McLain v. State

Decision Date16 March 2012
Docket NumberNo. 20A05–1109–CR–480.,20A05–1109–CR–480.
Citation963 N.E.2d 662
PartiesChad M. McLAIN, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Elizabeth A. Bellin, Cohen Law Offices, Elkhart, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Andrew R. Falk, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

CRONE, Judge.

Case Summary

Chad M. McLain 1 was stopped for failing to activate his turn signal at least two hundred feet before turning. The officer issued a warning ticket and told McLain that he was free to leave. Then the officer asked McLain if he had illegal substances in his car and for McLain's permission to search the car. McLain voluntarily consented to the search of his car and marijuana was discovered. McLain was charged with and convicted of possession of marijuana. On appeal, he claims that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the marijuana because the search of his car violated his state and federal constitutional guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure. Specifically, he argues that after the traffic stop was completed, the officer's continued questions and search of his vehicle were unconstitutional. Finding no constitutional violations, we affirm.2

Facts and Procedural History

On the afternoon of September 30, 2010, Elkhart County Police Officer Randy Valderrama was driving west on County Road 142 in Elkhart County. In front of him was a Pontiac Grand Am driven by McLain. Approximately fifty feet before the intersection of County Roads 142 and 13, Officer Valderrama saw the Grand Am's right turn signal come on, and it turned north onto County Road 13. Because McLain failed to activate his turn signal two hundred feet prior to turning as required by law,3 Officer Valderrama activated his emergency lights and stopped the vehicle at the intersection.

Officer Valderrama approached the vehicle on the passenger side. McLain was the only person in the vehicle. Officer Valderrama told McLain why he had been stopped and asked for his license and registration, which McLain produced. Officer Valderrama walked back to his vehicle to check McLain's license and registration. As he did so, he looked back into the Grand Am from the rear and observed that McLain “tensed up his hands on the steering wheel and then looked at the center console.” Tr. at 32.

At his patrol car, Officer Valderrama entered McLain's information into the records management system, which indicated that McLain had two “incidences” for possession of marijuana.4 Id. at 33. Officer Valderrama wrote McLain a warning for failure to signal and returned to McLain's vehicle. As a standard safety precaution, Officer Valderrama asked McLain to step to the rear of the car, and he complied. Officer Valderrama gave McLain the warning ticket, returned his license and registration, and asked him if he had any questions. McLain asked him how to obtain a “VIN check.” Id. at 33–34. Officer Valderrama gave McLain the appropriate phone number and advised him that he was free to leave.5

Officer Valderrama then asked McLain whether he had anything illegal in the vehicle. McLain stated that there was not. Officer Valderrama told McLain that he was “curious” because of McLain's two prior “incidences” for possession of marijuana. Id. Officer Valderrama asked for McLain's consent to search the vehicle, and McLain said, “I guess if you want to.” Id. at 34. Officer Valderrama asked McLain if he would step to the front of the vehicle and sit on the front bumper, facing away from Officer Valderrama, and McLain said that he would. As they walked to the front of the car, McLain told Officer Valderrama that “there's a bowl of marijuana on the seat and there's a bag of marijuana in the center console.” Id. at 35. Officer Valderrama then handcuffed McLain and placed him in the rear of the patrol car and requested assistance from a canine officer.

Officer Valderrama returned to McLain's vehicle and saw a silver and black metal pipe on the seat with a burnt green substance in it that smelled of burnt marijuana. Officer Valderrama opened the center console and found a clear plastic bag containing a leafy plant that smelled like raw marijuana. Officer Valderrama returned to his patrol car and read McLain his Miranda rights.

A canine officer arrived. The officer and his dog walked around McLain's car, and then the officer opened the car door and put the dog inside. The dog alerted to the pipe on the seat and the center console. Officer Valderrama then retrieved the pipe and bag, which were found to contain a total of 1.9 grams of marijuana. Id. at 40.

