McKenzie v. Webster Parish School Bd.
| Decision Date | 02 December 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 24266-CA,24266-CA |
| Parties | 79 Ed. Law Rep. 1154 Gerald W. McKENZIE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WEBSTER PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Jones & Smith Law Offices by Benjamin Jones, Monroe, for plaintiff-appellant.
James M. Bullers, Dist. Atty., L. Charles Minifield, Asst. Dist. Atty., for defendant-appellee.
Before SEXTON, VICTORY and STEWART, JJ.
Plaintiff, Gerald W. McKenzie, appeals a summary judgment in favor of defendant, Webster Parish School Board (School Board), in plaintiff's action for alleged wrongful termination from employment as a teacher in the Webster Parish school system. McKenzie argues that his termination was not in compliance with either the relevant statutes or the School Board's own policies. Finding that genuine issues of material fact exist, we reverse.
McKenzie was hired by the School Board in August 1985 and worked as a probationary teacher under a series of one-year contracts until May 1988, a period of less than three calendar years. He taught at Sarepta High School and also served in a coaching position. Throughout this period, he was subjected to numerous observations and evaluations by the high school principal, Mr. Fulton Jones, as well as other school officials. These evaluations were generally favorable except for observations of weakness in classroom control.
On June 6, 1988, McKenzie received a letter from the personnel director, Ralph Rentz, and superintendent, Jerry Lott, informing him that they would not renew his teaching contract. The letter stated that the School Board felt it could not renew his contract after three years of trying to help him improve his classroom management technique. He was informed that he was entitled to a hearing, but if one was not desired, a recommendation would be made to the School Board that his contract not be renewed.
In a letter dated June 20, 1988, to the superintendent, the principal stated that he did not request the renewal of McKenzie's contract because it was his understanding that McKenzie's ratings on the observations and evaluations for the past three years had not been up to Webster Parish standards. The principal pointed out that other than the classroom control problem, McKenzie had good character, was very cooperative, and a hard worker.
McKenzie received a follow-up letter on July 5, 1988 from the superintendent stating that based upon the recommendations of the principal, the personnel director, and Dr. Ray Burnham, secondary supervisor of the School Board, he would recommend to the School Board that McKenzie's contract for 1988-1989 not be renewed. This decision was based upon observations made by the principal, the secondary supervisor, and another evaluator that McKenzie was deficient in classroom management and that his control and management techniques did not meet acceptable standards. The superintendent stated that because he believed effective teaching could not take place in an environment that was not positively controlled, managed and organized by the teacher and because McKenzie had not done this satisfactorily according to his supervisors, the superintendent would support their recommendation. In a hearing on July 25, 1988, the School Board reviewed McKenzie's evaluations and elected not to renew his contract.
On February 6, 1989, McKenzie instituted this action claiming that the School Board, in violation of the teacher tenure and accountability statutes as well as its own policy relating to employee separations, had fired him from his employment as a teacher. McKenzie contended that the School Board's actions in terminating him were arbitrary and capricious and that other teachers similarly situated with lower evaluation scores were allowed to continue in their employment. McKenzie asserted that his evaluations were above average and that the School Board devised a scheme to fire him in order to make a coaching position available for the relative of a parish elected official who was hired over two other more qualified applicants.
In response to McKenzie's suit, the School Board filed a motion for summary judgment alleging there were no genuine issues as to material fact. In the motion, it noted that McKenzie had been employed by the School Board for a period of two years and ten months and thus was not a tenured teacher whose dismissal was governed by LSA-R.S. 17:443, but was controlled by LSA-R.S. 17:442 regulating non-renewal of non-tenured teachers. McKenzie was given notice by various correspondence that his contract would not be renewed and these letters were presented to the School Board. According to defendant, the letters listed three specific reasons, all related to classroom management, for the decision not to renew the contract and although it was not mandatory, the School Board afforded McKenzie a hearing.
After reviewing the materials submitted, the trial court granted the summary judgment. In its written opinion, the trial court noted that since McKenzie had not been employed by the School Board for three calendar years, he had not become a tenured teacher. Thus, the School Board was not required to follow the provisions for removing a tenured teacher as set forth in LSA-R.S. 17:443, and McKenzie could be discharged or dismissed pursuant to LSA-R.S. 17:442. The court found that the facts demonstrated the School Board sent McKenzie three letters that his contract would not be renewed and these letters contained valid, specific reasons for the nonrenewal. The trial court found that the School Board clearly satisfied the statutory requirements in its decision not to renew McKenzie's contract and that the decision was not arbitrary and capricious. Finally, the court held that the teacher accountability law, LSA-R.S. 17:391.5, did not apply to nontenured teachers and thus was inapplicable to the instant matter.
A motion for summary judgment should be granted if, and only if, the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA-C.C.P. Art. 966.
The mover for summary judgment has the burden of affirmatively showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and any doubt as to the existence of such issue of material fact, is to be resolved against the granting of the motion as it is not a substitute for, nor can it take the place of, a trial on the merits. If the evidence presented is subject to conflicting interpretations or reasonable men might differ as to its significance, summary judgment is not proper. Only when reasonable minds must inevitably concur is a summary judgment warranted and any doubts should be resolved in favor of a trial on the merits. Moreover, a summary judgment is rarely appropriate for a determination based upon subjective facts such as intent, motive, malice, knowledge or good faith. Penalber v. Blount, 550 So.2d 577 (La.1989); Liem v. Austin Power, Inc., 569 So.2d 601 (La.App. 2d Cir.1990); Yocum v. City of Minden, 566 So.2d 1082 (La.App. 2d Cir.1990); Marsh v. Reserve Life Insurance Company, 516 So.2d 1311 (La.App. 2d Cir.1987). The likelihood that a party will be unable to prove his allegations at trial does not constitute a basis for rendering summary judgment. Barbour v. Pit Stop Imports, Inc., 507 So.2d 14 (La.App. 2d Cir.1987).
On appeal, McKenzie does not complain of the trial court's holding that the provisions of LSA-R.S. 17:443 were inapplicable. Thus, McKenzie's termination is governed by LSA-R.S. 17:442, which provides in pertinent part:
Each teacher shall serve a probationary term of three years to be reckoned from the date of his first appointment in the parish or city in which the teacher is serving his probation. During the probationary term the parish or city school board ... may dismiss or discharge any probationary teacher upon the written recommendation of the parish or city superintendent of schools ... accompanied by valid reasons therefor.
Any teacher found unsatisfactory by the parish or city school board ... at the expiration of the said probationary term, shall be notified in writing by the board that he has been discharged or dismissed; in the absence of such notification, such probationary teacher shall automatically become a regular and permanent teacher in the employ of the School Board of the parish or city ... in which he has served his three-year probationary term ...
This statute simply requires the board to notify the non-tenured teacher/employee in writing that he has been discharged or...
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