McKenzie v. Department of Corrections
| Decision Date | 18 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | SC: 161690,COA: 347061,SC: 161691,COA: 347798 |
| Citation | 981 N.W.2d 353 (Mem) |
| Parties | Kenneth MCKENZIE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, State of Michigan, and Macomb Correctional Facility Warden, Defendants-Appellants, and Randall Haas, Defendant. Fatima Olden, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Department of Corrections, State of Michigan, and Macomb Correctional Facility Warden, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
On March 3, 2022, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the May 7, 2020 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
Plaintiffs have brought federal claims against state agencies and officials—claims that, until now, have always been heard in federal court. But today this Court leaves in place a decision by the Court of Appeals opening the circuit court doors to these claims. This resolution rests on an incorrect interpretation of the Court of Claims (COC) Act, particularly MCL 600.6440, and disregards the relationship between sovereign immunity and jurisdiction. A proper view of our statutes and caselaw would require these claims to be brought in federal court. Contrary to plaintiffs’ contentions, that outcome would not violate the Supremacy Clause or the Tenth Amendment: federal law at issue would remain supreme and could be enforced in federal courts. That is the system that has long governed in this state for these types of claims. By failing to reverse the Court of Appeals’ erroneous conclusion, the majority leaves in place a flawed opinion that subtly erodes our state's ability to determine the types of cases its courts will hear. I dissent.
Plaintiffs in these two cases sued the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) and the warden of the Macomb Correctional Facility in Wayne Circuit Court. They alleged various claims, the relevant ones here being that the warden discriminated against them in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC 12101 et seq. , on the basis of their allergies to the dogs used in the prison and that the MDOC and the state of Michigan violated the Rehabilitation Act, 29 USC 701 et seq. , by failing to provide reasonable accommodations for their allergies. The dogs were assigned to particular housing units, and plaintiffs, who worked in those units, requested a transfer to units without dogs. The warden initially honored this request but eventually returned plaintiffs to their original units.1
Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4), asserting that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over claims arising under federal law that could be remedied in federal courts. In particular, they noted that MCL 600.6419 gives the COC jurisdiction over suits against the state, but MCL 600.6440 exempts claims for which an adequate remedy is available in federal court. Accordingly, defendants argued that the exemption in MCL 600.6440 means that no Michigan court has subject-matter jurisdiction over federal-law claims against the state that are remediable in federal courts.
The trial court denied the motions, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in a published opinion. The Court of Appeals held that McKenzie v Dep't of Corrections , 332 Mich App 289, 307, 957 N.W.2d 341 (2020). The Court of Appeals also noted the general presumption that our state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over federal claims.
Defendants then sought leave to appeal here. After receiving supplemental briefing, we ordered argument on the application for leave, focusing on "(1) whether MCL 600.6440 divests the Court of Claims of jurisdiction over both of the appellees’ causes of action arising under federal statute; and (2) if so, whether the circuit court shares concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts over those causes of action." McKenzie v Dep't of Corrections , 508 Mich. 943, 943-944, 964 N.W.2d 370 (2021).
The overriding question in these cases is whether the circuit court can exercise jurisdiction over the present claims. Both the text of the COC Act and the historical treatment of such claims plainly demonstrate that the circuit court lacks jurisdiction. This conclusion raises no Supremacy Clause concerns.
To understand the meaning of the COC Act, its historical background must be examined. The traditional rule across the common-law world, including Michigan, is that "the ‘sovereign’ was immune from suit unless he consented to the action." Ross v Consumers Power Co. (On Rehearing) , 420 Mich. 567, 597, 363 N.W.2d 641 (1984). Thus, "[f]rom statehood forward, Michigan jurisprudence recognized that the sovereign (the state) was immune from all suits, including suits for tortious injuries which it had caused." Id. at 598, 363 N.W.2d 641. The rationale was not that "the state could do no wrong," but that the state had created the courts and therefore "was not subject to them or their jurisdiction." Id. As with many areas of law in the nineteenth century—such as divorces or corporate charters—the Legislature worked piecemeal, consenting to suits on an individual basis. Id. This proved infeasible, and in 1842 the state created a Board of State Auditors to decide whether to consent to suit; in the 1920s, this function transferred to the State Administrative Board, which could settle and pay claims. Id. at 599, 363 N.W.2d 641. The types of claims subject to the State Administrative Board's authority were those "arising from or by reason of negligence, malfeasance or misfeasance of any state officer, employe, commission, department, board, institution, or other governmental division...." 1929 PA 259, § 1.
The state's sovereign immunity remained despite the grant of general jurisdiction to circuit courts in the 1850 Constitution.2 The current Constitution states, "The circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters not prohibited by law[.]" Const. 1963, art. 6, § 13. The statute setting out the circuit court's civil jurisdiction similarly states, "Circuit courts have original jurisdiction to hear and determine all civil claims and remedies, except where exclusive jurisdiction is given in the constitution or by statute to some other court or where the circuit courts are denied jurisdiction by the constitution or statutes of this state." MCL 600.605.
After creation of the circuit courts in the 1850 Constitution, we continued to explain that "[t]he State has never, before or since, allowed itself to be sued in its own courts, and no officer could lawfully subject it to suit." People ex rel Ayers v Bd. of State Auditors , 42 Mich. 422, 427, 4 N.W. 274 (1880). We reiterated this conclusion in Greenfield Const Co., Inc. v Dep't of State Hwys. , 402 Mich. 172, 261 N.W.2d 718 (1978), stating:
Greenfield was decided after the enactment of the COC Act, which was first passed in 1939. While the act did not specifically state that sovereign immunity had been waived, that was its clear effect: Ross , 420 Mich. at 600, 363 N.W.2d 641 ; see generally Quality Tooling, Inc. v United States , 47 F.3d 1569, 1575 (C.A.Fed., 1995) (). The core provision, MCL 600.6419(1), provides the COC with jurisdiction over certain cases:
The exceptions noted in § 6419(1) deal with two separate circumstances. The...
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