McLaughlin v. Gill Simpson Elec., 376

Citation206 Md.App. 242,47 A.3d 1074
Decision Date29 June 2012
Docket NumberNo. 376,Sept. Term, 2011.,376
PartiesMartin McLAUGHLIN v. GILL SIMPSON ELECTRIC, et al.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Franklin J. Muher (Glusing & Muher, LLC, on the brief) Baltimore, MD, for appellant.

Antonio Lopez (Fiore, Krause, Fizer, Crogan & Lopez, on the brief) Owings Mills, MD, for appellee.

Panel: KRAUSER, C.J. GRAEFF and WATTS, JJ.

WATTS, J.

This appeal stems from an order of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County affirming the Workers' Compensation Commission's (the “ Commission”) denial of a Petition to Reopen 1 appellant Martin McLaughlin's workers' compensation claim. Appellant noted an appeal raising one issue, which we rephrase: 2

Whether the Workers' Compensation Commission erred in ruling that appellant's withdrawal of the Issues filed in conjunction with the Petition to Reopen constituted a withdrawal of the petition?

We answer this question in the negative, and, therefore, shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Before this Court, appellees, Gill Simpson Electric and Zurich American Insurance Company, and appellant presented an agreed statement of facts, which we quote:

On November 9, 2002, [a]ppellant [ ] sustained a compensable work related injury to his back. Following a course of treatment, a hearing was held on the nature and extent of any permanent disability that [appellant] suffered as a result of the injury.

On February 26, 2004, the Workers' Compensation Commission found [a]ppellantsustained a 25% disability under “other causes” for injuries related to his back, with 20% related to the accident and 5% related to pre-existing conditions. The award entitled [a]ppellant to 100 weeks of payments (less attorney's fees and expenses) and was properly paid by [a]ppellees. It is agreed that the last payment of compensation to [a]ppellant was July 27, 2004.

On February 15, 2005, [a]ppellant properly filed a Petition to Reopen under Section 9–736 of the Labor & Employment Article.3 In addition, [a]ppellant filed an Issue Sheet asking for Authorization for Medical Treatment. At that time, [a]ppellees agreed that the medical treatment was causally related, reasonable and necessary. At that point, with no hearing necessary, [a]ppellant filed a withdrawal of the Issues at the Commission and no hearing was held. During the next few years, various [I]ssues arose between the parties regarding the payment and provision of medical treatment. The parties were able to resolve these [I]ssues without a hearing and, each time, the [I]ssues were withdrawn by [a]ppellant and no hearing was held.

On September 22, 2009, [a]ppellant obtained a permanency evaluation from the same physician who rated him for the prior permanency hearing in 2004. On October 22, 2009, [a]ppellant filed Issues with the Commission requesting a hearing on the issue of “Worsening–Back”. Appellees filed an Issue sheet with the Commission on the issue of “Is this claim barred by 9–736, since the last payment of compensation took place o[n] 7/24/04?”

After a hearing, on January 14[ ], 2010, the Commission found, inter alia:

[T]hat the Petition to Reopen for Worsening of Condition is barred by Limitations:

The Order of permanent partial disability is dated 2/26/04 and the final payment of that Award was 7/27/04. The claimant filed a Petition to Reopen for Worsening of Condition on 2/15/05, but those [I]ssues were withdrawn on 3/30/05. No new [I]ssues for worsening of condition were filed until 10/22/09, more than five years after the last indemnity payment.

(Emphasis added).

On February 4, 2010, appellant timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review. On September 24, 2010, appellant filed a motion for summary judgment. On November 1, 2010, appellees filed “Employer and Insurer's Re[ ]sponse to Claimant's M[ ]otion for Summary Judgment and Cross–Motion for Summary Judgment by the Employer and Insurer.” In a memorandum in support of the cross-motion for summary judgment, appellees argued that appellant's [w]ithdrawal of Issues [wa]s [t]antamount to a [w]ithdrawal of the Petition to Reopen.” On February 8, 2011, the circuit court held a hearing on the motions. On April 25, 2011, the circuit court issued an Opinion and Ruling, granting appellee's cross-motion for summary judgment and affirming the Commission's January 14, 2010 order. The circuit court found that appellant's withdrawal of the Issues constituted a withdrawal of the Petition to Reopen.

