McKeever v. Block

• Citation: 932 F.2d 795
• Decision Date: 11 September 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-55552,89-55552
• Parties: Edward McKEEVER, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. Sherman BLOCK, et al., Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Page 795

932 F.2d 795

19 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1113

Edward McKEEVER, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. Sherman BLOCK, et al., Respondent-Appellee.

No. 89-55552.

United States Court of Appeals,

Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Sept. 11, 1990. ^*

Decided May 2, 1991.

Edward McKeever, Jr., in pro per.

No appearance for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before FLETCHER, BOOCHEVER and WIGGINS, Circuit Judges.

BOOCHEVER, Circuit Judge:

Edward McKeever Jr., pro se, appeals the dismissal of his Sec. 1983 action for failure to prosecute. McKeever appears to argue that, in ordering his civil rights action dismissed, the district judge erred because that order was based upon an erroneous belief that McKeever was obliged, but failed, to file a second amended complaint. We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

Between January 5, 1988 and January 14, 1988, McKeever stood trial for the attempted murder of his then wife. During the nine-day state trial in which he represented himself, McKeever claims he was taken daily from his cell at 5:30 a.m. and not returned until at least 11:45 p.m. each night. He contends that this abnormal transportation schedule deprived him of adequate sleep, food, necessary medication, library access and preparation time. All of these deprivations are alleged to have infringed his right to a fair trial by diminishing his capacity for adequate self-representation.

In his original complaint, McKeever specifically charged that, by resort to the unusual transportation procedures, Los Angeles County Sheriff Block, several Doe deputies responsible for transporting inmates to and from court, and a Doe commander of the Los Angeles County Jail had deprived him of a fair trial. Moreover, McKeever named a Doe Director of Medical Services for the Los Angeles County Jail and several nurses for denial of medication for his diabetes, before, during, and after trial.

The district judge referred McKeever's action to a magistrate who, before allowing the complaint to be served on the defendants, dismissed McKeever's complaint with leave to amend by minute order issued December 7, 1988. ¹ The magistrate expressly required that any amended complaint stand on its own, without reference to the original complaint.

In apparent response on December 14, 1988, McKeever filed the following letter critical of the magistrate's order of dismissal of the complaint:

After reading those document, then comparing the complaint to it, and reading the cases cited, then researching them, I The letter made no express reference for whose review it was intended. And contrary to its promise, there is no evidence that any argument or additional documentation was forwarded to the court for review. One day later, the magistrate issued a Report and Recommendation urging the action be dismissed for failure to prosecute. The district court, however, took no action with respect to that Report and Recommendation. ²

Edward McKeever Jr. had a great big bellie laugh, and then looked for the signature, to see if Pee Wee Herman had sign it. The complaint stands as written, no amended complaint will be offered. I wonder if this Magistrate had order to see any transportation or medical records from the Sheriff Dept. I am sure he hasn't, for this Magistrate continues to show extreme prejudice. This letter with a arguement will be forward with all other documents to be review, to prove my case....

On February 16, 1989, McKeever sent, and the magistrate accepted, an amended complaint. The amended complaint once again complained of the manner and circumstances of McKeever's daily transportation during his criminal trial. It named all the defendants included in the original complaint. ³ The amended complaint included a new allegation that the unusual transportation procedures resulted from a conspiracy among several defendants to obscure the fact that the number of inmates incarcerated exceeded established maximum prison capacities. It also realleged that the nurses and the Doe Medical Director deprived him of necessary medication. With one minor exception, however, the amended complaint failed to allege the particular days upon which the challenged activities occurred.

The magistrate dismissed the amended complaint for failure to disclose when the alleged events occurred. Once again, leave to amend was granted. McKeever did not amend by the magistrate's deadline. The magistrate then filed a Report and Recommendation directing that McKeever's action be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Despite McKeever's objection to the Report and Recommendation, the magistrate filed a Final Report and Recommendation urging dismissal. Adopting the recommendation, the district judge ordered the action dismissed. McKeever now appeals.

DISCUSSION

A district court may sua sponte dismiss an action for failure to prosecute. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1390, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962). But a case should be dismissed only for an unreasonable failure to prosecute. See Nealey v. Transportacion Maritima Mexicana, S.A., 662 F.2d 1275, 1280 (9th Cir.1980)). Such a dismissal will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1232 (9th Cir.1984) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we must decide whether the district judge abused his discretion in finding an unreasonable failure to prosecute.

Whether the failure to prosecute was unreasonable depends on whether McKeever's amended complaint was properly dismissed without service on the defendants. The refusal to file a second amended complaint would not be unreasonable if the first amended complaint was dismissed erroneously. While the magistrate can dismiss complaints with leave to amend, the district court necessarily must review that decision before dismissing the entire action. Otherwise, operation of the Local Rule might insulate from review rulings upon

which the district judge is constitutionally and statutorily compelled to pass. See Britt v. Simi Valley Unified School Dist., 708 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir.1983) ("The delegation of duties to the magistrate does not violate Article III if the ultimate decision is made by the district court."). See also 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636(b)(1)(A)(1988).

The Amended Complaint

Although the magistrate correctly noted that the amended complaint failed to specify when the challenged activities occurred, Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) does not explicitly demand such detail. It requires a short and plain statement of the claim showing entitlement to relief. All that is required are sufficient allegations to put defendants fairly on notice of the claims against them. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 1202 (2d ed. 1990). With respect to pro se litigants this burden is relaxed. See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir.1988) (pleadings of pro se civil rights plaintiff to be construed liberally, affording plaintiff benefit of any doubt). Because the amended complaint referred to McKeever's criminal trial, the dates of the alleged misconduct readily could be ascertained. The amended complaint therefore gave the defendants fair notice of the claims against them.

McKeever's complaint could properly be dismissed sua sponte and before the filing of responsive pleadings only if it were frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d). See also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1226. A complaint is frivolous only if it contains "inarguable legal conclusion[s]" or "fanciful factual allegations." Neitzke, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. Under such a standard, McKeever's amended complaint is not frivolous. The facts alleged are not fanciful; they do not describe delusional scenarios. See id. If true, they state colorable legal claims. Because they failed to discuss the complaints' allegations in terms of frivolousness, we cannot be certain that the magistrate and district judge applied the proper standard in dismissing before service of process. In any event, because we hold that the amended complaint was not frivolous, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the amended complaint for failure to prosecute.

The Original Complaint

The magistrate also dismissed McKeever's original complaint, with leave to amend, for failure to state a claim. Because the dismissal of a complaint with leave to amend is a non-dispositive matter, see Local Magistrates Rule 1.11.05, review of the original complaint by the district court, and consequently by this court, is not automatic.

Congress has established a system, to which the judges of the Central District of California have contributed by their promulgation of related rules, by which magistrates are to be employed in order to ease the burden on...