McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 09 June 1933
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 321.
• Citation: 227 Ala. 349,149 So. 822
• Parties: McKNETT v. ST. LOUIS & S. F. RY. CO.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

149 So. 822

227 Ala. 349

McKNETT v. ST. LOUIS & S. F. RY. CO.

6 Div. 321.

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 9, 1933

Rehearing Denied Oct. 12, 1933.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; T. J. Bedsole, Judge.

Action by Robert McKnett against the St. Louis & San Francisco Railway Company. Plaintiff takes a nonsuit, and appeals from adverse ruling on pleading overruling a demurrer to defendant's plea in abatement.

Affirmed.

FOSTER and BROWN, JJ., dissenting.

London Yancey & Brower and J. Kirkman Jackson, all of Birmingham for appellant.

Cabaniss & Johnston and L. D. Gardner, Jr., all of Birmingham, for appellee.

FOSTER Justice.

This action is alleged to have arisen in Tennessee under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USCA §§ 51-59) against appellee, a foreign corporation doing business in Alabama, as an interstate carrier. Defendant pleaded in abatement that the cause of action did not arise in Alabama and that it did not exist either by authority of the common law or the statutes of Tennessee, but arose under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and that section 5681, Code, did not apply, and the courts of Alabama had no jurisdiction.

By its terms that section only applies to actions which arose in another state either by common law or the statutes of that state. While the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USCA §§ 51-59) is a statute which is effective in Tennessee, as elsewhere in the several states, it was not enacted by the Legislature nor by any constitutional convention of that state; nor is its effectiveness there dependent upon any sort of state action or recognition. It is wholly beyond the authority of the state that it is a law.

We do not therefore think that the Legislature of Alabama in enacting what is section 5681, Code, intended that its language should have a meaning broader than that ordinarily to be understood by its common or general use. Since the cause of action is not there included, the plea in abatement is available, for prior to the authority of that enactment, it was held that an action on a claim which did not arise in Alabama could not be maintained in its courts against a foreign corporation without its consent. C. R. R. & B. Co. v. Carr, 76 Ala. 388, 52 Am. Rep. 339; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Harrison, 122 Ala. 149, 25 So. 697, 82 Am. St. Rep. 68; Dozier Lumber Co. v. Smith, etc., Lumber Co.,

145 Ala. 317, 39 So. 714; Southern Railway Co. v. Jordan, 192 Ala. 528, 68 So. 418. Such was the ruling of the circuit court, and it is affirmed.

Affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

On Rehearing.

PER CURIAM.

We are of the opinion the conclusion reached in the original opinion is correct. The authorities cited therein, which need no repetition here, demonstrate that the matter of jurisdiction is dependent upon section 5681, Code 1923, which for convenience is here reproduced: "Whenever, either by common law or the statutes of another state, a cause of action, either upon contract, or in tort, has arisen in such other state against any person or corporation, such cause of action shall be enforcible in the courts of this state, in any county in which jurisdiction of the defendant can be legally obtained in the same manner in which jurisdiction could have been obtained if the cause of action had arisen in this state."

We are concerned first with the proper construction of this statute. It is the general rule that words in common use are to be given their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning. Edwards v. Doster-Northington Drug Co., 214 Ala. 640, 108 So. 862; 59 Corpus Juris 975.

The words of the above-noted section, upon which rest the question of jurisdiction in this particular case, are "the statutes of another state," and the case turns upon the true meaning thereof. It has been expressly held and we think correctly so, that the natural meaning of "statute of a state," is a statute or law enacted directly by the Legislature of the state. Discussing a statute in which these words were used, the court in Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Memphis (D. C.) 198 F. 955, 957, said: "The natural meaning of 'statute of a state' is a statute or law directly passed by the Legislature of the state, and the natural meaning of 'any officer of such state' is an officer whose authority extends throughout the state, and is not limited to a small district; and * * * that Congress used these phrases with this natural meaning, rather than with the broader and less obvious meaning which trained lawyers might find therein." Giving therefore to the words "statutes of another state" their natural meaning (and we find nothing upon which to base a contrary interpretation), a federal statute is excluded.

