McKnight-Nero v. Walmart, Inc.
| Decision Date | 19 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 20-cv-1541 (APM) |
| Parties | CHEKETA MCKNIGHT-NERO, Plaintiff, v. WALMART, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Plaintiff Cheketa McKnight-Nero filed this putative class action lawsuit against Defendant Walmart, Inc. ("Walmart") after she was denied access to a Washington, D.C., Walmart location's exclusive shopping hour for customers with compromised health during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Complaint alleges violations of (1) the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. ("ADA"); (2) the District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C. Code §§ 2-1401.01 et seq. ("DCHRA"); as well as (3) negligent retention, training, and supervision. Defendant has moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Having carefully considered the Complaint and the parties' arguments, for the reasons that follow, the court grants Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiff Cheketa McKnight-Nero is a resident of Maryland who suffers from various health conditions, including diabetes, high blood pressure, and a rare blood cancer. See Compl., ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Compl.], ¶ 19. She alleges that on May 12, 2020, she traveled to the Walmart store located at 5929 Georgia Avenue Northwest in Washington, D.C., for the purpose of taking advantage of the store's "exclusive shopping" hour for "Seniors and Customers with Compromised Health" during the "COVID-19 public health crisis." Id. ¶ 20. According to Plaintiff, the store "provides exclusive shopping periods between the time of 6:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. [on Tuesdays and Thursdays] for Senior citizens over the age of 65 and people who have an impaired immune system, or identify as 'immunocompromised,'" id. ¶¶ 8, 21, to "reduc[e] their risk of contracting COVID-19 during regular business hours," id. ¶ 20.
Upon arriving at the entrance to the store at approximately 6:20 a.m., Plaintiff alleges "she was prohibited from entering . . . by a contracted security guard from Brosnan Security Solutions," a company with which Walmart contracts to "perform security services" at that particular location. Id. ¶¶ 22-23. Plaintiff recounts two different reasons why the guard refused her entrance to the store despite explaining to him that "she was an individual with a compromised immune system," id. ¶ 24, and that it would be her only opportunity "to shop for essential items that she needed for the week," id. ¶ 26. She first alleges that the guard "did not believe" she had compromised health. Id. ¶ 24. Additionally, the guard later stated that he was instructed by Walmart to allow only "'seniors' to enter the store between 6:00 a.m. and 7:00 [a].m." Id. ¶ 29. In either event, Plaintiff was denied entry.
At that point, Plaintiff says, she asked to speak to the store manager. See id. ¶ 25. When the guard refused to call for a manager, Plaintiff called the emergency telephone line of the police station adjacent to the store, and within minutes, three officers from the D.C. Police Department arrived at the scene. Id. ¶ 27. Plaintiff alleges that the police officers also asked the guard to call a store manager, but the manager never arrived. Id. ¶ 30. By that time, it was after 7:00 a.m. and the end of the exclusive shopping hour, so the guard permitted Plaintiff to enter the store. Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiff maintains that she was unable to shop, however, "due to the stress and anxiety of shopping with the public." Id. ¶ 32.
Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this action on June 11, 2020. See Compl. The Complaint asserts seven counts: Counts 1 and 2 allege "Public Accommodations Violation" and "Disability Discrimination" under the DCHRA, see id. ¶¶ 33-38; Count 3 alleges "Disability Discrimination" under the ADA, see id. ¶¶ 39-41; Count 4 alleges "Negligent Retention, Training and Supervision," see id. ¶¶ 42-45; Counts 5 and 6 allege "Disparate Impact - Public Accommodation Discrimination" and "Disparate Impact - Disability Discrimination" under the DCHRA, see id. ¶¶ 46-55; and Count 7 alleges "Disparate Impact - Disability Discrimination" under the ADA, see id. ¶¶ 56-60. Defendant has moved to dismiss Counts 3 and 7 for lack of standing, see Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 13 [hereinafter Def.'s Mot.], at 12-14, and every Count for failure to state a claim, see id. at 4-12, 14-17.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss for lack of standing is properly considered under Rule 12(b)(1), as standing goes to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. M.J. v. Dist. of Columbia, 401 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7-8 (D.D.C. 2019). When reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a court must "assume the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and 'construe the complaint liberally, granting [the] plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.'" Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). "If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A facially plausible claim is one that "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. This standard does not amount to a specific probability requirement, but it does require "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Bradley v. D.C. Pub. Sch., 87 F. Supp. 3d 156, 160 (D.D.C. 2015).
IV. DISCUSSION
The court begins its discussion with Plaintiff's ADA claims. The court then turns to Plaintiff's DCHRA claims and ends with a discussion of her negligent retention, training, and supervision claim.
Plaintiff's ADA claims challenge her access to a place of public accommodation and therefore arise under Title III of the statute. See Pl.'s Resp. in Opp'n to Walmart's Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 17 [hereinafter Pl.'s Opp'n], at 1, 4-6 (). Title III of the ADA provides that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). "Private parties bringing suit under Title III of the ADA are limited exclusively to injunctive relief." Jefferson v. Stinson Morrison Heckler LLP, 249 F. Supp. 3d 76, 80 (D.D.C. 2017) (); see also Reeves v. MV Transp., Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107 (D.D.C. 2012) . In this case, Walmart argues that Plaintiff lacks standing to assert her ADA claims because she has not shown a sufficient "likelihood of future injury from Walmart's exclusive shopping program" that could be remedied by injunctive relief. Def.'s Mot. at 12. The court agrees.
This court's powers under Article III of the Constitution are limited to adjudicating actual cases or controversies. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988). "In an attempt to give meaning to . . . [that] requirement, the courts have developed a series of principles termed justiciability doctrines, among which [is] standing . . . ." Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To establish standing, a plaintiff must show: (1) that she has "suffered an injury in fact," defined as the "invasion of a legally protected interest [that] is both (a) concrete and particularized, . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical"; (2) that a "causal connection" exists "between the injury and the conduct complained of," such that the injury is "fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant"; and (3) that it is "likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a" decision in favor of the plaintiff. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (cleaned up).
Furthermore, in actions like this one where a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, "[t]he standing requirement . . . 'cannot be met absent a showing of a real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will be wronged again.'" Jefferson, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 81 (quoting Deck v. Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1297 (D. Haw. 2000)). "[H]arm in the past . . . is not enough to establish a present controversy, or in terms of standing, an injury in fact." Am. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334, 336 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Stated another way, "[b]ecause injunctions regulate future conduct, a party has standing to seek injunctive relief only if the party alleges, and ultimately proves, a real and immediate—as opposed to merely...
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