McLaren v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 16 April 1896
• Citation: 19 So. 982,109 Ala. 571
• Parties: MCLAREN v. ANDERSON.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

19 So. 982

109 Ala. 571

MCLAREN v. ANDERSON.

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 16, 1896

Appeal from chancery court, Mobile county; W. H. Tayloe, Chancellor.

The bill in this case was filed against the appellant, Mary J McLaren, by the appellee, Thomas Anderson, who, on May 13 1875, recovered against Robert McLaren a judgment for $500 for a tort committed by said Robert McLaren. The purpose of the bill was to have set aside as fraudulent and void a conveyance of land executed by Robert McLaren and Mary J McLaren, his wife, to one James Robertson, and another conveyance, which was subsequently executed by James Robertson and wife to the defendant, Mary J. McLaren. Each of these conveyances was executed after the recovery of the judgment against Robert McLaren by the complainant. The bill alleges that the property described in said deed was substantially all of the property owned by Robert McLaren at that time, and that both of said deeds were voluntary conveyances, without any valuable consideration whatever, and were made for the purpose of placing the property beyond the reach of Robert McLaren's creditors, "and particularly for the purpose of putting said property beyond the reach of the levy and execution thereon for the payment and satisfaction of said judgment had and recovered by the complainant." The respondent demurred to the bill, and assigned seven grounds thereof, the first of which was that the administrator of the estate of Robert McLaren, who died in 1889, was not made a party to the bill. The facts disclosed by the bill showing the grounds of relief asked for, the grounds of the demurrer, and the rulings thereon are set forth at length in the report of the case on its former appeal to this court from a decree of the chancellor overruling the defendant's demurrer to the said bill which report is found in 16 So. 639, 104 Ala. 201. On this appeal the decree of the chancellor overruling the demurrers to the bill and denying the motions to dismiss the bill for the want of equity were affirmed.

Thereafter the defendant answered the bill, admitting the fact of the execution of the deed to Robertson, and of the other deed from Robertson and wife to the defendant; but denied that the property described in the deed, as so conveyed to said Robertson, was all, or substantially all, of the property owned at that time by the said Robert McLaren, deceased; and the answer averred that said Robert McLaren, at the time he executed the deed to Robertson, was the owner in his own name and was in possession of four other lots of land in the city of Mobile, which were then subject to levy and execution and sale, and which were worth in the aggregate much more than the amount of the complainant's judgment. This answer further denied that the deed to Robertson and the deed from Robertson to the defendant were made as a part of a scheme to place the lands described therein beyond the reach of the complainant and other creditors of Robert McLaren, but averred that the conveyances were made for the purpose of vesting the defendant with a legal title to the homestead and by making a proper provision for her as the wife of said Robert McLaren. It was further averred in the answer that by the action of the city court of Mobile, as described in the bill of complaint, it had been adjudged that said lands were exempt to the defendant's husband as his homestead against any claim of the complainant, and that, therefore said lands could be disposed of without injury to the rights of any of the respondent's creditors. The respondent prayed that her answer be taken as a cross bill, and that the complainant in the original bill be perpetually enjoined from further proceeding in law or in equity to subject the lands described in his bill to the satisfaction of the judgment which he had recovered against Robert McLaren, and prayed for such other and further relief as the nature of the case may require. The evidence for the complainant showed that the deed made by Robert McLaren and his wife to James Robertson, and the deed made by James Robertson and wife to Mary J. McLaren, the defendant, were both purely voluntary...