McKeesport Area School Dist. v. Com., Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review

Decision Date07 February 1979
Citation40 Pa.Cmwlth. 334,397 A.2d 458
PartiesMcKEESPORT AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW and Doris J. Dzombak, Respondents. McKEESPORT AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW and Margaret A. Kuhl, Respondents. McKEESPORT AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW and Rita M. Teti, Respondents. McKEESPORT AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW and Edward F. Thomas, Respondents. McKEESPORT AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW and Ann E. Putman, Respondents. McKEESPORT AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW and Darlene C. Beachley, Respondents. McKEESPORT AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW and Edmund S. Kalinoski, Jr., Respondents. McKEESPORT AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW and Doris Martino, Respondents. McKEESPORT AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW and Phyllis L. Spiegel, Respondents. McKEESPORT AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW and Jane G. Beatty, Respondents. McKEESPORT AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD OF REVIEW and Alex E. Bahus et al., Respondents.
CourtPennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Peter J. King, John P. Papuga, Tucker, Arensberg & Ferguson, Pittsburgh, for petitioner.

Daniel R. Schuckers, Asst. Atty. Gen., Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, Harrisburg, Ronald N. Watzman, Shelley W. Elovitz, Watzman, DeAngelis & Elovitz, Pittsburgh, for respondents.

William Fearen, Michael I. Levin, Cleckner & Fearen, Harrisburg, for Pa. School Boards Ass'n.

MENCER, Judge.

The above captioned cases were consolidated for argument before this Court because they all involve unemployment compensation claimants who were unemployed during work stoppages which resulted from labor disputes with the McKeesport Area School District (School District). The Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) held that the claimants had been "locked out" within the meaning of Section 402(d) of the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Law, Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex.Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, As amended, 43 P.S. § 802(d), and were therefore eligible for Special Unemployment Assistance (SUA) benefits, pursuant to Title II of the Emergency Jobs and Unemployment Assistance Act of 1974 (Assistance Act), 26 U.S.C.A. § 3304. 1 The School District appealed to this Court. 2 We affirm.

While cases at Nos. 1458 through 1467 C.D.1977 involve identical facts, No. 1468 C.D.1977 involves different facts, and that case will therefore be considered separately.

Nos. 1458
-1467 C.D.1977

The referee's findings of fact in these cases are exceptionally complete and detailed, thus making our task somewhat easier. The following is a summary of the referee's findings which have not been challenged by the School District.

Claimants are school teachers employed by the School District and are members of the McKeesport Area Association (Union). The collective-bargaining agreement between the School District and the Union was scheduled to expire on August 30, 1976, and negotiations for a new agreement began in December 1975. During these negotiations, the Union made it clear that its members were willing to continue working beyond the August 30 deadline under the terms and conditions of the existing contract for as long as negotiations continued. On August 30, no new agreement having been concluded, the Union and the School District agreed to extend the expired contract on a day-to-day basis for as long as progress was being made in negotiations.

Pursuant to this agreement, claimants reported on their first scheduled day of work, September 3, 1976, a teachers' "in-service day". Classes were scheduled to begin on September 7, 1976. On Saturday, September 4, 1976, the Union's president became ill and the Union therefore requested that the negotiating session scheduled for that day be continued until Sunday, September 5. Upon receiving this request, the School District immediately notified the Union that the School District was cancelling the day-to-day extension of the expired agreement. The Union again advised the School District that its members were willing to continue to work under the terms and conditions of the agreement but the School District refused to allow work under those conditions.

Students reported to school on the first day of classes, September 7, but were later sent home because the Union members did not report for work. On September 8, 1976, the Union again expressed its willingness to work for an indefinite period under the expired agreement, but the School District again refused this offer. As a result, the work stoppage continued through September 23, 1976, when the dispute was submitted to arbitration and the School District agreed to allow work under the terms and conditions of the expired agreement. SUA benefits were granted to claimants for the period of the work stoppage.

The School District's first argument is based on Section 203(b) of the Assistance Act which, at the time this case arose, provided as follows:

"(b) An individual who performs services in an instructional, research, or principal administrative capacity for an educational institution or agency shall not be eligible to receive a payment of assistance or a waiting period credit with respect To any week commencing during the period between two successive academic years (or, when the contract provides instead for a similar period between two regular but not successive terms, during such similar period) if

"(1) such individual performed services in any such capacity for any educational institution or agency in the first of such academic years or terms; and

"(2) such individual has a contract to perform services in any such capacity for any educational institution or agency for the later of such academic years or terms." (Emphasis added.)

