McKenzie v. Dep't of Corr.

• Decision Date: 07 May 2020
• Docket Number: No. 347798,No. 347061,347061
• Citation: 332 Mich.App. 289,957 N.W.2d 341
• Parties: Kenneth MCKENZIE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, State of Michigan, and Macomb Correctional Facility Warden, Defendants-Appellants, and Randall Haas, Defendant. Fatima Olden, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Department of Corrections, State of Michigan, and Macomb Correctional Facility Warden, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

332 Mich.App. 289

957 N.W.2d 341

Kenneth MCKENZIE, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, State of Michigan, and Macomb Correctional Facility Warden, Defendants-Appellants,andRandall Haas, Defendant.

Fatima Olden, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Department of Corrections, State of Michigan, and Macomb Correctional Facility Warden, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 347061

No. 347798

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted March 2, 2020, at Detroit.

Decided May 7, 2020, 9:00 a.m.

Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, and Kendell Asbenson, Assistant Attorney General, for the Department of Corrections, the state of Michigan, and the Macomb Correctional Facility Warden.

Rasor Law Firm, PLLC (by Andrew J. Laurila ) for Kenneth McKenzie and Fatima Olden.

Before: Stephens, P.J., and Cavanagh and Servitto, JJ.

Per Curiam.

In Docket No. 347061, defendants¹ appeal as of right the trial court's denial of their motion for summary disposition premised on MCR 2.116(C)(4) (lack of subject-matter jurisdiction). In Docket No. 347798, which this Court consolidated with Docket No. 347061, defendants appeal by leave granted the trial court's order denying their motion for summary disposition, also brought under MCR 2.116(C)(4). Olden v. Dep't of Corrections , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals entered April 23, 2019 (Docket No. 347798). We affirm in both cases.

I. FACTS

The facts in both cases are similar and largely undisputed. Plaintiffs, Kenneth McKenzie and Fatima Olden, (plaintiffs) are long-term employees of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) as corrections officers at the Macomb Correctional Facility (the Facility). In 2015, the Facility began a program in which inmates trained dogs to become leader dogs for the blind. The program only took place in certain housing units in the Facility. Plaintiffs were both assigned to one of those housing units and, therefore, frequently came into contact with dogs. Plaintiffs alleged that they were allergic to dogs and would suffer allergic symptoms whenever they came into close contact with the dogs. Plaintiffs alleged that they informed their supervisors of their allergic reactions

and then filed "Disability Accommodation Request and Medical Statements" with the MDOC, requesting that they be assigned to the housing units that did not have dogs.

While the Facility warden allowed plaintiffs to briefly move to different housing units, plaintiffs were ultimately returned to the housing units in which dogs were kept and trained. The MDOC denied plaintiffs' requests for accommodation, and the Facility warden also refused to accommodate their claimed allergies by assigning them to any other housing units or positions. Thereafter, plaintiffs each filed a charge of disability discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), after which they were allegedly subjected to retaliatory acts at the Facility. The EEOC found probable cause that the MDOC was in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and proposed conciliation agreements between the MDOC and plaintiffs, but the MDOC refused the terms and plaintiffs' charges were transferred to the Department of Justice (DOJ). The DOJ determined that it would not pursue charges on behalf of either plaintiff, and plaintiffs thereafter filed complaints against the Facility warden, the MDOC, and the state of Michigan. In their complaints, plaintiffs alleged violations of the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.1101 et seq. , retaliation in violation of the same act, violation of Title I of the ADA, 42 USC 12111 et seq. , by the Facility warden, and violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 USC 794, by the state and the MDOC.

In each case, defendants moved for summary disposition of the respective plaintiff's ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. Defendants asserted that the trial courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the claims because the claims arose under federal law and remedies for the claims might be available in the federal courts, precluding the state courts from hearing the claims. Specifically, defendants claimed that no Michigan statute provides circuit courts with jurisdiction over claims arising under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act and that, lacking statutory authority and because the courts lacked jurisdiction for any claim against the state for which there is a remedy available in federal courts, the trial courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' federal claims. The trial courts denied defendants' respective motions for summary disposition, separately opining that the court had subject-matter jurisdiction under Michigan's 1963 Constitution and the Revised Judicature Act (RJA)² to hear those claims. These appeals followed.

