McKinney v. City of Middletown

Decision Date26 September 2022
Docket Number19-1765-cv,August Term 2020
Citation49 F.4th 730
Parties William MCKINNEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF MIDDLETOWN, Thomas Sebold, Police Officer, Joshua Ward, Police Officer, and Michael D'Aresta, Police Officer, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Alexandra Elenowitz-Hess (Noam Biale, Heather Yu Han, on the brief), Sher Tremonte LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Thomas R. Gerarde (Beatrice S. Jordan, on the brief), Howd & Ludorf, LLC, Hartford, CT, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: Calabresi, Raggi, and Menashi, Circuit Judges.*

Judge Calabresi dissents in a separate opinion.

Menashi, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellant William McKinney appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Covello, J.) granting the defendantsmotion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. McKinney was arrested by officers of the Middletown Police Department in Connecticut for attempting to rob a Subway fast food restaurant. Following his arrest, the officers brought McKinney to the Middletown Police Department headquarters and placed him in a holding cell. After McKinney displayed concerning behavior, the officers decided to transfer McKinney to a padded cell. When the officers attempted to effect the transfer, McKinney threatened and attacked the officers, who used a baton, a police canine, and a taser to subdue him. When the officers secured McKinney in handcuffs, they withdrew the force and arranged for McKinney to be transported to the hospital for treatment of his injuries.

McKinney sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The defendant officers moved for summary judgment, arguing that their use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances and that they were protected under the doctrine of qualified immunity. The district court granted the defendants’ motion, holding that the defendant officers’ use of force was reasonable under the circumstances and did not amount to excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. On appeal, this court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding that a reasonable jury could conclude that the officers’ combined use of a baton, a police canine, and a taser was excessive despite McKinney's resistance. We remanded the case to the district court, expressing no opinion as to whether the defendant officers were entitled to qualified immunity.

On remand, the defendant officers renewed their motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. The district court again granted judgment in favor of the defendant officers, holding that McKinney failed to show that the defendant officers violated clearly established law of which a reasonable person would have known. McKinney appeals from that judgment.

McKinney argues that the defendant officers violated clearly established law by purportedly using a police canine for a purpose for which it was not trained, failing to give McKinney a warning before releasing the canine, allowing the canine to continue biting McKinney after he ceased actively resisting, subjecting McKinney to a dog bite that may have lasted for two minutes, and otherwise improperly escalating the use of force. McKinney also argues that the district court failed to apply the proper standard of review to the defendantssummary judgment motion by adopting the defendants’ version of events and failing to draw reasonable inferences in his favor. Finally, McKinney argues that the district court's grant of qualified immunity should be reversed on public policy grounds because the doctrine of qualified immunity has reduced the deterrent effect of the Fourth Amendment.

We are not persuaded by these arguments. McKinney has failed to demonstrate that under the specific facts of this case, the defendant officers’ incremental and combined use of a baton, a canine, and a taser violated clearly established law of which a reasonable officer would have known. The undisputed facts of the case show that McKinney threatened the defendant officers and actively resisted their efforts to subdue and secure him. Under those circumstances, reasonable officers could disagree as to whether the force the defendant officers applied in this case was lawful. The defendant officers are accordingly entitled to qualified immunity. McKinney's argument that the district court erred by adopting the defendants’ account of events and failing to draw reasonable inferences in his favor also fails. With one exception that does not affect the outcome of this case, the district court applied the correct summary judgment standard to McKinney's claims. We reject McKinney's argument that we should deny the defendant officers qualified immunity on public policy grounds. Whatever the merits of McKinney's argument, we are bound to follow the Supreme Court's and our circuit's precedent in assessing McKinney's claim. Under those precedents, the defendant officers are entitled to qualified immunity. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

BACKGROUND1
I

On the night of February 19, 2011, McKinney was arrested by officers of the Middletown Police Department for the attempted robbery of a Subway fast food restaurant. McKinney was charged with robbery in the first degree, breach of the peace in the second degree, and larceny in the sixth degree. On the night of his arrest, McKinney consumed alcohol, various psychiatric medications, and cocaine.