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends that the circuit court erred in granting the cross-motion for summary judgment and in finding that withdrawal of the Issues filed with the Commission constituted a withdrawal of the Petition to Reopen. Appellant argues that, because the filing of Issues is governed by the Code of Maryland Regulations (COMAR) and a Petition to Reopen is filed pursuant to the Maryland Annotated Code, the withdrawal of the Issues is not a withdrawal of the petition. Appellant asserts that the “doctrine of liberal construction” applies in this case, requiring that all provisions in the Workers' Compensation Act be construed liberally in his favor. Relying on Dove v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 178 Md.App. 702, 716–17, 943 A.2d 662 (2008), appellant maintains that it was not necessary for the Issues to be filed simultaneously with the petition, as claimants are not required to provide specific information in support of a Petition to Reopen. Appellant argues that, pursuant to Buskirk v. C.J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc., 136 Md.App. 261, 271, 764 A.2d 857 (2001), the Petition to Reopen tolled the statute of limitations because the petition alleged a change in his disability status.

Appellees respond that the withdrawal of the Issues constituted a withdrawal of the Petition to Reopen. Appellees contend that the allegation of a change in disability status in a Petition to Reopen must be accompanied by the submission of Issues at the time of filing. Relying on Dove, 178 Md.App. at 719, 943 A.2d 662, appellees argue that the Issues constituted the “basis in fact” necessary to support the Petition to Reopen. Appellees assert that, even if the withdrawal of the Issues was not the equivalent of a withdrawal of the Petition to Reopen, appellant failed to timely file facts in support of the petition, as the most recent Issues were not filed until after the expiration of the statute of limitations. Appellees maintain that the doctrine of liberal construction does not apply to the statute of limitations provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, as codified in the Labor and Employment Article of the Maryland Annotated Code.

Appellant replies that the holding in Buskirk, 136 Md.App. at 263–64, 764 A.2d 857, regarding a “basis in fact,” requires only that the claimant have a factual basis for the claim, not that the factual basis be specifically set forth at the time of filing the Petition to Reopen.

Standard of Review

Generally, in an appeal from judicial review of an agency action, we review the agency action directly, not the decision of the trial court. Anderson v. Gen. Cas. Ins. Co., 402 Md. 236, 244, 935 A.2d 746 (2007) (citing Watkins v. Sec'y, Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 377 Md. 34, 45–46, 831 A.2d 1079 (2003)); Dep't of Labor, Licensing & Regulation v. Muddiman, 120 Md.App. 725, 733, 708 A.2d 47 (1998). We must respect the expertise of the agency and accord deference to its interpretation of a statute that it administers ...; however, we ‘may always determine whether the administrative agency made an error of law.’ Watkins, 377 Md. at 46, 831 A.2d 1079 (citation omitted). [W]e must determine whether the agency's decision is in accordance with the law or whether it is arbitrary, illegal, and capricious.” Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Pennel, 133 Md.App. 279, 288, 754 A.2d 1120 (2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). If an agency's decision is predicated solely on an error of law, including errors in statutory interpretation, we may substitute our judgment for that of the administrative agency. Charles Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Vann, 382 Md. 286, 295, 855 A.2d 313 (2004); Kelly v. Consol. Delivery Co., 166 Md.App. 178, 185, 887 A.2d 682 (2005), cert. denied,393 Md. 161, 900 A.2d 206 (2006). The substituted judgment standard is equally applicable to the regulations of an agency. Pennel, 133 Md.App. at 288, 754 A.2d 1120.

Judicial review of the Commission's decisions is governed by Md.Code Ann., Labor and Employment Art. (“L.E.”) § 9–745, which provides, in pertinent part:

(c) Determination by court.—The court shall determine whether the Commission:

(1) justly considered all of the facts about the accidental personal injury, occupational disease, or compensable hernia;

(2) exceeded the powers granted to it under this title; or

(3) misconstrued the law and facts applicable in the case decided.

(d) Request for jury trial.—On a motion of any party filed with the clerk of the court in accordance with the practice in civil cases, the court shall submit to a jury any question of fact involved in the case.

(e) Disposition.—

(1) If the court determines that the Commission acted within its powers and correctly construed the law and facts, the court shall confirm the decision of the Commission.

(2) If the court determines that the Commission did not act within its powers or did not correctly construe the law and facts, the court shall reverse or modify the decision or remand the case to the Commission for further proceedings.

Under the statutory scheme, “an appeal from the Workers' Compensation Commission may follow two alternative modalities” in the trial court. Simmons v. Comfort Suites Hotel, 185 Md.App. 203, 224, 968 A.2d 1123 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The modality outlined in L.E. § 9–745(d) provides for an ‘essential trial de novo [.] Id. at 225, 968 A.2d 1123 (citation omitted). Trial courts employ the trial de novo where the question...

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