McLaughlin v. Esselte Pendaflex Corp.

• Citation: 50 F.3d 507
• Decision Date: 13 March 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-2984,94-2984
• Parties: 67 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 474, 2 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 1073 Barbara McLAUGHLIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ESSELTE PENDAFLEX CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 507

50 F.3d 507

67 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 474,

2 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 1073

Barbara McLAUGHLIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ESSELTE PENDAFLEX CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 94-2984.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 10, 1995.

Decided March 13, 1995.

Clyde E. Craig, St. Louis, MO, argued for appellant.

Michael P. Casey, St. Louis, MO, argued for appellee (Gary M. Smith, on brief).

Before HANSEN, Circuit Judge, FLOYD R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge, and WILL, ^* Senior District Judge.

WILL, Senior District Judge.

Barbara McLaughlin brought suit against Esselte Pendaflex Corporation ("Pendaflex") alleging gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a), the Missouri Human Rights Act, Mo.Rev.Stat. Sec. 213.010 et seq., and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 206(d)(1). The District Court granted Pendaflex's motion for summary judgment on the basis that McLaughlin failed to state a prima facie case of discrimination with respect to her claims. McLaughlin appeals. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Pendaflex is in the business of manufacturing filing supplies and products. McLaughlin has been employed by Pendaflex at its Union, Missouri plant since February 22, 1982. She contends that Pendaflex violated Title VII, the Missouri Human Rights Act, and the Equal Pay Act when it reorganized the plant and reassigned her from Parts Clerk (Maintenance Buyer/Store Attendant) in the maintenance department to Material Transaction Clerk in a different department. As a result, McLaughlin now works the night shift and is no longer entitled to curtailment days. Otherwise, she receives the same compensation now as she did prior to her reassignment. Pendaflex argues that the reassignment was part of an overall down-sizing and reorganization of the plant caused by decreased sales. McLaughlin argues only that the implementation of the reorganization plan was discriminatory; she does not contend that the decision to restructure was based on discriminatory motives.

Reorganization and down-sizing of the Pendaflex plant began in 1992. During that year, sixty hourly position were eliminated as were a number of salaried positions. Overall, the workforce was reduced by 33%. As part of this reorganization, Pendaflex eliminated and consolidated various positions. McLaughlin's position of Parts Clerk was eliminated. Additionally, the Maintenance Supervisor position, held by McLaughlin's supervisor Carl Gumpenberger, was also eliminated. A new position, Maintenance Coordinator, was established. This new position, currently held by Gumpenberger, combines tasks previously performed by McLaughlin as Parts Clerk and tasks previously performed by Gumpenberger as Maintenance Supervisor. Steve Stump's position as Project Engineer was also eliminated. Stump was assigned to the newly created position of Maintenance Engineer, which is a combination of some of his former duties and some of Gumpenberger's former duties. Furthermore, two Equipment and Process Technician positions, both held by males, were eliminated.

II. DISCUSSION

The District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Pendaflex is reviewed de novo applying the same standards as the District Court. Sargent Construction Co. v. State Auto Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 1324, 1326 (8th Cir.1994). "We will affirm the grant of a summary judgment motion if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Bashara v. Black Hills Corp., 26 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir.1994). There is no genuine issue of material fact if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). This Court determines whether there is a genuine issue of material fact based upon the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Reliance on "mere pleadings" will not suffice to discharge the non-movant's burden. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) & (e); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. Furthermore, Rule 56(c) requires

entry of summary judgment ... against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be 'no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is 'entitled to a judgment as a matter of law' because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.

Title VII claims are evaluated under the "burden shifting" analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). This framework is also appropriate for evaluating claims under the Missouri Human Rights Act. Midstate Oil Co. v. Missouri Comm'n on Human Rights, 679 S.W.2d 842, 845-46 (Mo.1984) (en banc). In a Title VII action, the plaintiff carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. "The burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." Id. If the employer articulates a legitimate reason for the employee's rejection, the burden then shifts back to the employee to show that the employer's justification is a pretext. Id.

A. Title VII & the Missouri Human Rights Act

The following elements will establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII: (1) plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) plaintiff met applicable job qualifications; and (3) despite qualifications, plaintiff was displaced. In addition, the plaintiff must also demonstrate that the adverse employment decision occurred in " 'circumstances which allow the court to infer unlawful discrimination.' " Davenport v Riverview Gardens School, 30 F.3d 940, 944 (8th Cir.1994) (quoting Craik v. Minnesota State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 469 (8th Cir.1984)).

The moving party, Pendaflex, has met its initial burden of showing that there is a lack of evidence to support McLaughlin's case. Therefore, McLaughlin may not rely upon her pleadings but must set forth specific facts to demonstrate that she has met her burden of establishing a prima facie case. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. McLaughlin is a female and Gumpenberger, a male, now performs what McLaughlin contends is the Parts Clerk position that she formerly held. Therefore, at issue is whether McLaughlin can meet the requirements with respect to the second, third, and fourth elements of the prima facie case-- i.e., that she was qualified for the position now held by Gumpenberger and despite her qualifications she was reassigned because she is female.

McLaughlin contends that her former position as Parts Clerk was not eliminated but renamed Maintenance Coordinator and is currently held by Gumpenberger. Pendaflex concedes that Gumpenberger, in the position of Maintenance Coordinator, is performing the tasks that McLaughlin formerly performed. However, the Maintenance Coordinator is also responsible for supervising the two machinists who work in the Die Shop, assisting in supervision of the Machine Shop, developing and monitoring a budget of approximately $425,000 per year, properly handling hazardous waste, and developing technical improvements such as increasing die life. Furthermore, McLaughlin concedes that Gumpenberger continues to perform some of the supervisory duties he performed prior to reorganization. Therefore, the Maintenance Coordinator position requires Gumpenberger to perform significantly different responsibilities from those McLaughlin performed as Parts Clerk.

McLaughlin fails to establish that she is qualified for this new Maintenance Coordinator position currently held by Gumpenberger. There is great disparity between McLaughlin's level of experience and Gumpenberger's level of experience. As Parts Clerk, McLaughlin's duties included providing parts to employees from the storeroom, ordering parts requisitioned by employees, and counting parts in inventory. In addition, she had authority to make purchases up to $250. Prior to that she performed clerical duties. Prior to reorganization Gumpenberger supervised McLaughlin and approximately eleven technicians. In his former position as Maintenance Supervisor, Gumpenberger was responsible for the maintenance of all equipment in the plant. He also had supervisory duties over the machinists in the die shop and the machine shop. He assisted with development of the maintenance department budget and was responsible for ensuring that the maintenance department remained within its budget. Furthermore, Gumpenberger's twenty-nine year plus employment history includes a significant amount of managerial, mechanical, and supervisory experience. The position of Maintenance Coordinator requires supervisory, mechanical, and administrative skills Gumpenberger possesses and McLaughlin lacks. Therefore, McLaughlin has failed to establish that she was denied a position for which she was qualified. As a result, she fails to establish the second and third elements of the prima facie case.

Furthermore, McLaughlin also fails...