Following his arrest, McKinney was placed in a cell in the Middletown Police Department cell block. At some point between 3:45 and 4:30 AM, officers noticed that McKinney had covered his cell camera with wet toilet paper, obstructing the officers’ view of his cell. Defendant-Appellee Officer Thomas Sebold approached McKinney's cell and asked McKinney to remove the toilet paper from the camera. McKinney obliged. After Officer Sebold left, McKinney began trying to injure himself by slashing his wrist and upper forearm with an unknown object. McKinney then covered his cell camera for a second time. Officer Sebold, this time accompanied by Defendant-Appellee Officer Joshua Ward, returned to McKinney's cell to instruct McKinney to remove the toilet paper from his cell camera. The officers found McKinney lying on the floor of his cell. McKinney was hostile to the officers and refused to stand up and remove the toilet paper from his cell camera, telling the officers, "Fuck you, you remove it." J. App'x 230.

Officer Sebold again asked McKinney to remove the material from his cell camera. McKinney replied with something to the effect of, "Fuck you. If I'm going to jail, it won't be for something minor. Come in here and I will go to jail for fucking you cops up." Id. In light of McKinney's concerning behavior, the officers decided to move McKinney to a padded cell. When the officers told McKinney that they planned to move him, McKinney responded that he would not be leaving his cell. Officer Sebold remained outside McKinney's cell while Officer Ward went to get Defendant-Appellee Officer Michael D'Aresta to assist them. McKinney continued to yell threats at Officer Sebold through his cell door, telling Officer Sebold that he would "fuck [him] up" if he tried to move McKinney to a padded cell. Id. at 232.

Officers Ward and D'Aresta returned to the cell block with a police canine named Hunter. Officer Sebold instructed McKinney that he needed to move back from his cell door so that the officers could enter, but McKinney refused to comply. McKinney continued to block the door and told the officers that if they wanted him, they would need to come in and get him. At that point, Officer D'Aresta readied Hunter by giving him the "watch him" command. Id. at 235. Officer Sebold cracked open the cell door. McKinney clenched his teeth and fists, looked Officer Sebold in the eye, and said, "Come on." Id. at 236.

McKinney picked up the foam mattress pad in his cell and pressed against the cell door. Officer Sebold entered and pushed McKinney to the back of the cell with his expandable baton. McKinney grabbed Officer Sebold's baton and attempted to wrest it from Officer Sebold's hands. McKinney then became "extremely combative" and "charged towards the [officers]." Id. at 240. At that point, Officer D'Aresta deployed Hunter, directing him onto McKinney's lower right leg. Upon being bitten by Hunter, McKinney dropped to the floor, falling partially on top of Officer D'Aresta. As McKinney tussled with the officers, Officer Sebold struck McKinney's leg with his baton, urging McKinney to stop resisting. McKinney continued to fight and struggle with the officers despite the dog bite and baton strikes.

Officer Ward deployed his taser via drive stun to McKinney's left shoulder, ordering that McKinney put out his hands so that he could be handcuffed. McKinney complied following the application of the taser and offered his left hand. The officers rolled McKinney onto his stomach, but he refused to expose his right arm. McKinney then ceased fighting the officers and yelled for the officers to get the canine off of him. Once McKinney was secured in handcuffs, Officer D'Aresta removed Hunter from McKinney's leg. The officers arranged for McKinney to be taken to the hospital for treatment of his injuries.

II

McKinney filed a lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officers Sebold, Ward, and D'Aresta in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, alleging "excessive and unreasonable force in violation of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 13 (capitalization omitted). In addition to his § 1983 claim, McKinney alleged state law claims of intentional, reckless, and negligent assault and battery against the officers as well as statutory and common law negligence against the City of Middletown.

The defendants moved for summary judgment. As...

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