McKenzie v. Maine Employment Sec. Com'n
Decision Date | 08 December 1982 |
Citation | 453 A.2d 505 |
Parties | Larry W. McKENZIE v. MAINE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION. |
Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Kettle, Carter, Hannigan & Vickerson, Edward W. Klein (orally), Portland, for plaintiff.
James E. Tierney, Atty. Gen., Peter Brann (orally), Susan P. Herman, Asst. Attys. Gen., Augusta, for defendant.
Before GODFREY, NICHOLS, ROBERTS, CARTER, VIOLETTE and WATHEN, JJ., and DUFRESNE, A.R.J.
The specific problem which this case presents is, whether an applicant for unemployment compensation who was erroneously declared ineligible to receive any benefits on the ground of insufficient wage credits should be awarded those benefits retroactively after the mistake is discovered, even though he failed in the interim to appeal the initial determination of ineligibility and to file weekly claims as required by statute (26 M.R.S.A. §§ 1192 and 1194). Following timely appeals from the denial of retroactive benefits within agency structured procedures, McKenzie's seasonable petition, filed in Superior Court, Cumberland County, for judicial review of the unfavorable decision of the Maine Employment Security Commission (Commission or MESC) pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 11001-11007 and M.R.Civ.P. 80B, caused the court to find error on the part of the Commission "by not allowing plaintiff's claim [for retroactive benefits] for the weeks in question." The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, the court ruling that it "would be hard pressed to penalize plaintiff for his good faith reliance on the Commission's determination" that claimant was ineligible for compensation benefits due to insufficient wage credits. We reverse the judgment of the Superior Court, remanding the case for entry of judgment affirming the decision of the Maine Employment Security Commission.
The facts in this case are not in dispute; under such circumstances, the question at issue is purely one of law. Paige v. Maine Employment Security Commission, 391 A.2d 321, 324 (Me.1978). We must then review the Commission's decision to determine whether, given those undisputed facts, it has correctly applied the applicable law. See Tobin v. Maine Employment Security Commission, 420 A.2d 222, 225 (Me.1980).
On March 31, 1981, Larry McKenzie filed for unemployment compensation benefits with the Commission. He reported his income for the preceding year and a half; he disclosed wages earned during the third calendar quarter of 1980 and mentioned receiving workers' compensation payments during the fourth quarter of 1980, but there is no evidence in this record that any particular amount of compensation payments was stated. The following week, McKenzie returned to the local MESC office to make his claim for benefits for the week ending April 4, 1981, pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A. § 1192(1), which provides that an unemployed individual
shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week only if:
1. [h]e has made a claim for benefits with respect to such week or part thereof in accordance with such regulations as the commission may prescribe; 1 ... (Emphasis ours)
Section 1192 further provides that an unemployed individual is eligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits only if he has been paid certain minimum wages "in each of 2 different [calendar] quarters in his base period." 26 M.R.S.A. § 1192(5). Also, workers' compensation payments are considered "wages" for the purpose of this section of the Act. Id. McKenzie's base period was from September 1, 1979 through December 31, 1980. See 26 M.R.S.A. § 1043(3). His earned wages together with the workers' compensation payments he had received factually qualified him for benefits under the "base wages" requirement of Section 1192(5). However, on April 9, 1981, i.e. 10 days after the Maine Employment Security Commission had requested a report from the Workers' Compensation Commission and/or the insurance carrier on the amount of workers' compensation benefits received by McKenzie during his base period, but had not been forwarded the desired information, the Commission, pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A. § 1194(2), mailed McKenzie a computer-generated notice stating that he was ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits "due to insufficient wage credits." The computer form, which purported to list all of McKenzie's "base period wages by quarter," showed the amount of his earned wages as he had reported them to the Commission representative, but did not list the workers' compensation payments he had received. On the back of this form, there appeared, inter alia:
If you believe the information contained in this determination is incorrect, you should contact the local office for review. After review, if you still think the determination is incorrect, you may file an appeal ... If you appeal, you should continue to file claims as long as you are unemployed.
McKenzie did not request a review; he did not appeal and did not continue to file weekly claims.
