McKendrick v. Petrucci

• Decision Date: 08 September 1976
• Docket Number: Docket No. 25639
• Citation: 247 N.W.2d 349,71 Mich.App. 200
• Parties: William Edward McKENDRICK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Peter PETRUCCI, Jr., and Louis R. Petrucci, Defendants-Appellees. 71 Mich.App. 200, 247 N.W.2d 349
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 349

247 N.W.2d 349

William Edward McKENDRICK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Peter PETRUCCI, Jr., and Louis R. Petrucci Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 25639.

71 Mich.App. 200, 247 N.W.2d 349

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Sept. 8, 1976.

Released for Publication Dec. 14, 1976.

[71 MICHAPP 202] Lopatin, Miller, Bindes & Freedman by Sheldon L. Miller, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.

Dice, Sweeney & Sullivan, P.C. by Jon Feikens, Troy, for defendants-appellees.

Before MAHER, P.J., and BRONSON and RILEY, JJ.

MAHER, Presiding Judge.

This appeal, from an order granting summary judgment for defendants, presents two issues. The first issue is constitutional, the second procedural.

Plaintiff, driving a friend's automobile, was rear-ended by defendant Peter Petrucci, who was driving an automobile owned by defendant Louis F. Petrucci, on October 9, 1973. Both vehicles had coverage under the insurance required by 1972 P.A. 294; M.C.L.A. § 500.3101, Et seq.; M.S.A. § 24.13101, Et seq. (No Fault). Plaintiff brought this action, alleging injuries caused by defendant Peter Petrucci's negligence. Defendants answered by invoking the provisions of the no fault act that abolished much of the tort liability for injuries caused in automobile accidents. M.C.L.A. § 500.3135; M.S.A. § 24.13135. That section provides substantial immunity from traditional tort liability for a no fualt insured:

'(1) A person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by his ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement.

'(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance or use within this state of a motor vehicle with respect to which the security required by subsections (3) and (4) of section 3101 was in effect is abolished except as to:

'(a) Intentionally caused harm to persons or property. [71 MICHAPP 203] Even though a person knows that harm to persons or property is substantially certain to be caused by his act or omission, he does not cause or suffer such harm intentionally if he acts or refrains from acting for the purpose of averting injury to any person, including himself, or for the purpose of averting damage to tangible property.

'(b) Damages for noneconomic loss as provided and limited in subsection (1).

'(c) Damages for allowable expenses, work loss and survivor's loss as defined in sections 3107 to 3110 in excess of the daily, monthly and 3 year limitations contained in those sections. The party liable for damages is entitled to an exemption reducing his liability by the amount of taxes that would have been payable on account of income the injured person would have received if he had not been injured.'

Plaintiff, pointing out that the section sets up two classes, one immune from most tort liability and the other not, claims that he, as a victim of injuries caused by a member of the class granted immunity, is subjected to an invidious discrimination. It is a violation of equal protection guarantees, plaintiff asserts, for an injured party's rights to be dependent upon whether or not the injury was caused by someone who had insurance coverage.

We quickly reject defendants' answer that plaintiff has no standing to challenge the statutory scheme. Plaintiff, as an automobile accident victim, might find his ability to maintain an action qualified by the immunity granted by the statute.

Plaintiff's argument is premised upon a reading of the statute that grants no immunity to an uninsured party to an accident. In so reading the statute, plaintiff is not alone. See Gaines v. Mohawk Motor, Inc. (Wayne Circuit Court, Civil No. 74--005--575 NI, decided August 1, 1974); 1975 Annual[71 MICHAPP 204] Survey of Michigan Law, Insurance Law, 22 Wayne L.Rev. 535, 539 (1976) ('The unfettered right of an individual injured in an automobile accident to sue in tort under preexisting common law rules is preserved in full if the other party to the accident is uninsured'.) The statute, however, is susceptible to another construction. Paragrpah (1) of M.C.L.A. § 500.3135; M.S.A. § 24.13135 states, witout qualification, that tort liability for noneconomic loss, I.e., pain and suffering, remains only if the threshold of either death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement is met. The paragraph makes no mention of insurance in creating this threshold for liability for noneconomic loss. The second paragraph of M.C.L.A. § 500.3135; M.S.A. § 24.13135 abolishes most tort liability when no fault insurance is in effect and details the limited tort liability which remains. Included among the instances of retained liability is liability for noneconomic loss set forth in paragraph (1). A reasonable construction of the entire section is that in every instance liability for noneconomic loss is limited by the threshold stated in paragraph (1), and that paragraph (2) only concerns the limitation of liability applicable when there is no fault coverage. The present case, however, does not require that this construction be accepted or rejected, since plaintiff's equal protection challenge fails even when premised upon the construction he offers.