The State charged McLain with class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana. McLain filed a motion to suppress any evidence obtained from the search of his car, arguing that the search violated both the federal and state constitutions. Following a hearing, the trial court denied McLain's motion. 6

On August 3, 2011, a bench trial was held. McLain objected to any evidence obtained after Officer Valderrama told him that he was free to leave, which the trial court overruled. The trial court found McLain guilty as charged. McLain appeals.

Discussion and Decision
Standard of Review

McLain argues that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence obtained from the search of his vehicle because the search violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. We will reverse a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence only when the trial court abused its discretion.” Cochran v. State, 843 N.E.2d 980, 983 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied. “An abuse of discretion may occur if a decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.” Id. “When we review a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence resulting from an allegedly illegal search, we do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling.” Reinhart v. State, 930 N.E.2d 42, 45 (Ind.Ct.App.2010).

I. United States Constitution

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part, “The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.] 7 A traffic stop of a vehicle and temporary detention of its occupants constitutes a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996)). McLain properly concedes that the initial traffic stop was valid. See id. (“It is well settled that police officers may stop a vehicle when they observe minor traffic violations.”) (citing Jackson v. State, 785 N.E.2d 615, 619 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), trans. denied.). McLain makes no argument that his consent was not voluntary. McLain argues, however, that after Officer Valderrama told him that he was free to leave, thereby concluding the valid traffic stop, the Fourth Amendment prohibited Officer Valderrama from asking any further questions unless such questions were based upon a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (holding that a brief investigatory stop may be justified by reasonable suspicion that the person detained is involved in criminal activity). And, according to McLain, since Officer Valderrama violated his Fourth Amendment rights by asking him about illegal substances in his vehicle and for permission to search it, McLain's consent to search the vehicle is invalid.

McLain's argument is based on the faulty premise that the Fourth Amendment was implicated after Officer Valderrama gave him his license, registration, and the warning citation and told him that he was free to leave. At that point, McLain was in fact free to leave, and he was not required to answer the officer's questions. ‘Not every encounter between a police officer and a citizen amounts to a seizure requiring objective justification.’ Powell v. State, 912 N.E.2d 853, 859 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (quoting Overstreet v. State, 724 N.E.2d 661, 663 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied ). “A person is ‘seized’ only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his or her freedom of movement is restrained.” Id. “The test for whether a reasonable impression existed that the individual was free to leave is ‘what a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would have thought had he been in the citizen's shoes.’ Woodson v. State, 960 N.E.2d 224, 227 (Ind.Ct.App.2012) (quoting Crabtree v. State, 762 N.E.2d 241, 245 (Ind.Ct.App.2002)). “Several factors may be considered in determining whether a reasonable person would not believe he was free to leave, including the presence of multiple officers, the display of a weapon, any physical touching of the person, or the use of a tone of voice by the officer indicating that compliance might be compelled.” Id.

There is no dispute that Officer Valderrama unequivocally told McLain that he was free to leave and returned McLain's license and registration. After that point, there is no evidence that Officer Valderrama displayed a weapon or restricted McLain's movements, or that the language and tone of Officer Valderrama's questions conveyed to McLain that his compliance would be compelled. Under these circumstances, we conclude that a reasonable person would feel free to leave. In short, the interaction between McLain and Officer Valderrama after the termination of the traffic stop was merely a consensual encounter, in which no Fourth Amendment interest is implicated. State v. Calmes, 894 N.E.2d 199, 202 (Ind.Ct.App.2008); see also State v. Carlson, 762 N.E.2d 121, 125 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (“ ‘Police questioning, by itself, is unlikely to result in a Fourth Amendment violation. While most citizens will respond...

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  • Bean v. State
    • United States
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    • 13 Febrero 2020
    ...Fourth Amendment, "a traffic stop of a vehicle and temporary detention of its occupants constitutes a ‘seizure.’ " McLain v. State , 963 N.E.2d 662, 666 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Police officers are charged with enforcing traffic laws and are authorized to stop drivers they observe commit traff......
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