Grain Co. v. Dant & Russell, Inc., 118 F.2d 967 (9th Cir.1941) ( ). As a result, parties frequently included "condition precedent" language to make certain that the arbitration process ran its course before a federal court could entertain a suit. See, e.g., Pettus v. Olga Coal Co., 137 W.Va. 492, 72 S.E.2d 881, 885 (1952) ( ). Therefore, we read "condition precedent" to some extent as an artifact left over from the days of hostility toward arbitration. To the extent that the phrase has meaning, we find that it does not undermine the binding nature of arbitration, but instead applies to the confirmation process permitted by 9 U.S.C. Sec. 9, or to other litigation in which the arbitration award would be final but just a sub-text in some larger litigation context.
Because the Kilpatricks submitted the dispute to arbitration under AAA rules that required binding arbitration unless the warranty provided for non-binding arbitration, and the warranty did not provide for non-binding arbitration, the district court was correct in determining that the arbitration was binding.
The Kilpatricks assert that the threshold question of whether the parties agreed to binding arbitration is purely a matter of contract to be determined according to state law. The Kilpatricks contend that if we construe the warranty according to Louisiana law, the federal policy favoring arbitration would not apply and that a state policy requiring that ambiguities in a document be resolved against the sophisticated drafter would control. The difficulty with this argument is that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. Sec. 2, declares that written agreements to arbitrate are enforceable when contained in a contract involving interstate commerce, see Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 834, 130 L.Ed.2d 753 (1995), and the Kilpatricks' warranty certainly falls within this category. The Supreme Court has explained that, in construing an arbitration agreement within the scope of the FAA, "as with any other contract, the parties' intentions control, but those intentions are generously construed as to issues of arbitrability." Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 105 S.Ct. 3346, 3354, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985). That is, the FAA "create[s] a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act," Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 941, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983), and that body of federal law requires that, "in applying general state-law principles of contract interpretation to the interpretation of an agreement within the scope of the Act, ... due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration." Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Stanford University, 489 U.S. 468, 475-76, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 1254, 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989). We think that this "federal policy favoring arbitration" covers more than simply the substantive scope of the...
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