McLaughlin v. Hall, No. 74-1148
Decision Date | 27 June 1975 |
Docket Number | No. 74-1148 |
Parties | George McLAUGHLIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Frank A. HALL et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Richard E. Shapiro, Boston, Mass., with whom Dianne J. Kenty, South Boston, Mass., was on brief, for plaintiff-appellant.
Michael C. Donahue, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom Francis X. Bellotti, Atty. Gen., and John J. Irwin, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Chief, Criminal Bureau, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for defendants-appellees.
Before COFFIN, Chief Judge, McENTEE and CAMPBELL, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff appeals from the district court's determination that his transfer from the Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Norfolk, to MCI, Walpole, did not constitute a denial of due process. Since our opinion this day in Fano v. Meachum, 1 Cir., 520 F.2d 374, establishes that such a transfer effects a deprivation of liberty sufficient to bring the due process clause into operation, we proceed to scrutinize the adequacy of the procedures utilized here.
On or about March 19, 1973 plaintiff was transferred from MCI, Walpole, to MCI, Norfolk, and no disciplinary reports were filed against him prior to the current controversy. On October 18, 1973 Deputy Commissioner Joseph Higgins, Massachusetts Department of Correction, wrote to the acting superintendent at Norfolk with regard to plaintiff:
After plaintiff and his attorney were informed that plaintiff might be reclassified, plaintiff's counsel consulted with an attorney for the Department of Correction regarding the procedures which would be followed. It was agreed that plaintiff would have a hearing at which he could be represented by counsel, and that he would have the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, present testimony on his own behalf, and tape record the proceedings. The Board was to render a written statement of reasons for its decision, and plaintiff was to have the opportunity to appeal the Board's recommendation prior to Commissioner Hall's final decision. The substance of the allegations concerning plaintiff was related to his attorney, and was also set forth in the Notice of Classification Hearing dated October 18, which informed plaintiff that a hearing would be held and that a transfer might result therefrom.
The hearing was held on October 23 and recorded in full. The October 18 memorandum was introduced, and Theodore Ristaino, Deputy Superintendent of Norfolk, testified that he had received the information contained therein from Deputy Commissioner Higgins. Ristaino was "extensively cross-examined" by plaintiff's counsel, but this proved to be little more than shadow-boxing since Ristaino had no first-hand, or even second-hand, knowledge of plaintiff's alleged misdeeds. Ristaino could not even name the law enforcement agency which had provided the information, nor was he able to provide any information about the ultimate source of the information transmitted by the agency. Plaintiff's counsel endeavored to have Higgins, the author of the memorandum, called as a witness at the hearing, but this request was denied. Plaintiff's counsel's repeated efforts to have the source of the information identified were all unsuccessful. Neither Higgins, the informant, nor the recipient of the informant's report at the law enforcement agency testified. The parties have stipulated that the classification board made no attempt to arrange for the questioning of these individuals on its own. Plaintiff presented two witnesses who testified to his active involvement in providing legal assistance to other Norfolk inmates, and he took the stand himself to deny any knowledge of or involvement in the alleged incidents being considered by the board.
The board recommended that plaintiff be transferred to Walpole. Its memorandum to the commissioner recited the contents of the October 18 memorandum and contained the following evaluation:
The board also expressed the opinion that transfer to Walpole would not necessarily mean the end of plaintiff's legal assistance activities. Counsel for plaintiff filed a detailed appeal from the board's recommendation, but the commissioner nonetheless ordered plaintiff transferred to Walpole. 1
The single question presented on this appeal is whether the board's failure to inquire into the credibility of the informant and the reliability of his information was so fundamentally unfair to the plaintiff as to deprive him of due process. We acknowledge at the outset that we are troubled by the realization that the administrative decision adverse to plaintiff was...
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Jackson, In re
...Wolff give no indication that in camera review is now required by federal due process. For example, the First Circuit, in McLaughlin v. Hall (1975) 520 F.2d 382, 385 (in an opinion by Chief Judge Coffin, author of Palmigiano, supra, 487 F.2d 1280), held that in light of Wolff it could not b......
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Helms v. Hewitt
...inquiry into the credibility and reliability of an informant. Walker v. Hughes, 558 F.2d 1247, 1259 (6th Cir. 1977); McLaughlin v. Hall, 520 F.2d 382, 384-85 (1st Cir. 1975); Willis v. Ciccone, 506 F.2d 1011, 1018 (8th Cir. 1974). See Meyers & Rabiejk, Burden of Proof and the Standard of Ju......
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Nelson v. Commissioner of Correction
...relied upon by committees making disciplinary decisions." Kyle v. Hanberry, 677 F.2d 1386, 1389 (11th Cir.1982). Cf. McLaughlin v. Hall, 520 F.2d 382, 385 (1st Cir.1975). Wolff indicated that prison administrators should devise regulations to insure that the procedures of a disciplinary boa......
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Moye v. Selsky, 90 Civ. 2503(RJW).
...of an informant." Helms v. Hewitt, 655 F.2d at 501 (citing Walker v. Hughes, 558 F.2d 1247, 1259 (6th Cir.1977); McLaughlin v. Hall, 520 F.2d 382, 384-85 (1st Cir.1975); Willis v. Ciccone, 506 F.2d 1011, 1018 (8th Cir.1974)). Thus, while the Helms court did not adopt the approach establishe......