McKirdy v. Cascio

• Decision Date: 25 January 1955
• Citation: 111 A.2d 555,142 Conn. 80
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Neil M. McKIRDY, Administrator (Estate of Neil J. McKirdy), v. Peter J. CASCIO et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 555

111 A.2d 555

142 Conn. 80

Neil M. McKIRDY, Administrator (Estate of Neil J. McKirdy), v. Peter J. CASCIO et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Jan. 25, 1955.

[142 Conn 81] J. Ronald Regnier, Hartford, with whom were Martin E. Gormley, New Haven, and William R. Moller, Hartford, for appellants (defendants).

William S. Gordon, Jr., with whom were George Muir and Mary C. Fitzgerald, Hartford, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before INGLIS, C. J., and BALDWIN, O'SULLIVAN, WYNNE and DALY, JJ.

O'SULLIVAN, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff administrator brought this action to recover damages for the death of his decedent. The death occurred as the result of injuries sustained by the decedent while riding as a passenger in an automobile owned by the named defendant and operated by his son, the defendant Joseph Cascio. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff to recover $50,000, and from the judgment rendered thereon both defendants have appealed.

We first discuss the assignment that the court erred in refusing to set the verdict aside on the ground that it was against the evidence. The jury could reasonably have found the following facts: At about 11:30 p. m. on June 18, 1952, Joseph Cascio, a high school boy, was operating his father's automobile on Deercliff Road in the town of Avon. Just before the accident occurred, Joseph was driving at a speed of between twenty and thirty miles an hour. A girl in her teens was sitting beside him, and the plaintiff's decedent and another young girl were occupying the rear seat. As the automobile was proceeding along a stretch where the road was winding and narrow, the driver turned his head to speak to those behind him. When he again looked ahead, he saw that the automobile was off the traveled portion of the highway. He immediately applied the brakes but was unable to stop the car before it crashed into a utility pole at the side of the road. As a result of the impact, the decedent was catapulted forward and his head went through the windshield. His jugular vein was severed by the glass and, because of the loss of blood, he died within the hour.

This narrative of facts readily supports a verdict against both defendants. The negligence of the driver was established by proof of the manner in which he continued to operate the automobile during the night season over a narrow, winding road while, at the same time, he turned to talk to those on the back seat; and the liability of Joseph's father would under the foregoing facts, naturally follow upon the unrebutted presumption that the automobile was being operated as a family car. General Statutes, § 7904.

The defendants also contend that the damages awarded by the jury were excessive and that, on this ground, the court erred in denying their motion to set the verdict aside. The jury could reasonably have found the following: The decedent was eighteen years old. His life expectancy was almost forty-nine years. He enjoyed good health and was of attractive appearance. He had some musical talent and was accustomed to entertain on the piano at social gatherings. He had just completed his high school course and, had he lived, would have graduated a few days later. He had planned to continue his education and had been accepted for matriculation at a college in Rhode Island. The decedent's father was part owner of a lithographing firm employing about twenty-five persons. During the summers of 1950 and 1951, the decedent worked in the firm's bindery and shipping departments. His earnings in 1950 were $458 and in 1951, $465. If he had decided to go to work rather than to college, a job at the firm would have been available to him at 85 cents an hour.

The defendants have urged upon us the necessity for a modification of our concept of the law as it deals with an action for wrongful death. Their purpose is to change the rule for the ascertainment of damages. They seek the adoption of a rule which woud make damages contingent on, and fix them in proportion to, the financial dependency of others upon the deceased. This effort, however, is abortive. In the first place, the existing legal principles on this subject matter are the law of the case, since the defendants did not challenge them during the course of trial. Lengel v. New Haven Gas Light Co., 142 Conn. 70, 111 A.2d 547. Ordinarily this court will refuse to entertain a question not distinctly raised below. New England General Contracting Co. v. Brennan Stone Co., 119 Conn. 296, 297, 175 A. 921; Bassett v. Mechanics Bank, 116 Conn. 730, 731, 166 A. 385; Practice Book, § 409. But this aside, any change in the law is presently unwarranted, at least by judicial decision. On the contrary, we reaffirm what we have frequently and consistently said in the past, that is, that our statute is not a Lord Campbell's Act. The right of recovery for death is as for one of the consequences of the wrong inflicted upon the decedent, and the damages are not based upon any loss occasioned his family or relatives. Chase v. Fitzgerald, 132 Conn. 461, 467, 45 A.2d 789, 163 A.L.R. 247; Shaker v. Shaker, 129 Conn. 518, 520, 29 A.2d 765; Davis v. Margolis, 108 Conn. 645, 648, 144 A. 655; Bunnell v. Waterbury Hospital, 103 Conn. 520, 529, 131 A. 501; Mezzi v. Taylor, 99 Conn. 1, 7, 120 A. 871; Kling v. Torello, 87 Conn. 301, 305, 87 A. 987, 46 L.R.A.,N.S., 930; Broughel v. Southern New England Telephone Co., 72 Conn. 617, 623, 45 A. 435, 49 L.R.A. 404; McElligott v. Randolph, 61 Conn. 157, 159, 22 A. 1094; Goodsell v. Hartford & N. H. R. Co., 33 Conn. 51, 56.

The task of fixing the amount of an award in death actions is far from easy nor was it lightened in 1951 by the legislative removal of the ceiling which had previously limited the maximum of such awards. Cum.Sup.1951, § 1392b, Cum.Sup.1953, § 2428c. Many of the factors upon which our rule for the assessment of damages rests are, at best, rather indefinite and speculative in nature. 'What the intestate's length of days would have been but for the mishap which befell him or what his state of health or earning ability cannot be known. Therefore the problem of estimating damages for the loss of his life with any exactness is, as in every such case * * * one beset with insurmountable difficulties. The law, nevertheless, undertakes to do justice as best it can, although of necessity crudely. The solution of the problem is left to the trier's good judgment.' Lane v. United Electric Light & Water Co., 90 Conn. 35, 37, 96 A. 155, 156, L.R.A.1916C, 808. For this reason we have frequently said that the amount of damages recoverable in actions for death is peculiarly within the province of the jury. White v. L. Bernstein & Sons, Inc., 123 Conn. 300, 302, 194 A. 723; Ratushny v. Punch, 106 Conn. 329, 337, 138 A. 220; O'Connor v. Zavaritis, 95 Conn. 111, 117, 110 A. 878. Their determination will be set aside, however, when it appears that the sum awarded is plainly excessive. Lengel v. New Haven Gas Light Co., 142 Conn. 70, 111 A.2d 547; Szivos v. Leonard, 113 Conn. 522, 525, 155 A. 637; Knight v. Continental Automobile Mfg. Co., 82 Conn. 291, 293, 73 A. 751.

Although the verdict is a generous one, we cannot hold that it is excessive. The jury were confronted with the problem of determining just damages for the death of a mere boy. He had not as yet reached the threshold of adult life. Many of the factors which, if he had been of mature age, are to be considered in an attempt to fix the economic loss to his estate could not be placed in evidence. These factors include, among others, such...