McKie v. Estate of Dickinson
| Decision Date | 02 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 20-CV-2973 (KAM) (CLP) |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER MCKIE, Plaintiff, v. THE ESTATE OF DORIS DICKINSON, CHARLES KORNEGAY, Administrator of the Estate of Doris Dickinson, and JANE DOE, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Plaintiff Christopher McKie, proceeding pro se, commenced this civil action against defendants Estate of Dickinson, Charles Kornegay, the Administrator of the Estate of Doris Dickinson and Irene Kornegay[1] (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges that defendants conspired to deprive him of property and benefits he is entitled to, following the death of Ms. Doris Dickinson. (See ECF No. 1, Complaint (“Compl.”) at 1-2.) Plaintiff alleges the following claims against defendants: fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and tortious interference (Counts IIII), as well as breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty conversion, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and indebitatus assumpsit (Counts IV-IX). (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff seeks a constructive trust, compensatory damages punitive damages, and costs. (Id. at 41-42.)
Presently before the court is defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (See ECF Nos. 21 Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss (“Def. Mem.”); 21-2, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (“Pl. Mem.”); 21-2, Defendants' Reply Memorandum (“Def. Reply Mem.).) For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
The following facts -- drawn from the complaint and documents that are incorporated by reference in, or integral to, the complaint -- are assumed to be true for purposes of this motion. See DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010). The court may also consider matters subject to judicial notice. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).[2]
I. Plaintiff's First Complaint
On March 2, 2020, plaintiff filed a civil action against the Estate of Dickinson and its two co-administrators, Charles Kornegay and Peggy Kornegay. See McKie v. Est. of Dickinson, No. 20-cv-1050 (KAM) (ECF No. 1, Complaint (the “first complaint”)). In the first complaint plaintiff alleged federal subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1335, and 1343(a)(1), but his complaint asserted no federal claims, interpleader, or civil rights violations. Plaintiff also alleged that this court had diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), but plaintiff failed to allege the domicile of any party and conceded that both plaintiff and defendant Peggy Kornegay were residents of New York State. In the first complaint, plaintiff sought monetary damages, a declaratory judgement “that he is the rightful beneficiary to Doris Dickinson's estate, ” and “a preliminary injunction ordering that any and all proceedings brought against the estate of Doris Dickinson be halted immediately and held in abeyance pending the outcome of this civil action.” (See Case No. 20-cv-01050, ECF No. 1, Complaint at 36-37.)
On May 29, 2020, this court dismissed plaintiff's complaint without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3). See McKie v. Est. of Dickinson, No. 20-cv-1050 (KAM), 2020 WL 2797243, at *3 . This court reasoned that even if plaintiff dismissed the New York-resident defendant in order to assert complete diversity of citizenship, most of plaintiff's claims would “fall squarely within the probate exception to diversity jurisdiction” or run afoul of the Anti-Injunction Act. Id. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on June 23, 2020, but failed to pay the filing fee in full or move for in forma pauperis status. (Case No. 20-cv-1050, ECF Nos. 19, 20.) Accordingly, plaintiff's appeal was dismissed effective August 3, 2020 and the mandate was issued on October 21, 2020. (Case No. 20-cv-1050, ECF Nos. 20, 21.)
II. Plaintiff's Second Complaint
On July 1, 2020, plaintiff initiated a second lawsuit and filed the instant operative complaint. (ECF No. 1, Compl.) In the instant complaint, plaintiff sued defendants Estate of Dickinson, Charles Kornegay, the administrator of the estate of Doris Dickinson, and Irene Kornegay, Mr. Kornegay's wife. (Id. at 1.) Charles and Irene Kornegay are residents of South Carolina. (Id. at 3.) Notably, Peggy Kornegay, a defendant and New York resident identified in the first complaint, is no longer a party to the current action. Thus, in the instant operative complaint, plaintiff asserts diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). (Id. at 2.)
Plaintiff alleges the following facts, which are substantially similar to those alleged in the first complaint: plaintiff became Mr. and Mrs. Doris Dickinsons' driver in 2006, and developed a close relationship with the Dickinsons over more than a decade. (Compl. ¶¶ 10, 15.) Plaintiff became the Dickinsons' “de facto personal assistant, ” doing chores like the laundry and taking out the trash, and running errands like grocery shopping, paying bills, and doing light repair work around the Dickinsons' apartment buildings. (Id. ¶ 22.) Mr. and Mrs. Dickinson owned two multi-family apartment buildings located on Sheffield Avenue in Brooklyn, New York. (Id. ¶ 21.) In October 2008, Mr. Dickinson died, and plaintiff began going to see Ms. Dickinson every day. (Id. ¶¶ 29-31.)
