McKinnon v. Republic Nat. Life Ins. Co.

• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: PETRIE; JOHNSON; REED
• Citation: McKinnon v. Republic Nat. Life Ins. Co., 610 P.2d 944, 25 Wn.App. 854 (Wash. App. 1980)
• Decision Date: 15 April 1980
• Docket Number: No. 3537-II
• Parties: Joan M. McKINNON, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Donald R. McKinnon, Deceased, Appellant, v. REPUBLIC NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Foreign Corporation; and Travelers Insurance Company, a Foreign Corporation, Respondents.

Page 854

25 Wn.App. 854

610 P.2d 944

Joan M. McKINNON, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Donald R. McKinnon, Deceased, Appellant, v. REPUBLIC NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Foreign Corporation; and Travelers Insurance Company, a Foreign Corporation, Respondents.

No. 3537-II.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

April 15, 1980.

Richard J. Glein, Seattle, for appellant.

Lee Corkrum, Richard E. Monroe, Seattle, for respondents.

PETRIE, Judge.

Plaintiff, Joan McKinnon, appeals from a summary judgment dismissing her complaint which sought to recover accidental death benefits under the terms of two group insurance policies issued by defendant Republic National Life Insurance Company and defendant Travelers Insurance Company. We reverse and remand for trial.

Preliminarily, we reject consideration of plaintiff's counsel's affidavit in opposition to defendants' motion, because the material "facts" stated therein obviously are not based upon the affiant's personal knowledge. Klossner v. San Juan County, 93 Wash.2d 42, 605 P.2d 330 (1980). We are, however, required to review the remainder of the facts in the light most favorable to Mrs. McKinnon. Summary judgment is available only when the moving party has met its burdens initially to prove by uncontroverted facts that (1) no genuine issue of material fact exists and (2) those facts establish that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ohler v. Tacoma General Hosp., 92 Wash.2d 507, 598 P.2d 1358 (1979).

From the record, we glean the following picture. In the afternoon of July 14, 1976, plaintiff's husband, Donald McKinnon, a person who "could swim fairly well", stated that "he was just going for a walk." He had no financial or marital problems and he "always acted in a manner in which to preserve his own safety and the safety of his family."

At mid-afternoon, traffic in both eastbound and westbound lanes of the Evergreen Point Floating Bridge across Lake Washington was "either stopped or slowing." Mr McKinnon was seen alternately walking and running eastbound on the bridge, darting in and out of traffic. He "looked as if he was being pursued . . ." He ran across the westbound lanes of traffic, and at a point on the bridge which was subsequently determined to be approximately 75 yards from the west shore and 20 feet above the water, he stepped up on the curb, put his hand on the north railing of the bridge and, although wearing a sweat shirt, light pants, and boots, jumped or catapulted off the bridge into the water which, at that point, was "about ten feet" deep.

An eyewitness who ran to the railing about 10 seconds later initially saw only bubbles in the water where Mr. McKinnon had entered. After a few more seconds, the same person observed that McKinnon "bobbed up" to the surface, was "spitting out a lot of water," and "dog-paddling to keep his head above water." The witness did not observe any external injuries, but did notice McKinnon "appeared to try to save himself" and that he "was dog-paddling slower than I thought he should have been paddling to keep himself up." The witness shouted words of encouragement to McKinnon, but after a few minutes McKinnon disappeared below the surface of the water and apparently drowned.

Both policies provide payments for specified losses, including death, resulting from accidental bodily injury. Republic's policy provides:

(W)hen accidental bodily injury occurs . . . directly and independently of all other causes, . . . the Company will pay:

Travelers' policy provides:

The term "injuries" as used in this Policy means accidental bodily injuries which are the direct and independent cause of the loss for which claim is made . . .

Both policies exclude coverage in the event of suicide, sane or insane, or any attempt thereat; and Republic's policy specifically excludes "Intentionally self-inflicted injuries."

Both companies urge us to affirm the summary judgment of dismissal on the alternative, but interrelated theories that as a matter of law Mr. McKinnon's death (1) was the result of suicide, or at least of an intentionally self-inflicted injury; or (2) was not caused by accidental bodily injury as defined in their respective policies.

