McKenna v. Crawford
| Decision Date | 03 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:17-cv-455-SI |
| Parties | DARREN MCKENNA, Plaintiff, v. WALTER CHRISTOPHER CRAWFORD AND CAROLYN JENNIFER CRAWFORD, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
Scott Talmage Cliff, THE LAW OFFICE OF SCOTT T. CLIFF, 7307 SW Beveland Road, Suite 213, Portland, OR 97223. Of Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Walter Christopher Crawford and Carolyn Jennifer Crawford, Defendants, pro se.
Plaintiff Darren McKenna sues Defendants Walter Christopher Crawford and Carolynn Jennifer Crawford ("Defendants") to recover unpaid wages allegedly owed under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 ("FLSA"), as well as wages and other damages under Oregon Revised Statutes ("ORS") Chapters 652 and 653. Before the Court is Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, seeking: (1) damages for unpaid wages allegedly owed by Defendants; and (2) dismissal of Defendants' counterclaims for defamation and slander. A jury trial is currently scheduled to begin on September 24, 2018.
A party is entitled to summary judgment if the "movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. Clicks Billiards Inc. v. Sixshooters Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001). Although "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . ruling on a motion for summary judgment," the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position [is] insufficient . . . ." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 255 (1986). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Defendants own and operate 5C Quick Mart (the "Store") in Northeast Portland, Oregon. The parties appear to agree that Plaintiff worked or at least "helped out" in the Store between September 2, 2015 and October 13, 2016. See ECF 33 ¶¶ 1-2 (McKenna Decl.). The parties dispute, however, whether Plaintiff was ever Defendants' "employee" and, even if so, how many hours and on what days Plaintiff worked. Defendants state that other than the first week and a half after Defendants opened the Store, Plaintiff worked or helped out at the Store, on average, only about 35 hours per week and never on weekends. ECF 32 at 3-4 (Defendants' Response toInterrogatories). Plaintiff asserts that he worked many more hours at the Store. ECF 33 ¶¶ 1-2. Plaintiff adds that he was not ever paid for his work during a 13-month period. Id. ¶ 3. On November 4, 2016, Plaintiff, through his counsel, made a written demand for payment of all back wages allegedly owed, which Defendants have refused to pay.
In their response to summary judgment, Defendants state that Plaintiff lived with Defendants and that they supported Plaintiff financially and treated him as a member of their family for many years. ECF 34 at 1-2 (Defendants' Response).1 According to Defendants, when Defendants opened the Store, Plaintiff "helped out" by working there in return for Defendants' having taken care of him for so long. According to Defendants, Plaintiff helped out in the Store because he "had nothing else to do" and because Plaintiff knew that it was time for him to help "support the household." ECF 34 at 1-2.2 While Plaintiff worked in the Store, Defendantsexplain, Plaintiff continued to live in their home, and Defendants continued to pay Plaintiff's daily living expenses, including food, utilities, clothing, and cigarettes. According to Defendants, they never discussed with Plaintiff paying him any salary or hourly wage, but add that they gave Plaintiff money during the time that Plaintiff was working in the Store. ECF 32 at 3.
Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment, arguing that it is undisputed that Plaintiff worked at least 35 hours per week between September 2015 and October 2016 and that he is, therefore, owed back wages for at least that amount of time. Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to summary judgment awarding him minimum wage compensation for these hours, FLSA liquidated damages, penalty wages, and prejudgment interest. In response, Defendants, proceeding pro se, argue that Plaintiff was never their employee, that they gave Plaintiff room, board, clothing, and money, and that a jury should decide whether Defendants owe Plaintiff anything further. Defendants also assert counterclaims, seeking damages for alleged defamation, slander, emotional distress, and financial hardship.
Plaintiff is only entitled to recover on his FLSA or state law employment claims if he was an "employee" of Defendants. The FLSA provides the following definitions: (1) "'Employer' includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee . . ."; (2) "Except as provided in paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) [], the term 'employee' means any individual employed by an employer." 29 U.S.C. § 203. "Employ," in turn, "includes to suffer or permit to work." 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). Plaintiff summarily asserts that he was "clearly" an "employee" for purposes of both the FLSA andOregon law because he was not a partner in the operation of the Store. The question of whether Plaintiff was an "employee" under the FLSA, however, is not so simple.
"The test of employment under the [FLSA] is one of 'economic reality.'" Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 (1985) (citing Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961)). This depends "upon the circumstances of the whole activity," rather than on "isolated factors." Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947). An employee, for purposes of the FLSA's minimum wage requirements, is someone who has "an express or implied agreement for compensation" with the purported employer. Williams v. Strickland, 87 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947)).
Two Supreme Court cases are particularly relevant to the analysis of whether someone is an "employee" under the FLSA. In Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., the Supreme Court held that participants in a week-long training course that was a prerequisite for employment with a railroad company were not employees. The Court explained that, although the FLSA has a broad scope, "[t]he definition 'suffer or permit to work' was obviously not intended to stamp all persons as employees who, without an express or implied compensation agreement, might work for their own advantage on the premises of another." Walling, 330 U.S. at 152. Second, the FLSA does not render one "whose work serves only his own interest an employee of another person who gives him aid and instruction." Id. Because the railroad "receive[d] no immediate advantage" from the trainees' work, the trainees were not employees. Id. at 153.
In Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985), the Supreme Court held that a district court had not erred in concluding that "associates" of a foundation were employees. The foundation, a nonprofit religious organization, ran severalbusinesses. Its associates, who were in recovery for drug addiction or who had previously committed crimes, staffed these businesses. The associates did not receive any salary, but received in-kind compensation in the form of food, clothing, and shelter. Associates were "fined" for poor performance on the job, worked on commission, and were denied food if they were absent from work for any reason. The Court distinguished Walling, explaining that, whereas in Walling the training course lasted only several days, the associates in Alamo "were entirely dependent upon the Foundation for long periods, in some cases several years." Alamo, 471 U.S. at 301. The Court concluded that "the district court's finding that the associates must have expected to receive in-kind benefits—and expected them in exchange for their services—is certainly not clearly erroneous." Id. Id.3 "The Court looked to the economic reality of the situation and held it involved work for compensation and hence employment." Benjamin v. B&H Educ., Inc., 877 F.3d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing Alamo).
After reviewing Walling and Alamo, the Ninth Circuit concluded in Williams that Williams, who lived and worked at a Salvation Army, was not an employee of the Salvation Army because he had no express or implied agreement for compensation. There was no express agreement, the court explained, because Williams had actually signed a written agreement stating that he was a beneficiary of the organization, and not an employee. The court also found that there was no implied agreement, because Williams went to the Salvation Army for help as a recovering alcoholic, and the work that Williams did for the organization was "solely" for thepurpose of his own rehabilitation. Williams, 87 F.3d at 1067. The court also concluded that it would be improper to find that Williams was compensated in-kind; rather, Williams agreed to, and did, turn over general assistance and food stamps for which he was eligible to the...
To continue reading
Request your trial