Around May 2010, plaintiff and his son moved into one of the apartments in Ms. Dickinson's building, allowing them to assist her more easily. (Id. ¶¶ 43-44.) Plaintiff continued assisting Ms. Dickson, including with financial affairs such as collecting rent from Ms. Dickinson's tenants and monitoring the maintenance of her buildings. (Id. ¶ 47.) By the time of Ms. Dickinson's death on September 11, 2019, plaintiff had been her companion, caregiver, and assistant, managing her personal and financial affairs, for a number of years.
Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Dickinson intended to name him as the beneficiary of her estate to compensate him for his services and that Ms. Dickinson informally created documents reflecting her testamentary intent; plaintiff also concedes, however, that Ms. Dickinson died intestate. (Compl. ¶¶ 20, 26, 62, 64, 76 n.9, 99.) Specifically, in September 2018, Ms. Dickinson expressed a desire to transfer the title of her truck to plaintiff, but plaintiff never filed the paperwork. (Id. ¶ 67.) During October 2018, Ms. Dickinson allegedly told plaintiff that she “wanted to leave everything that she owned to” plaintiff and instructed him to write on a paper that in the event of her death, “all of her real estate holdings, the funds in her bank accounts, and every other assets” would go directly to plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 62.) Plaintiff observed Ms. Dickinson sign and date a document reflecting her intent to leave everything to plaintiff, which was then placed inside a dresser drawer in Ms. Dickinson's bedroom. (Id.) There were no witnesses to observe Ms. Dickinson sign this 2018 document and Ms. Dickinson apparently never revealed or discussed the contents of this document with another person, other than plaintiff. Nor did plaintiff obtain a copy of the 2018 document.
In or around May 2019, Ms. Dickinson decided to “get[] her estate in order” and contacted real estate attorney Fern Dejonge to draft and execute a will. (Compl. ¶¶ 74-75.) Plaintiff allegedly attended a meeting where Ms. Dickinson explained to Ms. Dejonge that she wanted plaintiff to be the sole beneficiary of her will and for her entire estate to go to plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 76.) Ms. Dejonge allegedly agreed to draft the will and bring a final draft to Ms. Dickinson by September 13, 2019 for Ms. Dickinson to review and sign. (Id.) Ms. Dickinson passed away on September 11, 2019 and the complaint does not allege that Ms. Dickinson actually executed any will. (Id.)
At the time of Ms. Dickinson's death, plaintiff was unaware that Ms. Dickinson had any siblings. (Compl. ¶ 86.) Ms. Dickinson never mentioned she had a brother, defendant Charles Kornegay, and Mr. Kornegay did not attend Ms. Dickinson's funeral. (Id. ¶¶ 84-85.) Plaintiff alleges that he arranged Ms. Dickinson's funeral and paid for all funeral expenses. (Id. ¶ 84.)
Following Ms. Dickinson's death, Peggy Kornegay, Ms. Dickinson's aunt, asserts that she wished to make Ms. Dickinson's “funeral and burial arrangements and to find her last will and testament and to make sure that it was honored.” (See Case No. 20-cv-01050, ECF No. 9, Answer by Peggy Kornegay ( ).)[3] Ms. Peggy Kornegay asserts that plaintiff refused to turn over keys to Ms. Dickinson's apartment, refused to turn over Ms. Dickinson's bank cards, and said that plaintiff would “take money out of [Ms. Dickinson's] account for her funeral arrangements.” (Id.) One evening after Ms. Dickinson's death, plaintiff permitted Ms. Peggy Kornegay to inspect the decedent's home with plaintiff and they found an insurance policy designating plaintiff as the beneficiary. (Id.) Ms. Peggy Kornegay alleges that she took the insurance policy to the funeral home to pay for expenses and that plaintiff never produced any money taken from Ms. Dickinson's accounts. (Id.) Ms. Kornegay was “never granted access to the apartment again” and went to the Public Administrator's Office to inquire about becoming the administrator of the estate. (Id.)
On September 24, 2019, upon filing of a petition from Wilford Kornegay (Ms. Peggy Kornegay's son), the...
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