II. LAW GOVERNING JURISDICTION

On appeal, defendants assert that because the state retains sovereign immunity from suit in its own courts, waiver of that immunity can be achieved only through the Legislature's consent. They contend that while the Legislature has consented to the state being sued for certain things in the Court of Claims under the Court of Claims Act,³ it has not authorized the state to be sued in the Court of Claims or any other state court for federal Title I ADA or Rehabilitation Act claims. Defendants acknowledge that while states courts generally have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over federal claims, Michigan is without a court of competent jurisdiction to hear ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. According to defendants, the trial courts therefore lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' federal claims and summary disposition should have been granted in their favor with respect to plaintiffs' ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. We disagree.

"This Court reviews de novo a motion for summary disposition brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4)." Weishuhn v. Catholic Diocese of Lansing , 279 Mich. App. 150, 155, 756 N.W.2d 483 (2008). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(4) tests the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Braun v. Ann Arbor Charter Twp. , 262 Mich. App. 154, 157, 683 N.W.2d 755 (2004). "When viewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(4), this Court must determine whether the pleadings demonstrate that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or whether the affidavits and other proofs show that there was no genuine issue of material fact." Weishuhn , 279 Mich. App. at 155, 756 N.W.2d 483 (quotation marks and citation omitted). We review de novo as a question of law whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Bank v. Mich. Ed. Ass'n-NEA , 315 Mich. App. 496, 499, 892 N.W.2d 1 (2016). This Court also "reviews de novo questions of statutory construction, with the fundamental goal of giving effect to the intent of the Legislature." Cheboygan Sportsman Club v. Cheboygan Co. Prosecuting Attorney , 307 Mich. App. 71, 75, 858 N.W.2d 751 (2014).

The singular issue for our resolution is whether the trial courts had subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. "Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a court's power to act and authority to hear and determine a case." Forest Hills Coop. v. Ann Arbor , 305 Mich. App. 572, 617, 854 N.W.2d 172 (2014). Michigan's circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction and derive their power from the Michigan Constitution. Okrie v. Michigan , 306 Mich. App. 445, 467, 857 N.W.2d 254 (2014). Specifically, Const. 1963, art. 6, § 13 provides:

The circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters not prohibited by law; appellate jurisdiction from all inferior courts and tribunals except as otherwise provided by law; power to issue, hear and determine prerogative and remedial writs; supervisory and general control over inferior courts and tribunals within their respective jurisdictions in accordance with rules of the supreme court; and jurisdiction of other cases and matters as provided by rules of the supreme court.

The RJA also provides:

Circuit courts have original jurisdiction to hear and determine all civil claims and remedies, except where exclusive jurisdiction is given in the constitution or by statute to some other court or where the circuit courts are denied jurisdiction by the constitution or statutes of this state. [ MCL 600.605.]

Thus, a circuit court is presumed to have subject-matter jurisdiction over a civil action unless (1) Michigan's Constitution or a statute expressly prohibits it from exercising jurisdiction or (2) Michigan's Constitution or a statute gives to another court exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. Prime Time Int'l Distrib., Inc. v. Dep't of Treasury , 322 Mich. App. 46, 52, 910 N.W.2d 683 (2017). " ‘[W]here this Court must examine certain statutory language to determine whether the Legislature intended to deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction,’ this Court has explained, ‘[t]he language must leave no doubt that the Legislature intended to deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction of a particular subject matter.’ " Id. (citation omitted; alterations in original).

There is no dispute that claims of ADA and Rehabilitation Act violations arise under federal law. With respect to claims sounding in federal law, our Supreme Court has provided guidance concerning the circuit courts' subject-matter jurisdiction:

It has long been established that, so long as Congress has not provided for exclusive federal-court jurisdiction, state courts may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over federal-law claims whenever, by their own constitution, they are competent to take it. State courts possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the federal government, subject only to limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause. Thus, state courts are presumptively competent to assume jurisdiction over a cause of action arising under federal law. If concurrent jurisdiction otherwise exists, subject-matter jurisdiction over a federal-law claim is

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