McKinnon v. Hullett
| Decision Date | 16 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 3:18cv1191/LAC/EMT |
| Parties | WILLIE MENARDO MCKINNON, Plaintiff, v. SERGEANT B. HULLETT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
This matter is before the court on a joint motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Centurion of Florida, LLC ("Centurion") and Nurse Marie Williams ("Nurse Williams") (ECF No. 93), and Defendants' Supplement to their motion to dismiss (ECF No. 96). Plaintiff Willie Menardo McKinnon ("McKinnon") filed a response in opposition to dismissal (ECF No. 102). The case was referred to the undersigned for the issuance of all preliminary orders and any recommendations to the district court regarding dispositive matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2(C); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Upon consideration of the parties' submissions and the relevant law, the undersigned concludes that Defendants' motion to dismiss should be granted.
McKinnon, an inmate of the Florida Department of Corrections ("FDOC") proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, commenced this case by filing a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1). The operative pleading is now McKinnon's Third Amended Complaint (ECF No. 84). McKinnon names ten Defendants: (1) Centurion, (2) Nurse Williams, (3) Sergeant B. Hullett, (4) Warden W. Clemmons, (5) former FDOC Secretary J. Jones, (6) Officer J. Tuttle, (7) Officer C. Jackson, (8) Officer F. Scheier, (9) Officer J. Carrico, and (10) FDOC Dietician A. Gaskins. McKinnon asserts Eighth Amendment claims of deliberate indifference to his need for medical treatment for a hypoglycemic episode on December 13, 2017. McKinnon also asserts state law medical negligence/malpractice claims. McKinnon seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages.
On May 19, 2019, Defendants Centurion and Nurse Williams filed a motion to dismiss asserting the following defenses: (1) McKinnon's federal claims are subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; (2) McKinnon failed to meet the conditions precedent to bringing state claims for medical negligence/malpractice; (3) McKinnon's factual allegations fail to state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim; (4) Centurion and Nurse Williams are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to McKinnon's federal claims against them in their individual capacities; (5) Centurion and Nurse Williams are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to McKinnon's claims for monetary damages against them in their official capacities; and (6) McKinnon's federal claims for monetary damages are barred due to the lack of physical injuries (see ECF No. 93). Centurion and Nurse Williams subsequently withdrew their qualified immunity defense (see ECF No. 96).
McKinnon filed a Response in opposition to the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 102). McKinnon contends he exhausted his administrative remedies. He further contends his factual allegations state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim. With respect to the state claims, McKinnon argues the motion to dismiss did not specify that it was seeking dismissal of the state law claims. He contends, "the Defendants should motion specifically for the dismissal of state law claims" (id. at 3).
Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are governed by Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In applying that rule, the allegations of the complaint are taken as true and are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1393 (11th Cir. 1997). "Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed." Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006). The court may consider documents attached to a complaint or incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322, 127 S. Ct. 2499, 168 L. Ed. 2d 179 (2007); Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1272 (11th Cir. 2014); Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997) ().
To survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quotation and citation omitted). A claim is plausible on its face where "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citation omitted). Plausibility means "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." Id. (quotation and citation omitted).
The determination of whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citation omitted). The pleader is not entitled to relief "where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct." Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). The court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Id. at 678 (quotation and citation omitted). And "bare assertions" that "amount to nothing more than a "formulaic recitation of the elements" of a claim "are conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true." Id. at 681 (quotation and citation omitted). Stated succinctly:
Pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
The Third Amended Complaint sets forth the factual allegations that follow (see ECF No. 84 at 9-13).1 On December 13, 2017, at approximately 11:20-11:30 a.m., Defendants Tuttle and Jackson entered Wing 2 of G-dormitory to feed inmates the noon meal. Inmates informed Tuttle and Jackson that McKinnon was unresponsive in his cell. Tuttle and Jackson knew that McKinnon was diabetic and at risk for hypoglycemia. Tuttle and Jackson saw that McKinnon was unresponsive in his cell, but instead of obtaining medical assistance for McKinnon, they left McKinnon's food tray at his cell, which was Cell #117 and was on the bottom floor of the dormitory, and they proceeded to feed the other inmates, including the inmates on the second floor of the dormitory. After feeding the entire Wing 2, Tuttle and Jackson returned to McKinnon's cell and radioed a request that McKinnon's cell door be opened. Tuttle and Jackson then allowed another inmate to enter McKinnon's cell, while they stood outside.
Defendant Sergeant Hullett, who also knew that McKinnon was diabetic, approached McKinnon's cell upon hearing the radioed request to open the cell door and observing that the cell door was open. Hullett ordered the inmate to leave McKinnon's cell, and ordered "everyone" to leave Wing 2. Other inmates began banging on their cell doors, yelling, "Man down! 17 bottom!" Minutes later, Hullett returned to Wing 2 and acted as if he was conducting a security check. Another inmate notified Hullett that McKinnon was unresponsive. Hullett then went to McKinnon's cell and attempted to get a response. Other inmates yelled, "Sarge, you see he can't move!", "He's incoherent!", and "You're just standing there, do something!" Hullett responded with expletives and then left Wing 2.
More time passed as other inmates yelled for help. Defendants Officers Scheier and Carrico entered Wing 2. Scheier was aware that McKinnon was diabetic and was at risk for hypoglycemia. Other inmates notified Scheier and Carrico that McKinnon was unresponsive and needed immediate medical attention. The officers yelled, "Count is more important!" Scheier and Carrico commenced the count, and when they reached McKinnon's cell, they saw his condition and proceeded with the count, allegedly in accordance with the FDOC policy that count takes priority over an inmate's medical needs.
When count concluded, Sergeant Hullett and another officer secured McKinnon with handcuffs and leg restraints, placed him in a wheelchair, and transported him to the dormitory's medical triage room. McKinnon was unable to walk, stand, speak, or lift his head. Upon seeing McKinnon, Defendant Nurse Williams stated, Nurse Williams measured McKinnon's blood glucose level and determined it was 43. While Nurse Williams was attempting to treat McKinnon, Sergeant Hullett walked in and out of the triage room, telling Williams that McKinnon needed to be returned to his cell as soon as possible, because the warden was coming to the dormitory for an inspection, and Hullett "wanted to look good for the warden." Nurse Williams returned McKinnon to security, allegedly without completing the FDOC's protocol for treating hypoglycemia. Sergeant Hullett wheeled McKinnon from the dormitory's medical triage room to McKinnon's cell, even though McKinnon was still suffering from hypoglycemia and could not walk, talk, stand, or lift his...
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