The dissenting view appears to rest upon the assumption that such an interpretation would run counter to the intent of Congress and would not harmonize with the cases of Mondou v. N. Y., N.H. & H. R. R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 32 S.Ct. 169, 56 L.Ed. 327, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 44, Murnan v. Wabash Ry. Co., 246 N.Y. 244, 158 N.E. 508, 509, 54 A. L. R. 1522, and Walton v. Pryor, 276 Ill. 563, 115 N.E. 2, 4, L. R. A. 1918E, 914. But we think this is a mistaken interpretation of these authorities.

It must first be noted that the question whether the circuit court had jurisdiction is to be determined by the Constitution and laws of this state creating the courts and defining and limiting their jurisdiction. There is no restriction of the Federal Constitution upon the power of a state to determine the limits of the jurisdiction of its courts, except that the state must give to the citizen of other states the same rights that it accords to its own citizens.

So far as concerns this case, therefore, the authority of the state through its Legislature to limit its jurisdiction, as above indicated, is well established, for, as said by the United States Supreme Court in St. L., I. M. & S. R. R. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 28 S.Ct. 616, 617, 52 L.Ed. 1061, "Each state may, subject to the restrictions of the Federal Constitution, determine the limits of the jurisdiction of its courts, the character of the controversies which shall be heard in them, and, specifically, how far it will, having jurisdiction of the parties, entertain in its courts transitory actions where the cause of action has arisen outside its borders." And to like effect was the holding in Chambers v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 28 S.Ct. 34, 52 L.Ed. 143, all of which was fully discussed by the Illinois case of Walton v. Pryor, supra, wherein the Mondou Case, supra, is considered, and wherein it is pointed out that Congress had no authority and made no effort to prescribe the jurisdiction of a state court. That was a matter for the state and the state only, and presenting no federal question. And as further illustrating this fact, the Illinois court quotes and comments upon the Mondou Case as follows:

"One of the questions considered by the Supreme Court of the United States was this: 'May rights arising under those regulations be enforced as of right in the courts of the states when their jurisdiction, as fixed by local laws, is adequate to the occasion?' On that question the court said: 'There is not here involved any attempt by Congress to enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction of state courts or to control or affect their modes of procedure, but only a question of the duty of such a court, when its ordinary jurisdiction as prescribed by local laws is appropriate to the occasion and is invoked in conformity with those laws, to take cognizance of an action to enforce a right of civil recovery arising under the act of Congress and susceptible of adjudication according to the prevailing rules of procedure. We say "when its ordinary jurisdiction as prescribed by local laws is appropriate to the occasion," because we are advised by the decisions of the Supreme Court of errors that the superior courts of the state are courts of general jurisdiction, are empowered to take cognizance of actions to recover for personal injuries and for death, and are accustomed to exercise that jurisdiction, not only in cases where the right of action arose under the laws of that state, but also in cases where it arose in another state, under its laws, and in circumstances in which the laws of Connecticut gave no right of recovery.' The court being advised that the courts of Connecticut had jurisdiction of actions for personal injuries and for death in cases where the right of action arose under the laws of that state, and also, in cases where it arose in another state and under the laws of the other state where the laws of Connecticut gave no right of recovery, held that the courts of that state were bound to exercise the same jurisdiction to enforce a liability under the federal act.

"Section 6 of the federal act, as amended in 1910 [45 USCA § 56], contains this provision: 'The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this act shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several states, and no case arising under this act and brought in any state court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the United States.' In view of the powers of the federal government and the states and in the light of the uniform decisions relating to the subject, this provision can only mean that when the jurisdiction of the courts of a state as fixed by local laws empowers them to hear and determine a certain class of actions, an action of that class arising under federal law may be enforced as of right in the state court. * * *

"The Supreme Court of the United States has said that there has been no attempt of Congress to enlarge the jurisdiction of the state courts, but only to require its exercise

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