McKee v. Kinev
Decision Date | 02 July 1968 |
Docket Number | No. 8475,8475 |
Citation | 160 N.W.2d 97 |
Parties | Dennis P. McKEE and Ronald J. McKee, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Ben KINEV, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The character of a contract for the sale of real estate is not destroyed where such contract also provides for sale of personal property.
2. In this State there is no common law in any case where the law is declared by the Code. Sec. 1--01--06, N.D.C.C.
3. When the wording of a statute is clear and free of all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. Sec. 1--02--05, N.D.C.C.
4. A vendor or the successor in interest of a contract for sale of real estate is barred from maintaining an action for a personal money judgment under the statutes of this State limiting deficiency judgments and suits upon moneys owing secured by a land contract except in connection with, or subsequent to, the cancellation or the foreclosure of a land contract. Secs. 32--19--06 and 32--19--07, N.D.C.C.
Rausch & Chapman, Bismarck, for defendant and appellant.
Linn Sherman, Steele, for plaintiffs and respondents.
This is an appeal by Ben Kinev, the defendant, from the judgment of the District Court of Kidder County, North Dakota, in favor of the plaintiffs, Dennis P. McKee and Ronald J. McKee. Kinev has demanded a trial de novo.
James McKee and Ben Kinev entered into a contract in writing on November 10, 1960, for the sale by McKee to Kinev of certain real and personal property. The total purchase price was $9,500.00, which was payable in installments, as set forth in the contract. There was no promissory note executed by Kinev and the property described in the contract was the security for the purchase price. The contract provided that legal title to the property was to be retained by the seller until the purchase price had been paid in full. Kinev assumed possession of the property as of November 10, 1960, and has continued in possession since that date. Kinev paid a total of $5,000.00 on the original purchase price and there remained an unpaid balance of $4,500.00, plus interest, all of which has been past due since November 10, 1963. The real estate was assessed at approximately two-thirds, and the personal property at approximately one-third, of the total assessed value of the property. There was no apportionment of consideration between the real property and the personal property described in the contract.
James McKee, the original owner and seller and a party to the contract, died on May 5, 1964. Dennis P. McKee and Ronald J. McKee became the owners of the contract as the heirs and devisees of the decedent. The action for a personal money judgment was commenced by them to collect the balance due and owing on the contract, together with interest and costs.
Kinev interposed an answer wherein he admitted the execution of the contract, that he was in default, and that a balance of $4,500.00 was due and owing thereunder; but he alleged that the sole and exclusive remedy for cancellation or foreclosure of a land contract is provided in Chapter 32--19 of the North Dakota Century Code, that neither a vendor nor his successors in interest are authorized or permitted to bring any action in any court of this State for the recovery of any part of the debt secured by a mortgage or land contract, and that the holder of a real estate mortgage or land contract is entitled only to a foreclosure of the mortgage or a cancellation or foreclosure of the land contract.
The plaintiffs and the defendant entered into a stipulation of facts, which reads as follows:
'It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the plaintiffs and the defendant, through their respective counsel, that in lieu of testimony, this action is hereby submitted to the Court upon the following stipulation of facts:
'IT IS STIPULATED that defendant may have an objection as to paragraph 2 with respect to the assessed value of the property on the ground that the same is irrelevant and immaterial.'
The case was presented to the trial court, which found in favor of the plaintiffs, and further found that the contract was not a contract for deed within the provisions and meaning of Sections 32--19--06 and 32--19--07, N.D.C.C., but was a contract for the sale of both real and personal property; that the action was not an action for the foreclosure or cancellation of a contract for deed, but was an action for the recovery of the balance due to the seller and his successors in interest under a contract for the sale of both real and personal property; and ordered a money judgment of $4,500.00, plus interest at the rate provided in the contract from November 10, 1963, together with costs and disbursements.
Kinev has taken an appeal from the judgment. The issues raised by the appeal in this court are two-fold: whether Sections 32--19--06 and 32--19--07, N.D.C.C., govern the contract in question; and, secondly, whether the McKees are entitled to secure a personal money judgment against Kinev. The pertinent portion of Section 32--19--06, N.D.C.C., provides as follows:
'* * * The mortgagee or vendor or the successor in interest of either shall not be permitted or authorized either before or after the rendition of a judgment for the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage or the cancellation or the foreclosure of a land contract, if such mortgage or contract was made after July 1, 1951, to bring any action in any court in this state for the recovery of any part of the debt secured by the mortgage or contract so foreclosed or canceled in excess of the amount by which such debt and the costs of the action exceed the fair value of the mortgaged premises. * * *'
The salient part of Section 32--19--07, N.D.C.C., which is applicable to the case as bar,...
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