Mckey v. August
| Decision Date | 16 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 16-13642-WBV-MBN |
| Parties | SUSAN DILLARD MCKEY v. ROBERTA ZENO AUGUST, ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
SECTION D (5)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion For Summary Judgement to Dismiss Plaintiff's Breach of Contract Claim, filed by Roberto Zeno August and the St. John the Baptist Parish Library Board (collectively, “Defendants”).[1] Susan Dillard McKey opposes the Motion, [2] and Defendants have filed a Reply.[3] After careful consideration of the parties' memoranda and the applicable law, the Motion is GRANTED.
This case involves a civil rights lawsuit filed by Susan Dillard McKey, a former employee of the St. John the Baptist Parish Library (the “Library”), who alleges reverse racial discrimination and deprivation of continued family health insurance coverage without due process of law.[5] In her original Complaint, McKey asserts three causes of action: (1) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) against August, in her individual capacity, for hostile work environment and for discriminatory demotion and termination (2) a claim for “breach of contract and denial of due process” against the Library Board; and (3) a claim for false arrest/imprisonment against St. John the Baptist Sheriff's Office.[6] McKey's claim against the Sheriff's Office was subsequently dismissed by the Court on October 3, 2006.[7] Thereafter, McKey amended her Complaint to allege facts regarding her purported property interest in the retirement benefits set forth in the Library Board's Policies and Procedural Manual (the “Policy Manual”) and to allege a breach of contract claim against August and the Library Board based upon the divesture of her “vested rights” in the continued health insurance benefits set forth in the Policy Manual, a claim that McKey had previously abandoned.[8]
On January 7, 2020, Defendants filed the instant Motion, seeking summary judgment regarding McKey's breach of contract claims.[9] Defendants assert that they are entitled to dismissal because McKey did not have an employment contract with either August or the Library Board and, even if she had an employment contract with the Library Board, Defendants did not breach it based on the clear and unambiguous terms of the Policy Manual.[10] Defendants assert that at all material times, McKey's employment with the Library was at-will. Defendants claim that the source of McKey's claim for continuing family health insurance derives from the Policy Manual which, at the time of her termination in 2015, provided the following:
Defendants argue that the Policy Manual did not create an employment contract with McKey, and that it expressly disclaimed that it was an employment contract, providing that:
Not a Contract: This manual is designed to acquaint the employee with working for the St. John the Baptist Parish Library and to provide information on our current employment practices. Neither this manual nor any of the policies and practices included is intended as an employment contract (express or implied) and accordingly should not be considered as such. Nothing in this manual should be relied upon as a guarantee for certain privileges, working conditions or continued employment.[12]
Defendants assert that McKey acknowledged that she signed an Acknowledgment of the Policy Manual, had access to the Policy Manual, and familiarized herself with the applicable policies.[13] Defendants argue that Louisiana courts consistently reject the notion that employee handbooks and policy manuals form employment contracts, especially where, as in this case, they expressly state that they are not employment contracts and are merely informational statements of current employment policies.[14]
McKey argues that she had a contractual entitlement to her continuing health care coverage as a result of the Library's Board's Policy Manual, and that her property interest in retirement benefits, including continued health care coverage, originates from Louisiana Constitution Article 10, § 29(B).[15] According to that provision, “[m]embership in any retirement system of the state or of a political subdivision thereof shall be a contractual relationship between employee and employer, and the state shall guarantee benefits payable to a member of a state retirement system or retiree or to his lawful beneficiary upon his death.”[16] McKey argues that she met all of the eligibility criteria for the vesting of retirement benefits through the Deferred Retirement Option Plan (“DROP”) and, as such, had an entitlement to the promised benefit of continued health care coverage.[17] As such, McKey claims her interest in continuing health care coverage “is clearly a sufficient property interest to invoke due process protections.”[18] McKey then recounts how the Court previously granted Defendants' motion to dismiss her amended claim based on her purported Fourteenth Amendment right to continued health insurance benefits, [19] but later rescinded the Order and denied Defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that McKey had stated a plausible § 1983 claim to continuing health insurance benefits as a retired employee.[20] McKey argues that the “law of the case” doctrine applies here, and that the instant Motion should be denied because this Court already rejected the same arguments raised by Defendants, namely, that McKey is not retired because she was terminated.[21] McKey contends that because there is evidence that she enrolled in the DROP retirement plan on September 23, 2013, there are genuine issues of fact as to whether she was “retired, ” thus precluding summary judgment.[22] McKey further asserts that her claim against August for continued health insurance coverage should not be dismissed because she has alleged that August terminated her health insurance benefits and, therefore, violated her constitutional rights.[23]
In response, Defendants assert that McKey completely misunderstands the arguments raised in their Motion, which seeks dismissal of her state law breach of contract claim.[24] Defendants argue that whether McKey had a vested property interest in continuing health insurance is a separate claim and analysis from her state law contract claims. Defendants point out that McKey failed to address a single issue briefed in their Motion, and that the Court should grant summary judgment on that basis alone. Defendants argue that McKey has presented no law or evidence to demonstrate that she had a valid employment contract with either August or the Library Board through the Policy Manual, or that the Policy Manual grants her a contractual right to continuing health insurance.[25] Defendants maintain that McKey's entitlement to continuing health insurance benefits starts and ends with the Policy Manual, and that she is not entitled to those benefits as a matter of Louisiana contract law.[26]
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine disputed issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.[27] When assessing whether a dispute regarding any material fact exists, the Court considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.”[28] While all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, a party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions or “only a scintilla of evidence.”[29] Instead, summary judgment is appropriate if a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party.[30]
If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.”[31] The nonmoving party can then defeat summary judgment by either submitting evidence sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact, or by “showing that the moving party's evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party.”[32] If, however, the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on the dispositive issue, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim.[33] The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who must go beyond the pleadings and, “by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'”[34]
Contrary to McKey's assertions, the issue before the Court is not whether she has sufficiently alleged a property interest in the continued health insurance coverage set forth in the Library's Policy Manual. In fact, that question is before the Court in another motion currently pending before the Court.[35] Instead, as Defendants aptly point out in their Reply brief, the sole issue before the Court...
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