The School District contends that the "academic year" did not begin until September 23, 1976, when both teachers and students reported for work, and that the claimants were thus unemployed between "two successive academic years" and ineligible for SUA benefits under the above provision. We do not agree.

First, we note that, had the work stoppage commenced after only one day of academic instruction or even after half a day, Section 203(b) would clearly have no application. We are reluctant to hold that such an insignificant fact is determinative. Moreover, the phrase in parenthesis which follows the term "academic years" in Section 203(b) refers to a "Similar period between two Regular . . . terms" (emphasis added), indicating that Congress considered an "academic year" to be a regular, scheduled period, as opposed to an irregular, unpredictable period. The period of unemployment involved here did not occur between two regular periods; in fact, the period of unemployment arose suddenly and virtually without warning. In light of these considerations, we are convinced that Congress did not intend Section 203(b) to be applicable to the facts of this case.

The School District also argues that the claimants were not "locked out" but were on "strike" and therefore ineligible for benefits by virtue of Section 402(d) of the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Law. 3 The test to be applied in distinguishing a strike from a lockout for purposes of Section 402(d) was enunciated in Vrotney Unemployment Compensation Case, 400 Pa. 440, 444-45, 163 A.2d 91, 93-94 (1960):

"Have the employees offered to continue working for A reasonable time under the pre-existing terms and conditions of employment so as to avert a work stoppage pending the final settlement of the contract negotiations; And has the employer agreed to permit work to continue for a reasonable time under the pre-existing terms and conditions of employment pending further negotiations? If the employer refuses to so extend the expiring contract and maintain the status quo, then the resulting work stoppage constitutes a 'lockout' and the disqualification for unemployment compensation benefits in the case of a 'stoppage of work because of a labor dispute' does not apply." (Emphasis added.)

The School District contends that the Union's agreement to extend the expired contract on a day-to-day basis is insufficient to discharge the Union's duty to offer to continue working under the preexisting terms and conditions for "a reasonable time." However, what constitutes a "reasonable time" varies depending on the particular circumstances. Compare Lerch Unemployment Compensation Case, 400 Pa. 446, 163 A.2d 535 (1960), With Nelan Unemployment Compensation Case, 215 Pa.Super. 310, 264 A.2d 726 (1969). There is no indication that a day-to-day extension was unreasonable under the circumstances of this case, and the fact that the School District agreed to such an extension indicates that it felt it could indeed operate satisfactorily under such an arrangement.

Moreover, the School District's argument overlooks the fact that there is nothing in the record to suggest that it was the Union, rather than the School District, that wanted to restrict the agreement to a day-to-day extension rather than a longer period. What Is of record is that four days after agreeing to the day-to-day arrangement the School District cancelled it for the trivial reason that,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
22 cases
  • Hoffman v. Com., Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • April 27, 1990
    ...hours notice of a work stoppage was reasonable. Likewise, in McKeesport Area School District v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 40 Pa.Cmwlth. 334, 397 A.2d 458 (1978), the Commonwealth Court found that the teachers' offer to continue working under the expired contract on a day-to-day basi......
  • Hoffman v. Com., Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
    • September 3, 1986
    ..."reasonable time" varies depending on the particular circumstances of each case. McKeesport Area School District v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 40 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 334, 397 A.2d 458 (1979) (holding that day-to-day extension is not unreasonable for teachers) citing Hershey......
  • Oriti v. Board of Review, Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, s. 44918
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • March 31, 1983
    ... ... , were eligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits because they were locked ... See School Dist. of the City of Erie v. Unemployment ... 460, 409 A.2d 982; McKeesport Area School Dist. v. Unemployment Compensation ... ...
  • Sunstar Foods, Inc. v. Uhlendorf, 52001.
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • October 22, 1981
    ...in question. See, e. g., Assif v. Adm'r Unempl. Comp. Act, 137 Conn. 393, 77 A.2d 772 (1951); McKeesport Area School Dist. v. Unempl. Comp. Bd. of Review, 40 Pa.Cmwlth. 334, 397 A.2d 458 (1979). The lockout victim is equally unemployed whether or not terminated. The legislative policy of pr......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT