McLaughlin v. Fisher Eng'g
| Decision Date | 27 October 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 2002–770.,2002–770. |
| Citation | 150 N.H. 195,834 A.2d 258 |
| Parties | Dennis W. McLAUGHLIN, Sr. & a., v. FISHER ENGINEERING. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
McDowell & Osburn, P.A., of Manchester (Joseph F. McDowell, III and David C. Dunn on the brief, and Mr. McDowell orally), for the plaintiffs.
Friedman Gaythwaite Wolf & Leavitt, of Portland, Maine (Harold J. Friedman & a. on the brief, and Martha C. Gaythwaite orally), for the defendant.
The plaintiffs, Dennis W. McLaughlin, Sr., Kathryn McLaughlin and Ellen M. Faunce, individually and as administrators of their sons' estates, brought an action in Superior Court (Mangones , J.) against the defendant, Fisher Engineering (Fisher), manufacturer of the Fisher snowplow and snowplow mount, alleging strict products liability, negligence and failure to warn. The jury returned a verdict for Fisher. We affirm.
From the evidence presented at trial, the jury could have found the following facts. On October 25, 1997, Timothy McLaughlin and Matthew Wood were passengers in a Subaru traveling south on Route 114 in Goffstown. When the driver of the Subaru, Kyle Elliott, attempted to turn left onto St. Anselm's Drive, the Subaru was struck on its right side by a pick-up truck traveling north on Route 114. A Fisher snowplow mount was bolted to the front of the pick-up truck. McLaughlin, the front-seat passenger, was struck in the head and face by the snowplow mount and died at the scene of the accident. Wood, who was seated behind McLaughlin, was not struck by the snowplow mount but suffered severe injuries that caused his death two days later.
The snowplow mount attached to the front of the pick-up truck and its accompanying snowplow blade were manufactured by Fisher in 1982. The snowplow mount was designed to hold the snowplow blade in place. At the time of the accident, however, no snowplow blade was attached to the front of the pick-up truck.
The plaintiffs sued Fisher alleging that it was liable for enhanced injuries under theories of strict products liability, negligence, and failure to warn both before and after the 1982 sale of the snowplow and its mount. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of Fisher, the trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion to set aside the verdict.
On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in: (1) refusing to allow them to introduce evidence of fourteen other claims against Fisher; (2) excluding a photograph that depicted the injuries to McLaughlin's head and face; (3) allowing Fisher to introduce evidence of McLaughlin's substance abuse and Wood's incarceration; (4) permitting Fisher's accident reconstruction expert to testify concerning bio-mechanical issues; and (5) allowing Fisher's counsel to make statements during trial that the non-party driver of the Subaru was at fault. We address each argument in turn.
We review the trial court's rulings on admissibility of evidence under an unsustainable exercise of discretion standard. See State v. Pelletier, 149 N.H. 243, 249, 818 A.2d 292 (2003). "Unless a party establishes that such a ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case, it will not be disturbed." Id.
Prior to the start of the trial, Fisher moved in limine to exclude evidence of fourteen other lawsuits filed against it concerning its snowplow mount, arguing that evidence of other lawsuits was more prejudicial than probative and was based upon hearsay. It also argued that introducing that evidence would confuse the jury and result in unnecessary delay. The plaintiffs argued that evidence of other lawsuits was admissible: (1) to prove the existence of a particular physical condition, situation or defect; (2) to help show that the defect or dangerous condition caused the injury; (3) to show the risk that Fisher's conduct created; and (4) to prove that Fisher knew, or should have known, of the danger.
The trial court ruled that "lawsuits arising after the 1982 sale and installation date of the frame [were] not sufficiently relevant," but evidence of other lawsuits "might be found relevant if plaintiff[s] were to establish the criteria concerning a duty to warn after the sale." Moreover, the plaintiffs were not precluded from introducing statements made by Fisher in the prior lawsuits if the plaintiffs qualified those statements as admissions.
We cannot say that the trial court's decision to exclude evidence of other lawsuits was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of the plaintiffs' case. See Pelletier, 149 N.H. at 249, 818 A.2d 292. We agree with the plaintiffs that evidence of other lawsuits was relevant to the issue of Fisher's knowledge that the snowplow mount was potentially dangerous. However, evidence of other lawsuits was not necessary to prove Fisher's knowledge. Prior to trial, Fisher admitted that it recognized "a risk of automobile accidents involving vehicles, one of which has a snow blade hitch assembly such as the one involved in this accident, without a snow blade affixed to the assembly." At trial, the plaintiffs elicited testimony from a number of witnesses, including Fisher's expert and employees, concerning their knowledge of the existence of other claims against Fisher. Given such testimony, admitting specific evidence concerning fourteen other claims was likely to produce a trial within a trial and confuse the jury. See State v. Weeks, 140 N.H. 463, 467, 667 A.2d 1032 (1995). Thus, on this record, the plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the probative value of the evidence of other lawsuits was not substantially outweighed by the danger of misleading the jury or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. We find that the trial court exercised its sound discretion in balancing the interests on both sides. Id.
Next, the plaintiffs argue that the trial court's decision to exclude a color photograph taken at the scene of the accident that depicts the outline of the snowplow mount on McLaughlin's head and face was erroneous.
Originally, the trial court ruled that the plaintiffs would be allowed to introduce the photograph to "fairly meet the assertions of the defendant" that the snowplow mount did not cause the deaths of the decedents. On the second day of trial, however, Fisher stipulated that "as a result of the snow [sic ] mount coming into contact with Mr. McLaughlin, ... he died of a brain injury
." After Fisher agreed to offer this stipulation in open court, the trial court reversed its prior decision, finding that the probative value of the photograph was "somewhat lessened" by the stipulation but that the prejudicial effect of the photograph remained the same. Despite the stipulation, however, Fisher continued to maintain that McLaughlin would have died as a result of other injuries. Consequently, the trial court ruled that in lieu of admitting the photograph, the plaintiffs could elicit testimony describing McLaughlin's injuries in a "verbal fashion" and could use a " computer image or a drawn image of the injuries incurred by Timothy McLaughlin."
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice...." N.H. R. Ev. 403 ; Marcotte v. Timberlane/Hampstead School Dist., 143 N.H. 331, 346, 733 A.2d 394 (1999). "[A] trial judge is granted broad discretion when balancing the probative value of evidence against the possible prejudice resulting from its admission." Kallgren v. Chadwick, 134 N.H. 110, 115, 589 A.2d 120 (1991). We will uphold the trial court's determination unless the "ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of [the plaintiffs'] case." State v. Stayman, 138 N.H. 397, 402, 640 A.2d 771 (1994) (quotation omitted).
Here, after Fisher stipulated that McLaughlin died as a result of his face and head coming into contact with the snowplow mount, the trial court properly reapplied the Rule 403 balancing test. We disagree with the plaintiffs' argument that the photograph was necessary to prove that the snowplow mount was unreasonably dangerous. The plaintiffs had other evidence of the specific injuries that McLaughlin sustained to his face and neck. Because the trial court could properly find that the probative value of the gruesome photograph was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Fisher, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred by excluding it.
The plaintiffs next argue that the trial court erred in permitting Fisher to introduce evidence of McLaughlin's substance abuse and of Wood's incarceration. In motions in limine filed prior to trial, the plaintiffs argued that this information was not relevant and extremely prejudicial. In response, Fisher argued that the information was relevant to rebut the plaintiffs' claims for hedonic damages and loss of income.
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McLaughlin v. Fisher Eng'g, 2002-770.
...150 N.H. 195834 A.2d 258 DENNIS W. MCLAUGHLIN, SR. & a. v. FISHER ENGINEERING. No. 2002-770. Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Argued: September 11, 2003. Opinion Issued: October 27, 2003.150 N.H. 196 McDowell & Osburn, P.A., of Manchester (Joseph F. McDowell, III and David C. Dunn on the bri......