When the party challenging legislation on equal protection grounds cannot point to a fundamental right restricted or a suspect classification made by the challenged lenged legislation, judicial deference to legislative prerogative requires that the challenged classification be upheld unless it is shown to be lacking any rational justification. Dandridge v. Williams,[71 MICHAPP 205] 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 94 S.Ct. 1734, 40 L.Ed.2d 189 (1974).

The stricter test of 'fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation', Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76, 92 S.Ct. 251, 254, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971), has been recently applied by our Supreme Court. See, E.g., Alexander v. Detroit, 392 Mich. 30, 219 N.W.2d 41 (1974); Reich v. State Highway Department, 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972). Plaintiff relies upon these and other cases that have applied a test stricter than the traditional one for equal protection, E.g., Gallegos v. Glaser Crandell Co., 388 Mich. 654, 202 N.W.2d 786 (1972); Fox v. Employment Security Commission, 379 Mich. 579, 153 N.W.2d 644 (1967). The recent Supreme Court decision declaring unconstitutional the guest passenger statute, M.C.L.A. § 257.401; M.S.A. § 9.2101, Manistee Bank & Trust Co. v. McGowan, 394 Mich. 655, 232 N.W.2d 636 (1975), suggests when the application of the fair-and-substantial-relation-to-the-object-of-the-legislation test is appropriate.

'In my judgment, at least where the challenged statute carves out a discrete exception to a general rule and the statutory exception is no longer experimental, the substantial-relation-to-the-object test should be applied.

'Judicial deference to the Legislature is premised in part upon the perceived need for experimentation, especially in social and economic matters.' 394 Mich. at 671--672, 232 N.W.2d at 642.

This language from Justice Levin's opinion in Manistee Bank indicates that this Court, in examining the classifications made in the no fault act, need not imitate the aggressive review of legislation found in Reich and the other cases cited by [71 MICHAPP 206] plaintiff. Similarly, since this case does not present an instance of 'discrimination against important individual interests with constitutional implications and against particularly disadvantaged or powerless classes', San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 109, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1336, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973) (dissenting opinion of Marshall, J.), decisions of the United States Supreme Court that have scrutinized legislation 'with less than traditional deference and restraint', see, E.g., Reed v. Reed, supra, need not serve as models for the inquiry presently before this Court.

Plaintiff, to succeed in his equal protection challenge to the classification made in M.C.L.A. § 500.3135; M.S.A. § 24.13135, construed as he proposes, must convince this Court that reasons to support the classification cannot be produced. In this attempt he fails.

The no fault act, 1972 P.A. 294, evidences a clear purpose. All victims of automobile accidents in the state are to receive prompt compensation for their economic losses through insurance coverage. ¹ To achieve this purpose, the act requires that all automobiles registered in the state and all automobiles not registered in the state but operated in the state for more than 30 days in a calendar year, have no fault coverage in effect. The owner or registrant of an automobile who does not secure the required coverage is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by up to one year imprisonment and up to a $500 fine. M.C.L.A. § 500.3102(2); M.S.A. § [71 MICHAPP 207] 24.13102(2). The owner or registrant of an uninsured automobile is also liable to the no fault insurer who pays benefits to a person occupying an uninsured automobile. M.C.L.A. § 500.3177; M.S.A. § 24.13177. In providing that the uninsured tortfeasor does not have the same immunity that exists when there is insurance coverage, the act creates another significant incentive towards the goal of insurance coverage for all automobiles. In view of the clear relationship between the classification and the purpose of the act, it would be improper to invalidate the classification merely because it may incidentally bestow an advantage upon some accident victims.

We should not expect the act, which was a major overhaul of the method of automobile accident reparations, to emerge without some rough edges. Nor should this Court attempt to determine if the course chosen by the Legislature was the best one available. Our only concern is to examine the act for constitutional infirmities. The discrimination plaintiff...