We pause only momentarily to dispose of the suicide and intentionally self-inflicted injury arguments. Measured by the standard applied in Noll v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 66 Wash.2d 540, 403 P.2d 898 (1965), we find sufficient evidence in the record to require resolution of those issues by a fact finder. Under the facts presented, a finder of fact could reasonably infer that Mr. McKinnon's leap from the bridge was prompted by reasons other than an attempt at suicide.

The "accidental bodily injury" argument is not so readily disposed of. Defendants rely heavily upon the concept of an "accident" as enunciated in Evans v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 26 Wash.2d 594, 174 P.2d 961 (1946). Evans states the rule in a negative format at 622, 174 P.2d at 976:

accident is never present when a deliberate act is performed, unless some additional, unexpected, independent, and unforeseen happening occurs which produces or brings about the result of injury or death.

In Zinn v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 6 Wash.2d 379, 107 P.2d 921 (1940), cited favorably in Evans, the rule is stated in an affirmative format at 392, 107 P.2d at 927:

death is accidental, within the meaning of the provisions of insurance policies such as we have in the case at bar, where death occurs as the result of unusual, unexpected, or unforeseen events following an intentional act, provided that those events are not normally effected.

This concept of "accident" has become firmly entrenched in the common law of this state; it would be inappropriate for this court to dislodge it at this time. ¹ We do detect, however, that in recent years the Supreme Court has encouraged trial courts to grant broad deference to a fact-finder's ability to ferret out from the circumstantial evidence the additional "happening" or "event" and in close cases has encouraged trial courts to rely heavily upon the fact-finder's determination of whether or not any such happening or event is "unusual, unexpected, or unforeseen."

For example, in Noll v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra, the insurer denied liability under a double indemnity clause for death by accidental causes on the theory that the insured's death was caused by suicide and not by accident. Following a verdict in favor of the beneficiary, the insurer appealed, contending the trial court had erred by denying its motion for a directed verdict. Although the essential issue was whether or not suicide had been established as a matter of law, the Supreme Court recognized a theory of "accident" which certainly did not comport with the Evans/Zinn requirements. The insured was found dead on the floor of his garage lying at the rear of his car with his face one to three feet from the exhaust pipe. The car's engine was running, and the garage door was closed. The court accepted a theory that the insured had decided to attach his new license tabs to the car, and in the course of that effort his face was very close to the exhaust pipe "and that the jury could have believed that he took a couple of breaths in that position and then passed out." Noll v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra, 66 Wash.2d at 544, 403 P.2d at 900. The court thereupon affirmed the trial court's denial of the insurer's motion and declared that testimony in support of the beneficiary be "accorded the most favorable inferences."

In Tucker v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 67 Wash.2d 60, 406 P.2d 628 (1965), a majority of the Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's finding that the insured "was involved in an accident" in the face of the insured's own testimony that as he was sliding a heavy bulldozer cutting edge out of a station wagon, his "back went out" and he then fell. The court found sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding of accidental injury from the accident report form which the insured had presented to the insurer and which was admitted into evidence to establish that a claim had been made. On that form the insured had written "equipment slipped caused fall and injury." Despite a vigorous dissent asserting that there was "no unforeseen incident", a majority of the court, sitting en banc, affirmed the trial court's determination that the insured was covered under an accident insurance policy.

Applying the standard of appellate review as exemplified by Noll and Tucker, we reach the conclusion that a jury should pass upon the critical issues of fact in the case at bench.

The facts necessarily point to a conclusion that Mr. McKinnon's act of leaping over the railing was an intentional and deliberate act, regardless of his motivation for jumping. Thus, the only question remaining is whether the facts and all reasonable inferences derived therefrom permit a trier of fact to reach a factual conclusion that after the leap another event occurred which was "unusual, unexpected, or unforeseen" and which would not be "normally effected."

The facts do permit a conclusion that Mr. McKinnon's actions following his entry into the water were inconsistent with the actions of a person who "could swim fairly well." A jury could conclude that something occurred which impaired his swimming capacity. Thus, we cannot state as a matter of law that another "event" did not take place. Further, we cannot state as a matter of law that that event did not cause his death.

Accordingly, the real question is whether, under the fact pattern presented, that "event" can be categorized by a jury as "unusual, unexpected, or unforeseen." Clearly, if instead of landing in the water, McKinnon had struck the side of a passing boat, thus injuring himself and impairing his swimming capacity to the extent that he drowned, the intervening event of the passing boat at...