McKenna v. Elliott & Horne Co.
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
| Writing for the Court | WHITE; DORAN, J., and SCOTT |
| Citation | McKenna v. Elliott & Horne Co., 258 P.2d 528, 118 Cal.App.2d 551 (Cal. App. 1953) |
| Decision Date | 18 June 1953 |
| Parties | McKENNA v. ELLIOTT & HORNE CO. et al. Civ. 19356. |
Catherine A. McKenna, in pro. per.
Robert E. Rosskopf, Beverly Hills, for respondent.
appellant, Catherine A. McKenna, brought an action to quiet title to real property consisting of two lots described as lots 75 and 76 of Tract 2704 in the County of Los Angeles. Respondent, Frank R. Sipe, filed a demurrer and motion to dismiss the action. The demurrer was sustained with leave to amend. Upon the filing of a first amended complaint, respondent again demurred and moved to dismiss. The motion to dismiss, supported by affidavit, was upon the ground that the issues presented by the action were res judicata between the plaintiff and defendant Sipe, by reason of judgments entered in two previous actions in the superior court. The motion to dismiss was granted, and plaintiff appeals from the judgment of dismissal. Plaintiff has also appealed, quoting from her notice of appeal,
'And from the order of the court, denying the plaintiff's motion to vacate and set aside the said order and judgment made herein on the 12th of March, 1952.
'And from that certain order of the Court, on the 20th day of March, 1952, and from the order thereon made denying Plaintiff's Motion to Strike out defendant's motion of defense of res adjudicata, and motion to dismiss, and demurrer, and to enter judgment for plaintiff judgment for plaintiff on the pleadings.
'And from that order made on the 31st day of March, 1952, denying the plaintiff's motion, to set aside and strike from the file the said order and judgment of Dismissal of the action as to Frank R. Sipe, and from the whole thereof.
'And from that Order of the Court, made on the 27th day of March, 1952, denying the Plaintiff's Motion, to Dismiss, and the affidavit on Motion to dismiss, filed on the 27th of March, on the behalf of Frank R. Sipe, and the denial of the plaintiff's motion to enter judgment on the pleadings under the provisions of sections 437, and sections 446 and 447, Code of Civil Procedure, and from all and each and every of one of the said orders, so made by the Court, on the 20th day, March, 1952, and denying the motions of this plaintiff Being To-Wit:
'1--Motion to vacate and set aside Minute Order, putting Demurrer off Calendar, and denying motion to restore the Demurrer to the Calendar, and that the Court rule on the Demurrer on the merits, and from the order denying the Motion to strike from the file, the Demurrer, and the Motion of Frank R. Sipe, to dismiss the action as to Frank R. Sipe; and the order denying the plaintiff's Motion to enter judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Plaintiff.
On May 1, 1945, a default judgment was entered in superior court action No. 478808, quieting title in favor of Catherine A. McKenna against certain parties. On May 10, 1947, Frank R. Sipe, successor as beneficiary under a deed of trust on both lots 75 and 76 to one of the defendants in action No. 478808, commenced superior court action No. 526755, wherein judgment was rendered setting aside the default judgment in action 478808, and adjudging that Sipe was the owner and holder of a note and trust deed constituting a valid and subsisting instrument affecting the real property involved. Upon appeal, this latter judgment was affirmed, the court assessing a penalty of $300 against appellant McKenna for a frivolous appeal. Sipe v. McKenna, 105 Cal.App.2d 373, 233 P.2d 615.
In February, 1948, an action to quiet title was commenced by Sipe as to Lot 76, his title being based on a street bond foreclosure. Judgment in favor of Sipe against appellant herein was entered January 31, 1950, in action No. 540253. Upon appeal by appellant McKenna the judgment was affirmed. Sipe v. McKenna, 106 Cal.App.2d 559, 235 P.2d 416.
The present action was filed by appellant herein on July 6, 1950, after the entry of the judgments in the two previous actions and while they were pending on appeal, appellant averring that she had been the owner of the two lots for more than ten years, had been in open, notorious and adverse possession, and had paid all taxes thereon for more than twenty years.
By her first amended complaint, appellant asserted that she was the owner in possession and actual occupation of the properties 'and through her own person and right, and by and through her predecessor in title, Sarah O'Neill, has been in open, exclusive possession and claiming to own' the disputed properties, adversely to the defendants, and had paid all taxes on the properties for more than twenty years prior to the filing of the action.
Appellant's brief fails to present any argument directed to the merits of the contention that her claims are barred by the prior judgments. A...
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Branson v. Sun-Diamond Growers
...cases upheld that procedure (see, e.g., Olwell v. Hopkins (1946) 28 Cal.2d 147, 152-153, 168 P.2d 972; McKenna v. Elliott & Horne Co. (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 551, 554, 258 P.2d 528), later cases have held that speaking motions to dismiss have been superseded by the summary judgment statute. (......
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Muller v. Tanner
...a prior action (see Crowley v. Modern Faucet Mfg. Co. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 321, 324--325, 282 P.2d 33; and McKenna v. Elliott & Horne Co. (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 551, 554--555, 258 P.2d 528), and in the same action where plaintiff seeks to proceed on a complaint which in form is similar to one wh......
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People v. Sumner
...process. Neal v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n, 1949, 93 Cal.App.2d 678, 682, 209 P.2d 825; McKenna v. Elliott & Horne Co., 1953, 118 Cal.App.2d 551, 555, 258 P.2d 528; Helvey v. Security-First Nat. Bank, 1950, 99 Cal.App.2d 149, 151, 221 P.2d 257.' (Lincoln v. Didak, 162 Cal.A......
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Paul v. Allied Dairymen, Inc.
...109 Cal.App.2d 803, 806, 241 P.2d 639; Neal v. Bank of America, 93 Cal.App.2d 678, 682, 209 P.2d 825; McKenna v. Elliott & Horne Co., 118 Cal.App.2d 551, 555, 258 P.2d 528; Helvey v. Security-First Nat. Bk., 99 Cal.App.2d 149, 151, 221 P.2d 257). Even if there had been a motion to dismiss, ......