McLaughlin v. Curry
| Decision Date | 03 April 1928 |
| Docket Number | Jan. Term.,No. 108,108 |
| Citation | 242 Mich. 228,218 N.W. 698 |
| Parties | McLAUGHLIN v. CURRY. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to Circuit Court, Kalamazoo County; George V. Weimer, Judge.
Action by James A. McLaughlin against Sam E. Curry. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.
Argued before the Entire Bench except FLANNIGAN, C. J. Harry C. Howard, of Kalamazoo, for appellant.
J. Paul Wait, of Sturgis (John W. Adams, of Kalamazoo, of counsel), for appellee.
Plaintiff was injured in a collision of the automobile in which he was riding, driven by his son, 22 years old, and the car owned and driven by defendant on M-13, about 4 miles south of the city of Kalamazoo. We shall refer to defendant's car as the ‘front’ car, and the one in which plaintiff was riding as the ‘rear’ car. Both cars were going south. A short distance north of the point of the accident there was a parked car on the west side of the road. The front car pulled out to the left to pass it, and the rear car did likewise. The testimony introduced on behalf of plaintiff tended to establish, that, after passing the parked car, the front car turned to the right perceptibly, indicating that it was resuming its position in the right track. Defendant's testimony tended to establish that the front car did not yield to the right, but continued on the left side of the center of the road. Plaintiff's testimony tended to show that the rear car was going 25 to 30 miles an hour, and defendant's that the front car was not traveling to exceed 12 miles an hour. The testimony fairly sustains both contentions as to the rate of speed.
Plaintiff's testimony and that of other occupants of the rear car tends to show that, after passing the parked car, and after the frond car had yielded to the right, the driver of the rear car sounded his horn for the second or third time, and turned to the extreme left-hand side of the road. The front car turned to the left to go into a driveway leading to a residence on that side of the road, and the collision occurred. Defendants admits he did not comply with section 4 of Act 96, Public Acts 1923, by extending his arm outside the car indicating that he was about to make a left-hand turn, but testifies that he held up his right hand within the car. He denies that the horn was sounded, and there is negative testimony corroborative of this.
This statement of the testimony demonstrates that the trial judge did not err in refusing to direct a verdict for defendant. The assignments of error based on ruling of the court on the admissibility of testimony present no reversible error. In some instances, the questions asked by defendant's counsel called for conclusions of the witness, and in other instances the information sought was elicited by other questions before the examination of the witness was concluded. So far as defendant's requests stated the applicable law, they were given in substance in the elaborate charge of the trial judge. One contention advanced by defendant's counsel in his requests requires consideration. In the main, defendant's requests dealt with the subject of the claimed contributory negligence of plaintiff's driver.
In different phraselogy, but to the same end, defendant's counsel requested instruction to the effect that the driver of a passing car was required to assure himself that his signals were heard and understood by the driver of the car to be passed before he undertook to pass, and, unless he was so assured, he would be guilty of contributory negligence. The trial judge refused to give any of these requests or their substance. In this we think he was right. To follow defendant's contention would place on the driver of the passing car too high a degree of care. It was not required by the motor vehicle law then in force, and just how the driver of the passing car would be assured that his signal was heard and understood is not pointed out. The stoic driver who pays attention to his driving, and his driving alone, would never be passed, except at the peril of the driver of the passing car, and the slow-moving vehicle would hold up the traffic indefinitely, except for those of the more venturesome type who would be...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Voight v. Nyberg
...v. Kinnan, 1923, 195 Iowa 720, 192 N.W. 863; McWright v. Providence Telephone Co., 1926, 47 R.I. 196, 131 A. 841; McLaughlin v. Curry, 1928, 242 Mich. 228, 218 N.W. 698; Banta v. Hestand, 1938, 181 Okl. 551, 75 P.2d 415; Clayton v. McIlrath, 1950, 241 Iowa 1162, 44 N.W.2d 741, 27 A.L.R.2d 3......
-
France v. Benter, 51295
...his horn was a fact question rather than one of law.' Much in point is the reasoning of the Michigan Supreme Court in McLaughlin v. Curry, 242 Mich. 228, 218 N.W. 698, 699. We quote: 'By the Act of 1927, the duty of giving an audible signal was placed on the driver of the passing car, while......
-
Clayton v. McIlrath
...can see that such assumption is unwarranted.' Other authorities in support of the conclusion herein reached include McLaughlin v. Curry, 242 Mich. 228, 218 N.W. 698, 699; Banta v. Hestand, 181 Okl. 551, 75 P.2d 415; McWright v. Providence Telephone Co., 47 R.I. 196, 131 A. 841, VI. Defendan......
-
Smith v. Associated Transport, Inc.
...the vehicle ahead to swerve to the right in order to afford a path in which the overtaking vehicle might pass." See also McLaughlin v. Curry, 242 Mich. 228, 218 N.W. 698. The appellants do not seriously question Judge Niles' finding that Smith, the driver of the leading tractor, was neglige......