The information respecting McKenzie's workers' compensation payments reached MESC after April 22, 1981. The Commission, then, on its own initiative made a redetermination of McKenzie's eligibility status on April 27, 1981, and mailed him a second computer-form notice, this one stating that he was eligible for unemployment compensation benefits after all. Listed thereon were both his earned wages and his workers' compensation payments received as "base period wages." Forwarded to McKenzie with the notice was a check in the amount of $74, the benefits due him on the only claim filed through that date, which was for the week ending April 4, 1981. Notwithstanding the Commission's redetermination, McKenzie failed to file weekly claims until May 28, 1981, when he "reopened" his claim with the Commission and requested retroactive payments for the seven previous weeks in which he had failed to report and file.
Before tackling the critical problem involved in this case, we must have in mind certain governing precepts which come into play in this situation. First, generally speaking, the burden of persuasion on issues affecting eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits is on the claimant. Smith v. Director of the Division of Employment Security, 384 Mass. 758, 429 N.E.2d 700, 702 (1981); Thomas v. Rutledge, 280 S.E.2d 123, 130 (W.Va.1981); Duenas-Rodriguez v. Industrial Commission, 606 P.2d 437, 438 (Colo.1980); Eichman v. Com., Unemployment Compensation Board, 49 Pa.Cmwlth. 21, 409 A.2d 1389, 1391 (1980); Patrick v. Board of Review, 171 N.J.Super. 424, 409 A.2d 819, 820 (1979). But see Tobin v. Maine Employment Security Commission, 420 A.2d 222, 225-26 (Me.1980). A claimant must establish eligibility for each week for which benefits are claimed. Luskin v. Department of Employment, 100 Idaho 584, 602 P.2d 947, 949 (1979). Second, even though our Maine Employment Security Law, designed to relieve the stress of economic insecurity due to unemployment, has been viewed by this Court as remedial legislation mandating a liberal construction in favor of the claimant to afford all the relief the Legislature intended to provide, nevertheless, courts are not at liberty to read into the Act provisions which the Legislature did not incorporate therein, nor may they enlarge the scope of the statute, under the guise of construing the legislation. Toothaker v. Maine Employment Security Commission, 217 A.2d 203, 210 (Me.1966); Red Bird v. Meierhenry, 314 N.W.2d 95, 96 (Me.1982). It follows that the administrative authorities, as well as the courts themselves, have no inherent power to extend or ignore statutory appeal periods in the absence of delegated statutory authority to do so. See Whitchurch v. Department of Employment Security, 139 Vt. 566, 433 A.2d 284, 286 (1981). The specific periods of appeal statutorily affixed to the several steps in the chain of administrative review are jurisdictional and mandatory. Elliott v. Department of Employment Security, 137 Vt. 536, 537, 409 A.2d 563, 564 (1979); Fouste v. Department of Employment, 97 Idaho 162, 540 P.2d 1341, 1347 (1975); Kitchell v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 9 Pa.Cmwlth. 149, 305 A.2d 728, 729 (1973); McCoy v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 81 Ohio App. 158, 77 N.E.2d 76, 78 (1947). See also Rice v. Amerling, 433 A.2d 388 (Me.1981); Coates v. Maine Employment Security Commission, 428 A.2d 423, 427 (Me.1981); Brown v. State, Dept. of Manpower Affairs, 426 A.2d 880, 888 (Me.1981). The claimant of unemployment compensation benefits must be held to have knowledge of the requirements of the Act and legally adopted regulations of the Commission and must suffer such loss as may have arisen from his failure to comply with the plain mandatory terms of the statutory program. See Beckwith v. School Administrative District No. 2, 243 A.2d 62, 63 (Me.1968).
McKenzie puts forth a two-part argument to support his claim of entitlement to retroactive unemployment compensation benefits. First, he asserts that the Commission overstepped its statutory authority in making its initial determination of ineligibility before it was given the monetary information about the workers' compensation payments received by the claimant and requested of the Workers' Compensation Commission. We disagree. The Employment Security Law, as enacted by our Legislature in coordination with the nation-wide unemployment compensation insurance system devised by the Congress of the United States, anchors its primary objective of providing a substitute for wages lost during a period of unemployment to the unemployed worker, his family and the entire community (26 M.R.S.A. § 1042) upon "promptness" in the initial determination of eligibility status, "promptness" in paying compensation to the unemployed worker after an initial determination of eligibility, and "promptness" in the administrative review process providing...
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